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Abstract 
This dissertation explores a variety of issues in the microeconomics of 
development, specifically in terms of labor and human development in the Middle East 
and North Africa. The three essays in this dissertation address a diverse array of 
development challenges through microeconomic and microeconometric analysis. The 
first essay investigates the returns to vocational secondary schooling as compared to other 
routes to vocational skills, such as apprenticeships, in Egypt. A longitudinal dataset 
allows for causal inference about returns by comparing siblings. The essay shows that, 
for recent cohorts, the estimated returns to vocational secondary education are the same 
as attaining no formal education, while the returns to skills obtained outside of formal 
education are substantial. The second essay first demonstrates that fertility has recently 
risen in Egypt and then investigates whether declining employment opportunities for 
women, and therefore lower opportunity costs for childrearing, may have contributed to 
the increase in fertility. Discrete-time hazard models are used to estimate the relationship 
between employment and childbearing, variously incorporating instrumental variables 
and fixed effects to address the endogeneity of employment. Results suggest that 
declining public sector employment, which is particularly appealing to women, 
contributed to the rise in fertility. The third essay identifies large socio-economic 
disparities in child health and nutrition in Jordan and investigates the factors contributing 
to inequality in children’s height and weight, including parental health knowledge, food 
quantity and quality, health conditions, the health environment, and prenatal 
development. This essay demonstrates that the health environment and feeding contribute 
to inequality in child health but that these effects mediate only a small part of socio-
economic disparities. Much of the inequality in children’s health is determined 
prenatally, for instance through disparities in fetal growth. Overall, the findings of these 
three essays indicate important directions for future policies and programs to promote 
human and economic development.  
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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction 
The human development that individuals achieve shapes their wellbeing and 
determines the development of their economies (Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, & Miller, 
2004; Sen, 1999; Suri, Boozer, Ranis, & Stewart, 2011). Education, health, fertility, and 
labor market participation are some key dimensions of human development that are 
driven by microeconomic decision making within a context of national policies, 
programs, and institutions. In part because these areas of economics are extremely 
complex, many of the policies and programs supporting development have uncertain 
effectiveness. For instance, developing countries spend hundreds of billions of dollars 
each year on education, but the rigorous evidence base yields little clear guidance on 
allocating school resources. Even intuitive interventions such as reducing class sizes do 
not have strong support (Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, & Ravina, 2013).  
The deficit of evidence on what works to support development is particularly 
acute in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the only region in the world that has 
lower economics research coverage than its income or population would predict (Das, 
Do, Shaines, & Srikant, 2013). This deficit is particularly concerning given the multitude 
of human development challenges in the region; indeed, a number of unique and thorny 
human development challenges need to be addressed (Chaaban, 2009; Salehi-Isfahani, 
2013; United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2009; 
World Bank, 2012). 
One historical factor that has contributed to the lack of microeconomic research 
on the MENA region has been a dearth of microdata with which to answer research 
questions. However, data access has substantially improved over the past few decades as 
has the quality of data available. It is now possible to assess individuals’ economic 
behaviors using individual and household surveys and to investigate a number of 
important economic and human development challenges plaguing MENA. This 
dissertation exploits the increasingly rich landscape of household survey data to 
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investigate several different human development challenges in MENA.  
The three essays that form this dissertation examine human development issues 
through microeconomic and microeconometric analysis. The first essay recognizes that 
individuals and governments face a multitude of options for investing in workers’ human 
capital. Formal, in-school education is the most common choice for increasing human 
capital, but individuals also invest in training programs, apprenticeships, and other routes 
to skills and knowledge outside formal schooling systems. Governments and international 
development initiatives have generally assumed that formal education is a better route to 
human capital than non-formal alternatives. The first essay tests the assumption that 
formal education is the best route to job skills. The returns to formal vocational 
secondary schooling are compared to the returns to acquiring skills outside the education 
system, such as undertaking an apprenticeship, for male wage workers in Egypt. A 
unique longitudinal dataset, with information on schooling and skills, allows for causal 
inference about returns by comparing siblings, even siblings who have left their natal 
household. This essay shows that, for recent cohorts, the estimated returns to formal 
vocational secondary education are the same as attaining no formal education, that is, 
zero. However, the returns to skills obtained outside of formal education are substantial. 
These findings demonstrate that the assumption that formal education is the best 
investment in human capital must be re-examined.  
The second essay investigates whether declining employment opportunities for 
women can reverse the fertility transition. The essay presents new evidence that the 
demographic transition has not just stalled, but in fact reversed in Egypt. After falling for 
decades, fertility rates are increasing. The drivers of rising fertility rates are examined, 
with a particular focus on the role of declining public sector employment opportunities 
for women. By using unique data with detailed fertility and employment histories, the 
effects of public sector employment opportunities on women’s fertility are estimated. 
Estimates are calculated by examining the effect of public sector employment on the 
spacing and occurrence of births using discrete-time hazard models, the results of which 
are then used to simulate total fertility rates. The potential endogeneity of employment is 
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addressed by incorporating woman-specific fixed effects, incorporating local 
employment opportunities rather than women’s own employment, and using local 
employment opportunities as an instrument. Results indicate that the decrease in public 
sector employment, which is particularly appealing to women, has contributed to the rise 
in fertility. 
The third essay is motivated by the fact that the first few years of children’s lives 
provide a crucial window for their human development. Malnutrition, as a form of 
faltering development in the early years of life, has lasting consequences in terms of 
education, labor market, and adult health outcomes. Early childhood is also the period 
when inequality originates and the intergenerational transmission of poverty and 
inequality begins. It is therefore important to identify the causes of poor health in early 
childhood and to understand what drives inequality in early childhood health and 
nutrition in order to provide children with equal chances for healthy growth. In Jordan, 
there are substantial socio-economic disparities in children’s health and nutrition. The 
third essay examines the determinants and mediators of health disparities in children’s 
height and weight in Jordan, focusing on factors that might mediate socio-economic 
disparities, including parental health knowledge, food quantity and quality, health 
conditions, the health environment, and prenatal development. While this essay 
demonstrates that the health environment and food quantity and quality contribute to 
inequality in child health, these effects mediate only a small share of socio-economic 
disparities. A large share of inequality in children’s health is determined prenatally, for 
instance through disparities in fetal growth.  
Although they address disparate topics, one common thread through all three 
essays is that they question commonly held assumptions about human development and 
development policies. In the first essay, the assumption that school is the best route to 
skills is tested. The second essay’s findings contradict the assumption that the 
demographic transition is an irreversible process. The findings of the third essay 
demonstrate that the landscape of policies targeting malnutrition in the first few years 
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after birth is based on faulty assumptions about the determinants of deficits in child 
health. 
The three essays also grapple with a number of inter-related challenges in 
estimating economic relationships using household survey data. A particular concern for 
estimating causal relationships is endogeneity, including issues such as omitted variables 
or simultaneity. The essays apply a variety of econometric approaches to address 
endogeneity. Fixed effects are used for families in the first essay and for individual 
women over multiple births in the second essay. Instrumental variables are used in the 
second essay as an alternative approach to overcoming endogeneity. Another 
econometric difficulty discussed throughout the three essays is the challenge of 
measurement error, which can have a wide variety of effects on estimates depending on 
its severity and nature. 
All of the questions and econometric estimates in this dissertation are grounded in 
economic models but also draw on inter-disciplinary literatures. Alternative routes to 
human capital, such as apprenticeships and training, are added to the returns to schooling 
debate. The demographic phenomenon of fertility is linked to households’ utility 
maximization decisions. Inequality in children’s health is tied to a production function for 
child health. Drawing on other disciplines crucially informs the models and their 
interpretation. For instance, evidence on the role of genetic factors in children’s health 
outcomes, based on the genetics and biology literatures, plays an important role in 
understanding child health inequality.   
Together, the three essays, drawing on microeconomic models, microeconometric 
methods, and inter-disciplinary literatures, make important contributions to our 
understanding of development economics and the human development challenges facing 
the Middle East and North Africa. As well as questioning a number of key assumptions in 
development economics, they contribute important evidence on human development that 
can help guide policy and programs in the region. While the microeconomic decisions 
underlying human development processes are complex, it is crucial to understand them in 
order to promote human and economic development. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Is School the Best Route to Skills? Returns to 
Vocational School and Vocational Skills in Egypt 
2.1 Introduction 
Families, students and workers throughout the world struggle to decide what 
education and training to pursue. Governments also must choose how to invest in the 
education and training of their citizens. Formal, classroom-based education tends to be 
the most common choice and policy for increasing human capital—the skills and 
knowledge that can raise productivity and bring rewards in the labor market. Yet many 
people also engage in approaches other than formal schooling to develop their human 
capital, such as on-the-job-training or apprenticeships. When choosing between formal 
education and alternative routes to human capital, what path should individuals and 
governments pursue? 
Governments have assumed that formal education is the best route to human 
capital and job skills. This assumption is embedded in government budgets and education 
systems, which prioritize formal schooling. Global development initiatives also assume 
that formal education is the best route to skills. For instance, UNESCO’s Education for 
All initiative states that: “Formal secondary schooling is the most effective way to 
develop the skills needed for work and life” (UNESCO, 2012, p. 4). That formal 
secondary schooling is the best route to skills1 is a frequently assumed but as yet 
unproven hypothesis. This essay tests this assumption by comparing the returns to formal 
education and alternative routes to skill acquisition for the case of Egypt. Specifically, 
this essay compares the returns to vocational secondary schooling—a common approach 
                                                
1 The term “skills” is not well-defined in the literature and can be used with a variety of different meanings, 
including as a synonym for education or a particular level of education (i.e. college (Acemoglu & Autor, 
2011)), for certain types of knowledge and abilities (i.e. cognitive skills (Hanushek & Wößmann, 2008)) or 
in terms of specialized occupational knowledge (i.e. carpentry skills (Blattman, Fiala, & Martinez, 2014). 
This essay generally uses skills as synonymous with human capital unless otherwise specified.  
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to providing job skills in the formal education system—to the returns to acquiring skills 
outside the education system, namely undertaking training or an apprenticeship, for male 
wage workers in Egypt. 
What is known about the returns to different types of human capital? There is a 
substantial body of literature on the returns to education from both developed and 
developing countries which indicates that formal education is, in general, a worthwhile 
investment, with positive returns (Card, 1999; Duflo, 2000; Montenegro & Patrinos, 
2012; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004).2 The methodological and empirical issues in 
accurately estimating the returns to education are well documented (Card, 1999, 2001; 
Glewwe, 1996), and there are sufficient studies to have generated some consistency and 
consensus across studies and methods (Card, 1999; Montenegro & Patrinos, 2012).  
Other routes to human capital, outside the formal education system, such as work 
experience, training, and apprenticeships, have received far less methodological or 
empirical attention. There are an insufficient number of rigorous studies to assess the 
value of apprenticeships, even in developed countries, due in part to a shortage of data on 
the benefits and costs of apprenticeships (Riphahn & Zibrowius, 2015; Wolter & Ryan, 
2011). There are a few studies examining the rates of return to training, and these are 
primarily in developed countries.3 In contrast to studies on formal education, there is no 
established functional form that allows for comparison of estimates of returns to training 
across studies (Frazis & Loewenstein, 2005). Not only is the literature on the returns to 
human capital acquired outside formal education extremely limited, it also lacks a 
comparative element—when choosing between formal education or other routes to skill 
                                                
2 Studies of the returns to education are extremely numerous and cover most of the countries of the world. 
For instance Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) undertake a meta-analysis of the returns to education 
using studies covering 98 countries. Montenegro and Patrinos (2012) synthesize 545 surveys from 131 
different countries.  
3 There is also a large literature on active labor market policies (Card, Kluve, & Weber, 2010; Crepon, 
Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, & Zamora, 2013; Heckman, Lalonde, & Smith, 1999), particularly as welfare 
policies for the unemployed. This literature has potential implications for the returns to various skills and 
training for the unemployed, but it is not clear to what extent the findings can inform the returns to different 
types of human capital for the general population.  
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acquisition, which is a better investment? It is this vital question that this essay 
investigates, using the case of Egypt.  
A unique dataset, the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, allows for estimates of 
the returns to schooling and skills. In addition to its information on skills and how those 
skills were acquired, the data set includes actual years of work experience, which is 
usually not directly measured in surveys. Another key feature of these data is that they 
follow a panel of households over time, including individuals who split from their 
households of origin. This allows for inference about the returns to schooling and skills 
by applying family fixed effects (comparing siblings), an effective method for causal 
identification of the impact of human capital on earnings (Card, 1999).  
This essay shows that among male wage workers in Egypt, especially for recent 
cohorts, the estimated returns to formal vocational secondary education are essentially 
zero. Young Egyptians earn as much with a vocational degree as with no formal 
education. However, the returns to skills, specifically craft skills, are substantial. These 
differences in returns have important implications for Egyptian families and 
policymakers. Either drastic reforms will be needed to improve the quality and relevance 
of formal vocational schooling, or alternative routes to job skills—such as 
apprenticeships and on-the-job training—need to be expanded and encouraged. Globally, 
the assumption that formal education is the best investment in human capital must be re-
examined. 
The remainder of the essay proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the essay’s 
basic theoretical model: the human capital framework. Section 3 provides background on 
the education system, alternatives to human capital outside the education system, and 
returns to schooling and skills. The data are described in Section 4, and the methods for 
estimating returns in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results on the returns to formal 
education and to skills acquired elsewhere. Section 7 discusses the implications of the 
findings and concludes. 
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2.2 The Human Capital Framework 
In order to understand how both schooling and other routes to skills can affect 
earnings, this essay draws on the human capital framework. In this framework, 
individuals’ skills and knowledge are considered a form of capital, “human” capital, in 
which individuals can deliberately invest and from which individuals receive returns 
(Schultz, 1961). Investing in schooling, on-the-job training, health maintenance, and 
information acquisition are all different ways to invest in human capital, albeit routes 
with different returns (Becker, 1962). Although the broader nature of human capital has 
long been recognized, in most economic research human capital is measured as years of 
formal education. Education increases productivity and yields returns, in the form of 
higher wages (Mincer, 1974; Rosenzweig, 1995). In contrast, signaling, sorting, and 
screening models allow education to be correlated with differences among workers that 
predate their participation in the education system, such as ability (Weiss, 1995). Returns 
to schooling may therefore not just be due to productivity that was acquired by years 
spent in school. Education could also serve as an effective signal of innate productivity. 
There is growing recognition that years of schooling are an incomplete measure or 
mis-specification of human capital (Glewwe, 1996; Hanushek & Wößmann, 2008; 
Pritchett, 2001; Wößmann, 2003). Even those authors who recognize the inadequacy of 
years of schooling as a measure of human capital nonetheless continue to rely on test 
scores (in school), school quality, or other formal education-related measures of human 
capital, neglecting the formation of human capital outside the formal education system.  
The assumption that returns to formal schooling are greater than the returns from 
alternative routes to skill acquisition is embedded in the ongoing focus on formal 
education as a cornerstone of development. The United Nation’s Millennium 
Development Goals include achieving universal primary education, not achieving 
universal basic skills (World Bank, 2011). UNESCO’s global Education for All Initiative 
includes a goal of promoting learning and life skills for young people and adults, but 
assumes that formal secondary schooling is the surest route to skills (UNESCO, 2012). 
This is a frequently assumed, but untested, hypothesis. This belief is also embedded in 
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government budgets, which allocate large shares of public spending to formal education. 
For example, in Egypt the education system received 11.7% of 2010/2011 public 
spending (El-Baradei, 2013). Egypt’s new constitution mandates additional investments 
in education and will make secondary schooling compulsory starting in the 2016/2017 
school year (Egypt State Information Service, 2014). This essay tests whether it is in fact 
true that returns to formal vocational schooling are higher than returns to other routes to 
skills acquisition—such as on-the-job training and apprenticeships—in the case of Egypt.  
2.3 Background 
2.3.1 Education in Egypt 
Although pre-primary enrollments are rising, most young people enter the 
Egyptian school system at the primary stage. Figure 2.1 displays the structure of the 
education system in Egypt. After six years of primary school, young people attend 
preparatory (lower secondary) school for three years. After preparatory school students 
are tracked into either vocational or general (upper) secondary school, both usually for 
three years, based on their test scores. General secondary, which requires higher test 
scores, is the “academic” track, and almost all general secondary students go on to higher 
education. Vocational secondary is almost always terminal, with around 9% of students 
going on to higher education, primarily in two-year programs at post-secondary institutes 
(Assaad, 2013; Krafft, Elbadawy, & Assaad, 2013). Most vocational secondary students 
receive a certificate in either commercial or industrial vocational secondary, with a 
number of students in the agricultural track as well. Vocational secondary schools are 
almost exclusively public (99%) (Population Council, 2011).  
Egypt has steadily expanded its education system over the past several decades. 
Figure 2.2 displays educational attainment trends by age for males aged 25-64 (of an age 
to have reached their final educational attainment). The proportion with no formal 
educational certificate has fallen substantially over time. The share of males who attained 
only a primary or preparatory education has remained small and relatively flat, as has the 
share attaining general secondary (which is rarely terminal). The proportion of males 
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attaining a vocational secondary degree has risen steadily, from around 10% of those in 
their 60s in 2012 to more than 30% of those aged 25 to 40, with nearly 40% of the 
youngest cohorts attaining vocational secondary. Higher education4 has also expanded, 
but more slowly than vocational secondary. Overall, there has been a substantial 
expansion in education, and this large increase in the supply of educated workers will 
affect their wages. Additionally, since nearly 40% of recent graduates have a vocational 
secondary education, the returns to vocational secondary education are of substantial 
economic importance. 
2.3.2 Challenges in the Education System Generally and Vocational Secondary in 
Particular 
Egypt struggles with issues of education quality. Repetition, dropout, and 
absenteeism are all substantial problems (Elbadawy, 2015; Krafft, 2012). The education 
system is focused on generating credentials rather than increasing productivity (Assaad & 
Barsoum, 2009; Salehi-Isfahani, 2012; Wahba, 2001). That Egyptian students are 
experiencing a low quality of education and limited human capital accumulation is 
evidenced by students’ performance on international tests. Egypt is well below the 
international average for the TIMSS mathematics and science tests (given to students in 
the 8th grade), and compared to other countries in the region, Egypt has scores below the 
level its GDP predicts (World Bank, 2008).  
Within the Egyptian education system, the quality of vocational secondary is 
particularly low, with weak curriculum and materials, poorly trained instructors, and 
limited connections to the private sector. A recent review of Egypt’s national policies for 
education effectively summarized the state of vocational secondary education: “The 
technical and vocational education and training (TVET) system is very weak and poorly 
regarded by Egyptian society, and is an unattractive alternative in its present form” 
(OECD/World Bank 2010, p. 16). Youth are trained on equipment and skills that are 
outdated, and the number of vocational secondary students is driven by the supply of 
                                                
4 Higher education includes two-year post-secondary education. 
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young people rather than labor market demand for particular skills (UNDP & Institute of 
National Planning, 2010; World Bank, 2007). Although the deficiencies in vocational 
secondary are widely recognized, and numerous reform projects have been implemented, 
they have not substantially improved vocational secondary education (UNDP & Institute 
of National Planning, 2010).  
The expansion of vocational secondary in Egypt was in part a consequence of 
public policies that made government employment desirable and educational credentials a 
pre-requisite for government employment (Antoninis, 2001). Starting in the 1960s, the 
government guaranteed public sector jobs to all secondary and higher education 
graduates (Assaad, 1997a). Public sector jobs are particularly appealing to vocational 
secondary graduates, who obtained a substantial wage premium in the public sector 
compared to the private sector (Assaad, 1997a; Salehi-Isfahani, Tunali, & Assaad, 2009). 
The job guarantee is no longer in effect as of the 1990s, and public sector hiring has 
declined (Amer, 2009; Assaad, 2009). The decreased opportunities for vocational 
secondary graduates to work in the public sector—and therefore to earn a substantial 
wage premium—will affect the returns to vocational secondary.  
In part due to the problems in the Egyptian education system, especially in 
vocational secondary, education and labor market mismatch is a serious problem in Egypt 
(UNDP & Institute of National Planning, 2010). For instance, data from 2009 show that 
less than half of vocational secondary students who received hands-on training in school 
and had obtained employment reported that their training reflected the needs of the labor 
market (Krafft, 2012).5 Because of the low quality of vocational secondary education, 
employers sometimes express preference for hiring young people who have not attended 
formal vocational secondary (World Bank, 2013a).  
                                                
5 Vocational secondary graduates were asked, “Did you receive any hands-on experience in the school?” 
Those who reported that they did receive hands-on experience were then asked, “Do you believe that the 
training you received reflects the needs of the labor market?” These questions were asked only of students 
in the industrial track (Population Council, 2011). 
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2.3.3 Alternatives to Formal Education: Apprenticeships and On-the-Job Training 
Given the poor quality of the formal schooling system, apprenticeships and other 
forms of on-the-job training are the primary route to job skills for young people in Egypt. 
Traditional apprenticeships consist of a (male) youth assisting and being trained by a 
craftsman. Families often have to pay the craftsman for that training (UNDP & Institute 
of National Planning, 2010). Apprentices typically do not live with craftsmen but remain 
with their families during training. It is usually a family’s social networks and the 
concentration of craft trades in a community that provide a youth with apprenticeship 
opportunities (Assaad, 1997b). Craftsmen prefer apprentices under age 18, due to a 
perception that only young people are able to learn new skills and tolerate the harsh 
discipline of training (Assaad, 1993). Thus, young people undertake apprenticeships at an 
age that limits pursuing formal secondary education (Tunali & Assaad, 1992).  
After a period of training and very low wages, apprentices can expect to 
eventually “graduate” to being assistants and ultimately craftsmen themselves.6 
Familiarity and experience with tools and techniques, rather than formal learning, is what 
matters in the context of apprenticeships (UNDP & Institute of National Planning, 2010). 
Young people who pursue manual occupations but do not undertake an apprenticeship 
generally become common laborers, and remain so throughout their careers (Assaad, 
1997b; Tunali & Assaad, 1992). The distinction between skilled and unskilled 
occupations in Egypt is well-defined, and a worker’s path is essentially set at first entry 
into the labor market. For instance, in the construction sector, there is almost no mobility 
between craft (skilled) and unskilled occupations (Assaad, 1997b). 
2.3.4 Schooling and Work Decisions 
With the choice between formal education and alternative routes to skills, such as 
apprenticeships and on-the-job training, how do families make school and work 
decisions? Theoretically, young people no longer attend school when the marginal utility 
                                                
6 For instance, in the construction sector it takes two to three years for an apprentice to become an assistant 
and an additional three to four years for an assistant to then become a craftsman who can work 
independently (Assaad, 1997b). 
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of future returns to education is less than the utility lost to schooling costs and the value 
of their (potentially employable) time (Bacolod & Ranjan, 2008; Becker, 1993; Edmonds, 
2008). That a child receives a particular level of formal education is not necessarily the 
efficient outcome, but only one potential result depending on the returns to different 
alternatives, such as apprenticeships. Additionally, young people and families faced with 
school and work decisions do not necessarily subscribe to the same perspective as 
academics. Schooling decisions are based on a mix of youth and parental preferences 
over different educational and work options. Information on the returns to education 
plays a key role in the decision, and while perceived returns to education drive 
educational decisions, these perceptions may not be accurate, especially in developing 
countries (Jensen, 2010). In the case of Egypt, future returns may have substantial non-
wage components, for instance the prestige of a job (especially the higher prestige of a 
public sector job), the security of employment, or returns in the marriage market (Assaad, 
1999; Barsoum, 2015; Elbadawy, 2009). 
There are conflicting perspectives on the impact of early work on human capital 
accumulation. Early work may compete with human capital accumulation by limiting 
education (Baland & Robinson, 2000). Alternatively, children engaged in work may 
acquire skills that increase their human capital (Bourdillon, Levison, Myers, & White, 
2010). Families in Egypt often consider children’s work to be an opportunity for skill 
development, with young people who receive on-the-job training perceived as having 
better prospects for employment. Anecdotally, some youth express a preference for 
combining school and work, and if this is not possible, they view early work as more 
important than formal vocational education (Carothers, Breslin, Denomy, & Foad, 2009). 
This suggests that early work may in fact be more important to human capital 
accumulation than formal education.  
The potential complementarity between schooling and work can also be seen in 
programs for older children and adults. Apprenticeships and internships can link school 
with work, helping young people accumulate skills and work experience. The German 
model of training with a company combined with part-time classroom learning is a prime 
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example. Apprenticeships are also particularly important for the acquisition of job skills 
that match the needs of the labor market (UNESCO, 2012). Informal combinations of 
school and work are very common in the developing world but typically are not 
coordinated to link school and work. Formal, coordinated school/work combinations are 
much rarer than informal combinations in the developing world, but they do exist. One 
example is the Mubarak-Kohl Initiative in Egypt. Designed as an alternative to standard 
vocational secondary schooling, this program consisted of two days in school and four 
days in a workplace per week, for three years (Adams, 2010). 
2.3.5 Returns to Education 
The international evidence suggests that Egyptians could expect substantial 
returns to increases in education. A 2004 review of the returns to education identifies the 
overall average private return to a year of schooling as around 10% (Psacharopoulos & 
Patrinos, 2004). This is averaging across all years and types of education for 98 countries. 
While there is some consensus about individual, micro-economic estimates of returns to 
education, the macro-economic role of education is less clear. Results from the literature 
include effectively zero macro-economic returns (Pritchett, 2001), and some micro-
economic evidence also supports the lack of returns to education (Glewwe, 1996). 
However, the macro-economic literature also finds returns that are in fact greater than the 
micro-economic literature suggests (Krueger & Lindahl, 2001). 
Egypt has low private returns to schooling, about half the world average. An 
estimate based on 2006 data found average returns of 5.4% per year in Egypt (Salehi-
Isfahani, Tunali, & Assaad, 2009). The rapid expansion of formal education, as well as 
the low quality of education and the labor market-education mismatch have all been 
identified as problems driving low returns in the region (Assaad & Barsoum, 2009; 
World Bank, 2008). In Egypt, private returns tend to be lower at lower levels of 
schooling, and highest at the tertiary level (Said, 2015; Salehi-Isfahani, Tunali, & Assaad, 
2009), the opposite of the pattern observed globally (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004).  
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Globally, there has long been an ongoing debate on the issue of investing in 
general versus vocational education, with periods of both favoring and disfavoring 
vocational education (Bennell & Segerstrom, 1998; Bennell, 1996; Oketch, 2014). In 
individual studies, vocational secondary graduates have been shown to earn higher 
(Moenjak and Worswick (2003) in Thailand), equal (Pugatch (2014) in South Africa), or 
lower wages (Newhouse and Suryadarma (2011) in Indonesia) than their general 
secondary peers. The synthesis of this literature has been inconclusive (Bennell, 1996; 
Kahyarara & Teal, 2008), and has rarely taken into account alternative routes to human 
capital accumulation outside the schooling system.  
In Egypt, attending general secondary and then higher education definitely 
generates much greater returns than does a vocational secondary education. Focusing on 
urban men ages 20-54 in Egypt, Salehi-Isfahani, Tunali, and Assaad (2009) found that, in 
2006, the cumulative returns to completing vocational secondary (twelve years of 
school), as compared to not completing any level of education, were just 30%. Returns to 
vocational secondary had declined substantially from 1988 to 2006 and were lower in 
Egypt than Iran or Turkey. The study also found non-linearities in the returns to 
education, indicating that the standard (linear) Mincer model is not appropriate for Egypt.  
Returns to vocational secondary education may in fact have decreased to zero. 
One of the most recent studies of returns to education in Egypt, using a 2009 survey and 
focusing on 15-29 year olds, found that the marginal return to secondary education7 was 
negative 3% (El-Araby, 2013). This means that continuing from preparatory into 
secondary yields negative returns. However, this study has several econometric 
weaknesses.8 The question also remains as to whether the apparent low returns to 
vocational education are due to low and diminishing returns to vocational skills, or little 
                                                
7 The marginal return is relative to preparatory education. Vocational and general secondary education were 
not distinguished in this study. However, since general secondary education is rarely terminal, the vast 
majority of individuals attaining only a secondary education are vocational secondary graduates.  
8 For instance, although the regression included a control for gender, estimates were not done for men and 
women separately. Controls were included for job type, which may itself be influenced by the level and 
type of education, i.e. secondary certificate holders may be more able to obtain permanent or public sector 
jobs. Another potential problem is that no effort was made to address selection into different types of 
education. 
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or no skills being conferred by vocational education. In contrast, this essay sheds light on 
this important question by comparing the returns to vocational education with the returns 
to vocational skills acquired elsewhere. 
2.3.6 Returns to Skills  
While there are numerous studies on returns to formal education, both globally 
and in Egypt, there is a very limited body of evidence on the returns to other measures of 
skills. Some research exists on the returns to cognitive skills (Hanushek, Schwerdt, 
Wiederhold, & Wößmann, 2013; Hanushek & Wößmann, 2008) and there is some 
evidence on the returns to training, primarily in developed countries. Almeida and Faria 
(2014), studying on-the-job training, find returns of 7.7% in Malaysia and 4.5% in 
Thailand. Almeida and Carneiro (2009), studying firms providing formal job training in 
Portugal, estimate an internal rate of return to training of 8.6% for the firms that offer 
training but an average (marginal) internal rate of return of -0.3% for all firms. Frazis and 
Loewenstein (2007), using U.S. data, find annualized returns of around 40-50% for 60 
hours of formal training (training programs or on-the-job training), but also strong 
evidence of heterogeneity in returns, such that their findings cannot be extrapolated onto 
the untrained. Frazis and Loewenstein also point out that estimates of returns to training 
lack a standardized functional form analogous to the Mincer equation for returns to 
education.  
Even in the developed world, there is little evidence on the returns to other key 
routes to skill acquisition, such as apprenticeships (Wolter & Ryan, 2011). The evidence 
on the firm side is that investing in apprenticeships can be worthwhile, but this effect is 
contingent on education and labor market policies (Muehlemann & Wolter, 2014). 
Although not focused on causal identification, the work of Riphahn and Zibrowius (2015) 
on Germany’s apprenticeship and vocational training system finds positive returns in the 
labor market that are similar across different types of training. 
One of the challenges in evaluating the returns to human capital formed outside 
the education system, particularly in developing countries, is that programs are 
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heterogeneous, targeting businesses or individuals, providing training on or off the job, 
and providing very different types of training. McKenzie and Woodruff (2014) review 
what is known about programs targeting entrepreneurs in micro and small enterprises to 
provide management and business skills in the developing world and find little evidence, 
primarily due to a shortage of high-quality studies. Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez's (2014) 
evaluation of a cash transfer program in Uganda, which provided youth with transfers to 
pay for vocational training, tools, and start-up costs, found that monthly earnings 
increased by 38% after four years as a result of the program. Although the authors 
interpret the effect of the program as alleviating a credit constraint, it also suggests there 
are substantial returns to skills. Those who received the cash transfer invested in skills 
training as well as tools and materials and were twice as likely to work in a skilled trade. 
The resulting increase in earnings, if a result of vocational training, suggests that returns 
to skills can be quite high.  
One of the few pieces of evidence specifically on apprenticeships is a study from 
Ghana (Monk, Sandefur, & Teal, 2008). For those without education, apprenticeships 
have a return similar to that for primary education, more than a doubling of income. 
Evidence on the returns to skills from other contexts is less promising. A randomized 
experiment evaluating Turkey’s vocational training programs for the unemployed found 
no long run impacts (Hirshleifer, McKenzie, Almeida, & Ridao-Cano, 2014). An 
evaluation of South Africa’s combined classroom learning and on-the-job training 
program found little impact on employment outcomes (Rankin, Roberts, & Schöer, 
2014).  
Skills can be task-specific, and there is evidence that task-specific human capital 
plays an important role in individual wages (Gathmann & Schönberg, 2007), suggesting 
that there are returns related to both skills and skill/job matches. Mismatches between 
education and the educational requirements of jobs also can affect returns. There is a 
lower return to education that is greater than the education required for a job (over-
education), as well as a penalty if education is below the education required for a job 
(under-education) (Dolton & Silles, 2008; Groot & van den Brink, 2000; Hartog, 2000; 
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Rubb, 2003). The evidence in Egypt suggests that job-specific skills, rather than formal 
education, are the most important pre-requisite for vocational employment; employability 
is based on workshop experience (Antoninis, 2001). Overall, while a few studies provide 
some tentative evidence on returns to skills, this essay addresses a clear need for 
additional research on skills.  
2.4 Data 
This essay uses the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS), a rich panel data 
set that includes detailed data on individuals’ labor market characteristics and histories. 
The ELMPS was fielded in 1998, 2006, and 2012.9 It is a household survey, with each 
round nationally representative at the time of fielding, and with weights that account for 
attrition processes.10 The 2012 sample followed previous round households and split 
households, as well as adding a refresher sample, for a total sample of 12,060 households 
and 49,186 individuals.11 Throughout the essay, the panel data are used only for the 
identification of siblings.12 Estimates of returns are based only on the 2012 round of the 
survey.  
Using the ELMPS, the essay focuses on wage-earning males aged 15-64 in 2012, 
who are referred to as the “OLS sample” and described in Table 2.1. This age group is 
considered the working-age population in the context of Egypt (Assaad, 2009). Ideally, 
one would examine the returns to education regardless of whether an individual is a 
                                                
9 The surveys were conducted by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) and the Egyptian Central Agency 
for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). See Assaad and Krafft (2013) for additional details on 
the ELMPS 2012.  
10 Attrition was due to a variety of reasons, including death, migration, and the inability to relocate an 
individual or household. In 2012, most of the significant predictors of attrition were geographic and 
demographic characteristics; there were only a few small differences by education or labor market status 
(Assaad & Krafft, 2013).  
11 Descriptive statistics in this essay use sampling weights. Regressions do not use sampling weights, as 
unweighted OLS is the preferred approach when the sampling scheme is not based on the dependent 
variable (Winship & Radbill, 1994). This is the case with the ELMPS, which sampled geographically. In 
general, if results are homogenous across sub-samples, then unweighted results are more efficient, and if 
there is heterogeneity, both weighted and unweighted results will be inconsistent, so unweighted methods 
are preferred (Deaton, 1997). 
12 Since education is fixed once individuals have graduated from school, panel data methods such as fixed 
effects cannot be used on an individual level.  
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wage-earner or works in non-wage employment. However, realistically it is not possible 
to estimate the return to labor, much less human capital, of individuals whose income is 
from self-employment, including farming. This essay therefore focuses solely on wage 
earners, who are almost three-fourths of males aged 15-64. In Egypt, effectively all males 
participate in the labor market, so selection into the labor market is not an issue for this 
sample. However, female labor force participation is low and there is selection into the 
labor market for females. Since women have both different labor market behaviors 
(Assaad & Krafft, 2015a) and different wages, which vary by their labor market 
characteristics (Said, 2015), this essay examines the returns to education only for males.  
An important set of estimates in this analysis are those that compare siblings by 
using family fixed effects, which exploits the fact that the ELMPS tracks many siblings 
of working age. The panel nature of the ELMPS allows one to identify siblings even after 
they have left their natal household, which is particularly important for estimating 
returns, since income will affect individuals’ ability to form new households. The “family 
fixed effects sample” restricts the sample of wage-earning males 15-64 (the OLS sample) 
to those who were observed in at least one round (1998, 2006, or 2012) living in their 
birth household (which makes it possible to identify siblings), with their parent(s) as 
heads of household. This subset is further restricted to those who, when they were living 
in their birth household, had a male sibling who is also a wage earner as of 2012. These 
male siblings are not necessarily living in the same household in 2012. The family fixed 
effects sample is a 2,300 individual subset of the 8,372 individual OLS sample.  
2.4.1 Key Outcome and Explanatory Variables 
The key question this essay examines is whether individuals earn higher wages 
from formal vocational secondary education or from vocational skills acquired through 
other means. The dependent variable, wages, is the natural log of hourly wages in 2012 
Egyptian Pounds (LE).13 Years of school is measured as the number of years completed. 
                                                
13 This measure is the hourly average for all wage compensation, including overtime, bonuses, incentives, 
profit sharing and any other types of wages. Hourly wages are based on workers’ reports of the net amount 
received in each of these categories, the frequency of receipt, and their hours of work.  
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The level of education is the highest level an individual completed within the schooling 
system. The self-reported educational requirements of a job are also controlled for, to 
distinguish between the returns to different educational requirements and formal 
education attained, as returns may vary depending on whether education matches job 
requirements (Dolton & Silles, 2008; Groot & van den Brink, 2000; Hartog, 2000; Rubb, 
2003).  
The regressions control for actual years of work experience,14 rather than the 
more common “potential” work experience (usually age minus years of schooling and 
school entry age). The regressions also control for the year an individual worked for the 
first time with dummy variables for different five-year cohorts of labor market entrants. 
Given the changing economic conditions and policies in Egypt, the timing of labor 
market entry may affect wages. It is also important to account for regional differences in 
wages, so controls for the six different regions of Egypt are included.  
In terms of skills, individuals were asked, “Does your job require any skill?”15 
and a dummy variable was used to indicate “yes” responses. The coefficient on this 
variable will indicate the combined returns to having both a skill and a job requiring that 
skill. Individuals in craft occupations were asked their skill level, specifically whether 
they were an apprentice, an assistant, or a craftsman.16 Dummy variables were created for 
these skill levels, since different skill levels will have different returns.17 
2.4.2 Descriptives for OLS and Family Fixed Effects Samples 
As well as applying ordinary least squares (OLS), this essay estimates family 
fixed effects models. There are therefore two different samples used in estimation. Table 
2.1 describes the characteristics of the samples. The first is the sample of all male wage 
earners, ages 15-64 (“OLS sample”). This sample has 8,372 observations. These 
individuals have an average of 9.9 years of school, with 20% not having a completed any 
                                                
14 Calculated based on spans of work, in years, from the survey’s life events calendar.  
15 Questions were asked in Arabic, with the exact word for skill being literally translated as “technical 
skill.” 
16 The majority of skilled wage workers (54.4%) work in craft occupations.  
17 The reference category is therefore non-skilled or non-craft occupations.  
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education certificate, 12% having completed primary education, 7% preparatory 
education, 35% vocational secondary education, 3% general secondary education, and 
24% higher education. About 2% of this sample of wage earners is currently in school. 
More than half (56%) are working in jobs that have no formal educational requirements, 
while a fifth (19%) are working in jobs that require a secondary education. Two-fifths 
(41%) are working in jobs that they report require some sort of skill. Looking specifically 
at the skill level in craft occupations, 1% of the sample is skilled apprentices in craft 
occupations, 6% are assistants, and 15% are skilled craftsmen in craft occupations, while 
78% of the sample is either unskilled or not in a craft occupation. The average wage 
earned in this sample is 6.4 Egyptian Pounds (LE) per hour.18  
The second sample is the family fixed effects (male sibling) sample. This sample 
consists of 2,300 observations from 955 (birth) households, and is denoted “Family FE 
Sample” in Table 2.1.19 The most substantial differences between the OLS and family FE 
samples are in terms of age; the family FE individuals have an average age of 29.5 
compared to 35.5 for the OLS sample. This younger sample is due to limiting the analysis 
to siblings observed together in their natal household in 1998, 2006, or 2012. The family 
FE sample has years of schooling and levels of schooling similar to the OLS sample. 
Individuals in this sample are slightly less likely to work in a job that requires formal 
education: 63% work in a job that requires no formal education, compared to 56% in the 
OLS sample. However, a similar share work in a job that requires skill, and a similar 
percentage are at the different levels of craft occupations. The average wage of this 
                                                
18 As of 2012, the exchange rate was approximately 6.1 LE to one U.S. Dollar (World Bank, 2013b). 
19 The decrease in sample size from the OLS sample to the family fixed effects sample is due to a number 
of factors. One is the failure to track split individuals; 30% of the males who would otherwise meet the 
criteria for inclusion did not have their siblings observed in 2012, the same rate as loss of split individuals 
in the sample as a whole (Assaad & Krafft, 2013). The greatest loss is due to the fact that of the 8,380 male 
wage workers ages 15-64, only 4,040 were observed in their natal household in some round. This means 
the sample is primarily at a certain point in their life course, but this is otherwise unlikely to bias results. 
The sample is further reduced from 4,040 to 2,534 due to a substantial number of males who did not have a 
male sibling observed who was working in 2012. Since these males are excluded due to the relatively 
random patterns of birth order and sibling gender, this is unlikely to cause substantial bias. The final sample 
reduction from 2,534 to 2,300 is due to the additional limitation that working male siblings must be 
engaged in wage work. Since relatively little of the sample is lost due to this limitation, it is not likely to 
engender substantial bias.   
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sample is 5.8 LE. There are small geographic differences between the two samples. 
Overall, the family FE sample is quite similar to the sample of all male wage-earners 15-
64, bolstering the generalizability of results based on this sample.20  
2.5 Methods for Estimating Returns to Education and Skills 
The traditional method to estimate private returns to education uses the standard 
Mincer equation, which regresses the log of wages on years of schooling, work 
experience, and work experience squared (Mincer, 1974): ln!! = !! + !!!! + !!!! + !!!!! + !! (2.1) 
where i denotes an individual, W the hourly wage, S the years of schooling, and E years 
of work experience. Throughout, the error term, !!, necessarily includes any omitted 
variables. The coefficient on years of schooling, !!, is interpreted as the return to an 
additional year of schooling (in percentage terms). 
While the traditional Mincerian approach is very popular, it is not without 
problems. The empirical evidence suggests that the impact of years of schooling on (log) 
wages is not linear, but may vary across different levels of education (Psacharopoulos & 
Patrinos, 2004; Salehi-Isfahani, Tunali, & Assaad, 2009). The Mincer equation can be 
modified to estimate separate returns for each level of education as follows:  
ln!! = !! + !!!!"! + !!!! + !!!!! + !! (2.2) 
where !!" is a series of dummy variables for j different levels of education. Returns are 
then estimated for attaining a certain level of education, rather than per year. 21 Non-
                                                
20 To further test the comparability and generalizability of the family fixed effects sample, a probit was run 
for the probability of a male wage worker being included in the family fixed effects sample, using the same 
covariates that are used in the models for returns. Those educated at the preparatory level or higher were 
significantly less likely to be included than those who had completed no formal education. Those with jobs 
requiring higher education were also significantly less likely to be included. There were no significant 
differences in terms of skills. Unsurprisingly, given the need to have been observed in one’s natal 
household, there were significant cohort and work experience differences, with more recent cohorts more 
likely to be included. In terms of region, compared to Greater Cairo, only urban Upper Egypt was 
significantly different (more likely to be included). All of the categorical variables, aside from the cohorts, 
had marginal effects that were less than 10 percentage points. This finding further bolsters the 
generalizability of the family fixed effects sample.  
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linearities can be due to credentialism or a “sheepskin effect” (Card, 1999), or they may 
be due to screening or signaling (Spence, 1973; Weiss, 1995). Screening or signaling 
theories usually interpret non-linearities as the result of using credentials as signals of 
human capital or productivity in the face of imperfect information. However, non-
linearities may actually occur because credentialed workers have more human capital, the 
amount of human capital that allows one to successfully complete a level (Strauss & 
Thomas, 1995). 
The Mincerian approach is unlikely to yield causal estimates of the impact of 
schooling on wages, because differences in ability, school quality and family background 
can substantially bias estimated returns (Card, 1999; Glewwe, 1996; Wößmann, 2003). A 
variety of approaches have been used to overcome this problem. The first is to claim that 
this is not, in fact, a problem, since the standard Mincer estimates have been consistent 
with higher quality studies that successfully identify causal effects (Card, 1999; Duflo, 
2000). Instrumental variables approaches are also common but are not without 
limitations. First, they require a high-quality instrument to identify schooling decisions. 
Second, even valid instruments can generate biased estimates in the presence of 
heterogeneous individuals (Card, 1999). Third, common instruments, such as changes in 
the structure of the education system and policy, tend to generate local treatment effects 
that are not necessarily generalizable (Card, 2001).22 Given that a good instrument is not 
available in the ELMPS, IV methods are not used in this essay.  
Another approach that allows for causal estimates of returns to education is to 
apply family fixed effects. This process compares the education and wages for siblings, 
                                                                                                                                            
21 The interpretation of a coefficient in these semi-logarithmic equations as a percentage change is an 
approximation that holds most closely for small changes in continuous variables. For dummy variables, 
although an interpretation in percentage terms is a close approximation for small coefficients, the 
coefficient and percentage change diverge as the coefficient increases in magnitude (Halvorsen & 
Palmquist, 1980). The approximate nature of the percentage change interpretation must be kept in mind 
throughout. 
22 Card (2001) provides this helpful example as an illustration: assume that the presence of a nearby college 
is uncorrelated with ability after controlling for observables. College proximity is therefore a potential IV 
for schooling. However, the correlation between education and ability can be different for those near a 
college than those far, as is demonstrated empirically. This violates key assumptions for conventional IV 
estimators, and provides only the local average treatment effect (LATE).   
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twins, father/son, or mother/daughter pairs. The idea behind this approach is that 
estimating returns within families substantially reduces the unobservables that bias 
normal cross-sectional comparisons (Card, 1999). Unobserved differences in ability 
among siblings can still be an issue with this method. However, Card (1999) shows that 
ability bias is lower in fixed effects comparisons of twins or siblings than in OLS or IV 
estimates.  
The fixed effects approach is particularly effective at diminishing bias in 
countries where family characteristics play a large role in educational outcomes, as is the 
case in Egypt (Assaad, 2013; Krafft, Elbadawy, & Assaad, 2013).23 Family 
characteristics also play a large role in selection into different occupations and skills. For 
instance, an individual with family working in craft trades in the construction sector is 
significantly more likely to enter craft work himself (Assaad, 1997b).24 Family 
characteristics can also have direct impacts in the labor market even after accounting for 
human capital (Assaad, Krafft, & Salehi-Isfahani, 2014).  
Measurement error in schooling or skills can also affect estimates, usually biasing 
them downward (Card, 1999; Glewwe, 1996). One drawback to within-family estimates 
is that measurement error creates larger downward biases than for other methods (Angrist 
& Krueger, 1999; Card, 1999). However, measurement error will affect reports of both 
education and skills,25 so the relative returns of schools and skills may be less distorted.  
                                                
23 For instance, a disadvantaged male from rural Upper Egypt (the country’s poorest region) with illiterate 
parents and from the bottom wealth quintile can be compared with an advantaged male who lives in the 
urban governorates, has parents with university education, and who is from the top wealth quintile. While 
the disadvantaged male has a 44% chance of a less than secondary education, the chance for the advantaged 
male is essentially zero. The disadvantaged male has a 47% chance of a secondary degree and the 
privileged male a 3% chance. The disadvantaged male has a 9% chance of a university education, while the 
advantaged male has a 97% chance (Assaad, 2013). 
24 There is a strong pattern of intergenerational occupational transmission in Egypt, particularly in craft 
trades. For instance, while just 12.5% of all males 15-64 work in building trades, 40.0% of those men 
whose fathers were in the building trades themselves work in building trades. This pattern is particularly 
strong for smaller trades; while just 3.8% of men work as cabinet makers (or related trades), 21.7% of men 
whose fathers were in the cabinet trade themselves end up in this work. This pattern is not as pronounced in 
other, non-craft occupations. For example, while 7.2% of men work in sales and service jobs, 12.0% of 
men whose fathers worked in sales and service themselves work in sales and service, a much weaker 
pattern of intergenerational transmission.  
25 It is possible to obtain some sense of the potential severity of measurement error by comparing reported 
education from male wage workers past school age in the panel from 1998 to 2006 (not everyone was re-
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To control for other important factors, a number of additional variables can be 
incorporated into the model as controls, !!" , where j denotes different dummy variables 
for regional categories and for five-year labor market entry cohorts. Controls are also 
included for the categorical education requirements of a job, !!" , where j denotes 
different education categories, such as a job requiring a university education. With the 
addition of these controls, the Mincerian levels model can also be extended to include the 
private returns to skills as: 
ln!! = !! + !!!!"! + !!!!"! + !!!! + !!!!! + !!!!"! + !!!!"! +!!! (2.3) 
where !!" is a dummy variable for whether individual i has a skilled job or skill level j. 
The coefficients on skills, !!, represent the returns to having both a skill and a job that 
requires that skill, and can be contrasted with combinations of !! and !!, the returns to 
education and to having a job that requires a specific level of education, respectively. By 
controlling for both work experience and education, estimated returns to skills will also 
exclude the level of skills accumulated through education or acquired based on simply 
time spent in a job, and thus be more representative of acquiring skills outside of 
education or daily experience.  
For individual i from natal household h one can estimate equation (2.3) as a 
family fixed effects model:  
ln!!! = !! + !!!!!!! + !!!!!!! + !!!!! + !!!!!! + !!!!!!!
+ !!!!!!+!!! + !!!!  
 
(2.4) 
                                                                                                                                            
asked in 2012). Vocational secondary education, the schooling level of interest, appears to be relatively 
well measured in the data, as 87% of those reporting vocational secondary in 1998 made the same report in 
2006. Unfortunately, similar comparisons cannot be made to determine the accuracy of skills, since 
whether an individual works in a job that requires skills can genuinely change over time.  
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where the family fixed effect, !! , allows any unobservables that do not vary within the 
family to be differenced out when comparing siblings. In order for this method to 
generate a causal estimate of the returns to education and skills, certain assumptions have 
to hold. Ideally, the error term would be orthogonal to siblings’ schooling and skills. This 
means that unobservables that do vary within the family, such as differences in ability 
and aptitude between siblings, would have to be unrelated to schooling and skills. 
Although most of the unobservable differences are likely to be removed by family fixed 
effects, this method is unlikely to eliminate all bias. There may be selection into both 
education and other forms of skill acquisition even among siblings. However, some 
assessment of the direction of bias can be undertaken. Results are presented below which 
show that, between siblings, the more able (those with higher test scores) are selected into 
additional education.  
2.6 Findings 
2.6.1 Education, Skills, and Employment 
One apparent consequence of the dramatic expansion of education in Egypt is that 
individuals often work in jobs that they report require lower education than they have 
obtained. Table 2.2 presents the percentage of employed males working at a job that 
requires an education level below the education level they have attained, by educational 
attainment. Additionally, Table 2.2 shows the percentage of employed males working at a 
job that requires no formal schooling, by educational attainment.26 Overall, about half 
(51%) of workers report that they have a job that requires education below their 
educational attainment, and slightly more than half (55%) report that they are working at 
a job that in fact requires no formal education, which suggests a large mismatch between 
the education system and the labor market. Notably, nearly two-thirds of vocational 
                                                
26 The educational requirements of a job are self-reported but the distributions of responses of no education 
required across different occupations (Table 2.9) and economic activities (Table 2.10) are consistent with 
expectations. For example, while 94.8% of agricultural workers report that their job requires no formal 
education, just 1.7% of individuals engaged in professional, scientific, or technical activities report that 
their job requires no education.   
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secondary graduates (63%) are working at jobs that they report require less than their 
education level and half (49%) are working at jobs that they report require no formal 
education whatsoever. The supply of educated graduates has expanded well beyond the 
demand for educated workers. This problem affects the majority of vocational secondary 
graduates and will reduce the returns they can obtain for their education.  
Slightly less than two-fifths (39%) of employed males 15-64 work at jobs that 
they report require a specific skill (Table 2.3).27 While only 28% of illiterate males work 
in skilled jobs, males with a primary education or higher have similar chances (between 
39% and 45%) of reporting being in a skilled job, regardless of their education level. 
Individuals with less than a secondary education who report working in a skilled job 
primarily learned their skills on the job or through a craftsman (i.e. in an apprenticeship). 
Notably, only 18% of vocational secondary educated individuals in jobs requiring a skill 
learned that skill in vocational secondary education. The combined low level of skilled 
work and acquiring skills through vocational secondary means that out of all vocational 
secondary graduates, just 7% are engaged in skilled work using skills from vocational 
secondary education.  
More often, vocational secondary graduates working in a skilled job learned their 
skills through a craftsman (in an apprenticeship) (40%). On-the-job learning was also a 
common route to skills (22%). The share of men with lower education levels learning 
their skills through a craftsman was 62%-65%, which is comparable to the sum of 
vocational secondary graduates who learned their skills either via vocational secondary or 
from a craftsman. This indicates that vocational secondary education and apprenticeships, 
as routes to skill acquisition, have the potential to be substitutes. However, that 
vocational secondary graduates were more than three times as likely to have learned their 
skills from a craftsman or on the job as from their vocational education indicates that 
vocational secondary is a poor source of job-appropriate skills.  
                                                
27 Skills are self-reported but are distributed across occupations (Table 2.11) and economic activities (Table 
2.12) with a clear and predictable skill gradient. For instance, just 13.0% of salespersons report they hold a 
skilled job, compared to 86.5% of machinery and related trades workers.   
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Ideally, wages reflect workers’ marginal productivity; in reality, they often reflect 
a mix of marginal productivity and other factors, essentially portraying wages associated 
with an education or career path. Table 2.4 presents mean and median hourly wages in 
2012 LE by educational attainment among male wage workers. The mean wage across all 
levels of education is 6.40 LE, and the median wage is 4.50. Mean and median wages for 
lower levels of education show only minor variation. Vocational secondary graduates 
have slightly higher wages than those with less education; median wages are 0.28 LE per 
hour higher than median preparatory wages, and the mean gap is 0.90. The largest 
difference is at the level of university, where both mean and median wages rise 
substantially. 
The higher wages associated with vocational and university education are in large 
part a product of high public sector wages. However, as the government has attempted to 
decrease the size of the public sector and as the supply of graduates has increased, the 
relationship between wages and education has changed. Figure 2.3 presents wages by 
education level28 and years of work experience. Youth with 0-10 years of work 
experience have very similar wages if they have no education or any education up 
through vocational secondary education. Only higher education has a higher return. 
While wages rise somewhat with years of work experience for vocational secondary 
graduates, the gradient is fairly slight, especially compared to higher education. Young 
people would be as well off, in terms of wages, without any formal educational certificate 
as they would be having attained a vocational secondary education.  
2.6.2 Returns to Education and Skills Using OLS 
Estimating the standard Mincerian equation for 15-64 year-olds (Table 2.5, 
specification 1) the rate of return to education is 4.1% per year. However, as seen in 
Figure 2.3, returns to education appear to have substantially diminished for recent 
graduates. Specification 2 therefore restricts the sample to young males, ages 15-34 in 
2012. These are individuals who would have been of working age starting in the mid-
                                                
28 Post-secondary institutes and university & above have been combined into the category “higher 
education,” which is used hereafter.  
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1990s and thereafter, and would have been facing the end of the government employment 
guarantee for educated graduates. Looking at these 15-34 year olds, the return to 
education is 2.2% per year. This is a substantial decrease from the return experienced by 
the older generation (ages 35-64) of 5.3% per year (specification 3). Increases in the 
quantity of education, the increasing share of vocational secondary education, and the end 
of the government employment guarantee may all be contributing to the very low returns 
to education for young people in Egypt.  
The standard Mincer equation can serve as a helpful reference and, consistent 
with previous research, demonstrates that the returns to education in Egypt are quite low. 
However, there are also substantial non-linearities in the returns to education in Egypt. 
Specifications 4 through 6 therefore estimate the returns to education using the level of 
education attained, with the different educational attainments compared to the reference 
category of an individual who is illiterate or can read and write but did not complete any 
formal education. These specifications also include a series of five-year labor market 
entry cohort dummies, to adjust for different wages facing later cohorts, and controls for 
regional wage differences. Although not shown, these controls tend to be significant. 
Looking at the returns to different levels of education for 15-64 year-olds (specification 
4) the cumulative returns to vocational secondary are 21.7%. The substantial non-
linearities in returns to education are obvious in specification 4, since different levels of 
education have very different returns. 
Since returns to education, and especially vocational secondary, appear to have 
substantially diminished for recent graduates, specification 5 re-estimates specification 4 
with a sample restricted to males aged 15-34 in 2012. These are individuals who have a 
particularly high rate of vocational secondary attainment (Figure 2.2) and low wages 
associated with vocational secondary education (Figure 2.3). Looking at these 15-34 year 
olds, the returns to vocational secondary are near zero and not statistically significant. 
The direction of bias in these regressions, in terms of selection on ability, or even the type 
of family connections that will yield more advantageous employment, is, if anything, 
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likely to bias results in favor of higher returns to increasing levels of education.29 
Therefore, finding that for 15-34 year olds the returns to completing a vocational 
secondary education—twelve full years of school—are statistically indistinguishable 
from remaining uneducated is remarkable. It is also a substantial change from the 
experience of older Egyptians (ages 35-64), for whom all levels of education generate 
substantially higher returns, vocational secondary particularly so, with a return of 40.4% 
compared to remaining uneducated.30  
The differences in returns across generations are in large part due to changes in 
public policy, specifically in terms of government hiring and compensation, particularly 
for vocational secondary graduates. As Table 2.6 shows, there are large premiums to 
education for public sector workers 35-64 years of age in 2012. Compared to uneducated 
workers, vocational secondary graduates in the public sector have 69.3% higher wages. 
In the private sector, this difference is just 11.7%. Additionally, more than half of 35-64 
year-old male wage workers are employed in the public sector. In contrast, among 15-34 
year-olds, there is now zero return to vocational secondary in the public sector (and only 
16% of vocational secondary educated male wage workers ages 15-34 are in this sector), 
and just a 5.6% return to all twelve years culminating in a vocational degree in the private 
sector.31 The premium to vocational secondary in the public sector that the older 
generation enjoyed no longer exists for the younger generation. 
As an alternative to investing in formal vocational education, should young 
people invest in other routes to vocational skills? Table 2.7 investigates the returns to 
                                                
29 More able students progress further in school; one of the most common reasons for dropping out of 
school is not doing well in school (Population Council, 2011).  
30 The differences across generations in the returns to vocational secondary are also visible when 
comparing returns in different rounds of the ELMPS. The exact same specification cannot be used, because 
actual work experience is not available in all rounds; age less school start age and years of school must be 
used for work experience. For individuals 15-34 in 1998, the return to vocational secondary was 17.5%. 
For those 15-34 in 2006, the return to vocational secondary was 11.4%. For those 15-34 in 2012, using the 
same specification, the return to vocational secondary was 9.3%. All returns were statistically significant. 
Using this specification, the returns to vocational secondary have thus been halved for young Egyptians 
over the 14 years from 1998 to 2012.  
31 The change across generations is not due to differences in the skill level of jobs by age or sector; public 
and private sector workers have similar probabilities of skilled jobs, and there are not very different 
patterns by age.  
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holding a job that respondents report requires skills, and additionally the returns to 
different levels of skill in craft occupations, after controlling for an individual’s education 
level and the job’s education requirements. After adding the job’s education requirements 
and skills, the returns to vocational secondary for 15-64 year-olds have dropped from 
21.7% (specification 4, Table 2.5) to 14.9%32 and the returns to a job that requires 
secondary33 education are 14.2%. Vocational secondary graduates’ returns are mediated 
through job education requirements due to wage premiums for public sector jobs 
requiring vocational secondary, even after accounting for skills (not shown).34  
Focusing on 15-34 year olds, and incorporating job requirements and skills in 
specification 8, the return to vocational secondary is again near zero and statistically 
insignificant. There is also no statistically significant return to obtaining a job that 
requires secondary education. The sum of the vocational secondary coefficient with 
obtaining a job that requires secondary education is statistically significant, but the sum is 
just a 7.2% return relative to remaining without education in a job that requires no 
education. In contrast, for 35-64 year olds (specification 9), after accounting for skills the 
return to vocational secondary education is 20.3% and the return to a job that requires 
secondary education is 25.0%. Vocational secondary education’s benefits have dropped 
substantially across generations; given the opportunity cost, and cost to society of 
educating these individuals for an additional three years, vocational secondary appears to 
be a very poor economic investment, yielding no higher wages than remaining 
uneducated.  
Compared to the return to vocational secondary, skills are a substantially better 
investment. Among 15-64 year-olds (specification 7), the return to an individual’s job 
requiring any skill is 10.2%. Although apprentices and assistants in craft trades obtain no 
                                                
32 There are essentially no changes to the returns to education if skills and skill levels are added without 
adding the educational requirements of a job (not shown), which suggests that education and skilled work 
are essentially orthogonal, consistent with Table 2.3.  
33 Job requirements are self-reported and do not distinguish between general and vocational secondary. 
Since general secondary is not generally terminal, jobs requiring a secondary education will usually be 
expecting a vocational secondary degree.  
34 Most jobs requiring an education are in the public sector (59% of jobs requiring a secondary degree are 
public sector jobs).  
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higher returns than other skilled workers, craftsmen in craft trades receive a 8.4% return 
to their skill level—on top of the return to a job that requires a skill. This is notably 
higher than the return to vocational secondary education, although less than the return to 
vocational secondary education and obtaining a job that requires that level of education.35 
When restricting specification 7 to 15-34 year olds (specification 8), the return to skills 
persists at 8.4%, and the returns to being a craftsman actually rise to 11.4%.36 For 35-64 
year-olds, the return to skills is 10.8%, and craftsmen receive an additional 6.7% (the 
latter is insignificant, but also difficult to distinguish from having a skill in this older age 
group as very few older men are assistants or apprentices). So while vocational secondary 
returns have fallen to zero for 15-34 year olds, the returns to skill and the additional 
effect of becoming a craftsman remain similar across generations. 
2.6.3 Returns to Education and Skills Using Family Fixed Effects 
While OLS regressions are commonly used for estimating returns to education, 
they are potentially biased due to omitted variables.37 One method for removing bias 
from estimates of the returns to education is the use of family fixed effects. By comparing 
two or more siblings from the same family, bias associated with family characteristics 
will be removed. Bias related to individual characteristics—including ability—is likely to 
remain. However, in Egypt, family characteristics strongly shape both educational 
attainment and job access. The direction of bias related to individual ability can also be 
signed by looking at observable measures of ability. Self-reported test scores38 (out of 
100) can be compared among siblings in the family fixed effects sample whose 
                                                
35 Vocational secondary graduates do not receive differential returns to their skills. Skill and skill level 
interactions with education levels showed no statistically significant interactions for vocational secondary 
graduates.  
36 The returns to skill are not driven by returns for those with general secondary or higher education; for 
both 15-64 year-olds and 15-34 year-olds the returns to skills and skill levels are similar when general 
secondary and higher education graduates are excluded.  
37 For instance, when adding observable parental characteristics (education and employment characteristics) 
to Specification 7, parental characteristics are statistically significant, and their addition also reduces the 
returns to education. Unobserved family characteristics are likely to be further biasing the results.  
38 Individuals have to pass an exam to complete a level of school, and it is the scores on these tests, at the 
end of primary and the end of preparatory, that are reported in the ELMPS. Data is collected only for 
individuals 45 and younger, if they attended a given level. Many individuals also do not recall their scores.  
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households have variation in education or skills. The difference in test scores in terms of 
education was that those siblings who were most educated had 7.3 point higher primary 
test scores and 2.6 higher preparatory test scores compared to their less educated 
siblings.39 This indicates that even within families, siblings with higher ability attain 
more education, yielding a bias in favor of finding higher and positive returns to 
education even within families. In contrast, siblings who obtained skills or became 
craftsmen tended to have lower academic ability as measured by test scores. Siblings who 
had skilled jobs had 1.4 point lower primary test scores and 0.9 lower preparatory test 
scores than siblings with unskilled jobs.40 Siblings who were craftsmen had 1.8 point 
lower primary test scores and 0.3 point lower preparatory test scores than siblings who 
were not craftsmen.41 More academically able siblings continue in school, while the less 
able drop out and work in craft or skilled trades. Thus, ability bias is likely to inflate the 
returns to school and (slightly) deflate the returns to skills acquired elsewhere.42  
Table 2.8 presents the estimates of returns to education for the family fixed effects 
sample.43 Estimates for ages 15-64 and 15-34 are presented; there are too few males 35-
64 with siblings of the same age who were observed in their natal household to present 
                                                
39 The average primary score of a less-educated sibling was 69.6 and the average primary score of the most-
educated siblings was 76.9. Likewise in preparatory the average test score of a less-educated sibling was 
66.1, while the average test score of a most-educated sibling was 68.7. 
40 The average primary score of siblings who did not have a skilled job was 78.3, compared to 76.9 for 
siblings who did have a skilled job. The average preparatory score was 72.4 for siblings who did not have a 
skilled job and 71.5 for siblings who had a skilled job. 
41 The average primary score of siblings who were not craftsmen was 75.2, compared to 73.4 for siblings 
who were craftsmen. The average preparatory score was 70.2 for siblings who were not craftsmen and 69.9 
for siblings who were craftsmen. 
42 The pattern of selection on unobservables into higher levels of education and away from skilled craft 
occupations is consistent with estimates of selection based on observables (Altonji, Elder, & Taber, 2005; 
Oster, 2013). 
43 The family fixed effects model identifies returns based on households that vary in terms of their 
characteristics. In the 2,300 individuals and 955 households in the family fixed effects sample, 1,395 
individuals in 551 households vary in education, with 1,000 respondents in 386 households having 
variation in vocational secondary. There are 861 respondents in 337 households with variation in having a 
job requiring skills and 533 respondents in 206 households with variation in being a craftsman. While a 
larger sample might allow for more precise estimation, for the variables of interest there is sufficient 
variation to expect reasonable estimates.  
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models separately for this age group.44 The linear returns to education using family fixed 
effects are substantially lower than the OLS returns. The standard Mincerian return to a 
year of school is only 1.8% for ages 15-64 (specification 10), about one-fifth the 
international average (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004). Among 15-34 year-olds, the 
linear returns are not significantly different from zero. Looking at the returns to different 
levels of education in the family fixed effects model, among 15-64 year-olds, the return 
to vocational secondary is 10.2%, significant at only the 10% level (specification 12). For 
15-34 year olds, there is no level of education that has a statistically significant return 
(specification 13).  
Although the returns to education are substantially diminished in the family fixed 
effects model, suggesting that the OLS models for returns to education were biased 
upwards,45 the returns to skills—specifically, becoming a craftsman—remain substantial. 
In specification 14, for 15-64 year-olds, the return to vocational secondary is 
insignificant. The returns to having a skill, and obtaining a job that requires a skill, are 
essentially zero and insignificant. However, the returns to attaining a craftsman level of 
skill, in a craft trade, are 17.7%. Being a craftsman has the same return as higher 
education. Restricting to the sample of 15-34 year olds, it is notable that the return to 
being a craftsman for this age group is 20.3%. The return to vocational secondary 
education is near zero and insignificant, although the return to obtaining a job that 
requires secondary is 15.4%. The family fixed effects model indicates that the returns to 
education are lower than the (already low) estimates obtained from the OLS model. 
Vocational skills acquired outside the formal schooling system, specifically apprenticing 
                                                
44 There are 262 individuals from 121 households with at least two males 35-64 within the fixed effect 
sample. 
45 The lower returns in the 15-64 year-old sample are due in part to the higher share of young adults in the 
15-64 year-old family fixed effects sample than in the 15-64 year-old OLS sample. Running OLS on the 
15-64 year old fixed effects sample generates returns that are lower than in the full 15-64 sample but higher 
than once fixed effects are applied. However, when running OLS on the 15-34 year-old family fixed effects 
sample, the returns to education are similar or higher to those using the 15-34 year-old OLS sample. This 
indicates that, once age differences across the samples are accounted for, it is not differences in the OLS 
versus family fixed effects samples that drive differences in returns.  
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in a craft trade and ultimately becoming a craftsman, are consistently a better investment 
for young people than formal vocational secondary education.  
2.7 Discussion and Conclusions 
Historically, there have been high private returns to vocational secondary 
education in Egypt. However, these high returns occurred due to high public sector wages 
and the public sector employment guarantee (Assaad, 1997a; Salehi-Isfahani, Tunali, & 
Assaad, 2009). OLS estimates suggest that there remain positive private returns to 
vocational secondary education, as compared to no formal education, for males 15-64. 
Returns to education estimated using OLS are unlikely to be causal estimates. Therefore, 
to obtain causal estimates, this essay compared male siblings who were wage earners. 
Returns to education were notably lower for all levels of education using this estimation 
technique. However, focusing on male youth 15-34, there were essentially no returns to 
vocational secondary education with either family fixed effects or OLS. Young men 
receive the same wages after twelve years of education, culminating in a vocational 
secondary degree, as they would have if they had not attended school at all.  
In sharp contrast to the nil returns to vocational secondary education, the returns 
to skills are substantial. For men 15-64, in the OLS model the rate of return to a job that 
requires skill is estimated to be around 10.2%, and achieving the craftsman level in a 
craft trade confers an additional 8.4% return. These returns hold for young males as well. 
While the returns to obtaining both skills and a job that requires those skills generally did 
not persist in the family fixed effects model, the returns to being a craftsman in a craft 
trade were 17.7% in the working-age family fixed effects model. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient on becoming a craftsman was similar for youth age 15-34 as for 15-64 year-
olds and remained significant. The family fixed effects estimates confirm that youth 
receive higher returns from investing in alternative routes to vocational skills—
specifically, apprenticing in a craft trade in order to become a craftsman—than from 
investing in vocational secondary education. Despite the fact that the returns to skills 
acquired elsewhere are higher, young people may still prefer to attend vocational 
  36 
secondary education for other reasons, especially a chance at a public sector job, with the 
associated non-monetary benefits46 and higher prestige.47  
A substantial amount of money is spent on vocational secondary education, 
supposedly to provide young people with job skills. In Egypt, education is nominally free 
of charge. While there are associated costs, and indeed, often quite substantial private 
expenditures (Assaad & Krafft, 2015b; El-Baradei, 2013), the largest cost is that the 
government is funding a vocational secondary education for around two-fifths of each 
recent birth cohort. This investment will be further expanded when secondary education 
becomes compulsory in the 2016/17 school year (Egypt State Information Service, 2014). 
Public investment in education can be justified on a number of grounds, but all rest upon 
young people benefiting from that education. Yet the different methods consistently 
indicated that young vocational secondary graduates earn no higher wages and are no 
more likely to be in a skilled job. Thus, “investing” in vocational secondary education 
appears to have no economic benefits. 
It could be argued that vocational secondary should be reformed. However, given 
that the problems with vocational secondary have been recognized for decades, and the 
long list of reform attempts (Adams, 2010; Antoninis, 2001; OECD/The World Bank, 
2010; Wally, 2012) that have been tried with no discernable improvements, this route 
does not show much promise. Perhaps vocational secondary should be abandoned 
entirely, a policy that would yield substantial budgetary savings to society. Young people 
who tested into general secondary at the end of preparatory could then continue on for 
                                                
46 The ratio of non-wage benefits to wage benefits in the public sector has been estimated to be 
approximately 1:1 (Assaad, 1999); non-wage benefits are much rarer in the private sector.    
47 Two other possible benefits of attaining a vocational secondary education that would not be reflected in 
the returns to education could be higher chances of employment or improved migration opportunities. Male 
vocational secondary graduates have a 4.7% unemployment rate, higher than preparatory graduates (2.4%), 
which suggests that there are no substantial benefits of vocational secondary in terms of accessing 
employment (Assaad & Krafft, 2015c). Migration plays a large role in the Egyptian labor market. 
Migration is essentially exclusive to men (Wahba, 2015). Estimates are that around 14% of Egyptian males 
ages 25-34 are either previous (return) migrants or current migrants (Assaad & Krafft, 2014). Migrants tend 
to be slightly more educated than non-migrants. For instance, 49% of all migrants who left the country over 
2000-2009 had a secondary education (Wahba, 2015). This is slightly higher than the share of young men 
with a secondary education in Egypt (see Figure 2.2). So secondary education may also slightly increase 
the chances of migration and provide a benefit through that avenue, but this avenue is not exclusive nor 
disproportionately likely for secondary graduates as compared to other young men.  
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general secondary and higher education; young people who did not would stop at the end 
of preparatory, around age fifteen, and enter into the labor market. There are myriad 
alternative uses for vocational secondary’s funding—such as paying for skills training, 
tools, and start-up costs, a worthwhile strategy in Uganda (Blattman, Fiala, & Martinez, 
2014), or improving the quality of basic education, which is more likely to generate 
public returns. Vocational secondary schools could also be transformed into general 
secondary schools, although the value of broadly providing general secondary education 
requires further research.  
Abandoning vocational secondary, either for general secondary or earlier school 
exit, would leave young people with only the more effective routes to skills. While not all 
young men would become apprentices and ultimately craftsmen,48 none would 
experience a costly form of education that generates no returns. Other forms of work-
place training and apprenticeships outside the craft trades are also likely to be valuable, 
and should be researched and encouraged.  
Ending vocational secondary education would also address Egypt’s 
education/labor market mismatch. That most educated men are in jobs that do not require 
their education, or frequently that do not require any education at all, is just one 
illustration of this mismatch. The results of this essay suggest that mismatch, 
characterized by low returns, is more of a problem when skills are acquired in the 
education system than through alternatives such as apprenticeships. The mechanisms 
underlying this result are important, and merit consideration in vocational policy. First, 
employers have much better information on what skills are in demand (since they 
demand them) than the education system or students. Second, while vocational secondary 
education trained students essentially regardless of labor demand (UNDP & Institute of 
National Planning, 2010; World Bank, 2007), craftsmen are very unlikely to take on 
apprentices without work for them to do. These information and labor demand issues 
make it difficult for the education system to perform as well as employers in providing 
                                                
48 Additionally if many more individuals shifted into this form of human capital accumulation, with an 
increase in the quantity of skills in the workforce, the returns would likely drop.  
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training—particularly when private sector employers are not in any way linked to the 
education system. Employer-driven training for current workers and new hires may 
therefore be a better approach to matching workers’ skills with the skills demanded by 
the labor market.  
The fact that acquiring vocational skills through an apprenticeship, and ultimately 
becoming a craftsman, yields higher returns than vocational secondary education has 
important implications not only for young people and the government in Egypt, but also 
for development policy worldwide. A sizeable body of literature indicates that there are 
high returns to capital for microenterprises (de Mel, McKenzie, & Woodruff, 2008). This 
literature drives the push for microfinance as a development tool. However, the 
education-employment mismatch in Egypt suggests that a lack of opportunities to form 
appropriate human capital is limiting development. 
The economic literature on human capital has over-emphasized formal education. 
While there are numerous returns to education studies, this is one of very few studies 
examining the returns to human capital acquired outside the formal education system. 
This deficit needs to be redressed, with substantial additional research on skills 
acquisition and the returns to skills, as well as other forms of human capital. The bias in 
favor of formal schooling is also apparent in government budgets and the efforts of 
international organizations. The targets of the Millennium Development Goals include 
schooling goals but not skills goals (World Bank, 2011). The Education for All Initiative 
includes a goal of promoting learning and life skills, yet states, “Formal secondary 
schooling is the most effective way to develop the skills needed for work and life” 
(UNESCO, 2012, p. 4), a frequently assumed hypothesis that—in the case of Egypt—
does not appear to hold. The primacy of formal education needs to be re-evaluated in 
light of these findings.   
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Figures  
Figure 2.1. Structure of the Egyptian Education System 







Compulsory Schooling   
Primary    ⇒  Preparatory    ⇒   Higher Institutes 
Grades 1-6 Grades 7-9  Four-year 
  General Secondary    ⇒  University 
  Grades 10-12 Four-year 
(Ages 6-11) (Ages 12-14) (Ages 15-17) (Ages 18 and up) 
Note: Ages in parentheses are ideal, assuming on time entry and no repetition. 
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Figure 2.2. Educational Attainment by Age, Three-Year Moving Averages, Males, 
Ages 25-64 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012. 
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Figure 2.3. Smoothed Mean Hourly Wages (in 2012 LE) by Educational Attainment 
and Years of Work Experience, Male Wage Workers, Ages 15-64, 0-40 Years Work 
Experience 
 
Note: Lowess smoother with bandwidth 3. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012. 
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Tables  
Table 2.1. Sample Descriptives 
  OLS Sample Family FE Sample 
  Percentage of Sample Percentage of Sample 
Current Student 2.1 2.5 
Education Level 
  Illiterate or Read/Write 19.7 17.7
Primary 12.0 13.7 
Preparatory 6.8 6.8 
Vocational Secondary 34.7 37.1 
General Secondary 2.5 2.9 
Higher Education 24.3 21.8 
Required Education for Job 
  Illiterate or Read/Write 55.5 63.0
Primary 4.1 4.0 
Preparatory 2.5 2.2 
Secondary 18.5 15.8 
Higher Education 19.4 15.0 
Region 
  Greater Cairo 19.4 15.8
Alexandria & Suez Canal 8.8 8.7 
Urban Lower 9.3 8.4 
Urban Upper 7.2 8.7 
Rural Lower 31.6 31.1 
Rural Upper 23.6 27.3 
Job Requires Skill 41.1 40.6 
Skill Level, Craft Occupations 
  Not Skilled or Not a Craft Occupation 
(Reference) 77.6 74.8 
Apprentice 1.2 1.4 
Assistant 5.8 7.4 
Craftsman 15.3 16.4 
  Means Means 
  (Standard Deviations) (Standard Deviations) 
Years of School 9.89  9.81  
 
(4.80) (4.37) 
Age 35.50  29.52  
 
(11.07) (7.33) 
Years Since First Job 18.30  12.58  
 
(11.68) (7.87) 
Years of Work Experience 16.94  11.78  
 
(11.25) (7.53) 
Hourly Wage (2012 LE) 6.40  5.81  
 
(12.46) (19.38) 
Observations (N) 8,372 2,300 
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Notes: OLS sample is male wage earners 15-64. Family FE sample is male wage earners 15-64 who were 
sons of the household head in 1998, 2006, or 2012, and had a male sibling who was also a wage earner in 
2012.  
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012.
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Table 2.2. Education Requirements of Jobs by Education Level, Employed Males, 













Reads & Writes 73.9! 73.9!
Primary 87.1! 73.2!
Preparatory 86.9! 63.9!
General Secondary 58.7! 46.5!
Vocational Secondary 63.1! 49.0!
Post-Secondary Inst. 57.5! 19.1!
University & Above 30.5! 12.9!
Total 50.5! 54.9!
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012. 
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Job Requires Skill 27.8! 45.0! 43.6! 39.3! 27.6! 39.8! 40.7! 44.0! 38.8!
          
Skill Acquisition, Conditional on Having a Job that Requires a Skill!
Regular School (Except 
Vocational Education)! 0.2! 0.2! 1.3! 2.5! 14.1! 6.6! 17.6! 69.5! 17.6!
Vocational Education! 0.9! 0.7! 1.3! 2.0! 4.3! 18.2! 35.0! 2.9! 8.6!
Vocational Training! 3.3! 3.4! 6.2! 5.0! 5.3! 5.7! 4.9! 1.5! 4.4!
Through Contractor! 9.3! 6.0! 5.3! 4.8! 0.0! 4.6! 2.7! 0.6! 4.4!
Through Craftsman! 63.2! 63.4! 64.7! 62.4! 49.9! 40.1! 21.7! 6.2! 42.2!
On the Job! 20.7! 21.7! 18.3! 20.4! 26.0! 22.4! 17.6! 17.3! 20.3!
Other! 2.4! 4.7! 2.9! 3.0! 0.5! 2.4! 0.6! 2.0! 2.5!
Total 100.0! 100.0! 100.0! 100.0! 100.0! 100.0! 100.0! 100.0! 100.0!
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012. 
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Table 2.4. Mean and Median Hourly Wages (in 2012 LE) by Educational 
Attainment, Male Wage Workers, Ages 15-64  
  Mean Median 
Illiterate 4.78 3.89 
Reads & Writes 5.30 3.85 
Primary 5.45 4.00 
Preparatory 4.87 4.12 
General Secondary 5.76 4.40 
Vocational Secondary 5.77 4.40 
Post-Secondary Inst. 7.47 5.22 
University & Above 9.89 6.59 
Total 6.40 4.50 
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012. 
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Table 2.5. OLS Linear and Level Estimates of Returns to Education, Male Wage 
Workers 
Dependent Variable: ln(hourly wage). 
Specification:        Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5     Spec. 6    
Ages: 15-64 15-34 35-64 15-64 15-34 35-64 
Years of School    0.041***    0.022***    0.053***                                     
              (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.002)                                        
Education Level 
(Illiterate/R&W 
Omitted)                                                             
Primary                                             0.035      -0.046       0.059    
                                                  (0.027)     (0.032)     (0.047)    
Preparatory                                         0.072**    -0.028       0.119**  
                                                  (0.030)     (0.040)     (0.047)    
Voc. Sec.                                           0.217***    0.031       0.404*** 
                                                  (0.021)     (0.027)     (0.032)    
Gen. Sec.                                           0.236***    0.116**     0.274*** 
                                                  (0.045)     (0.056)     (0.076)    
Higher Ed.                                          0.565***    0.326***    0.763*** 
                                                  (0.024)     (0.035)     (0.036)    
Work Experience (Yrs.)   0.023***    0.034***    0.001      -0.002       0.021**     0.001    
              (0.002)     (0.006)     (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.010)     (0.005)    
Work Experience (Yrs.) 
Sq./100   -0.024***   -0.107***    0.017*      0.015      -0.082**     0.003    
              (0.005)     (0.025)     (0.010)     (0.012)     (0.040)     (0.010)    
Constant        0.835***    0.997***    1.009***    1.122***    1.193***    1.580*** 
              (0.026)     (0.040)     (0.071)     (0.038)     (0.049)     (0.086)    
Region             No          No          No         Yes         Yes         Yes    
5-year Labor Market 
Entry Cohorts       No          No          No         Yes         Yes         Yes    
Observations     8369        4738        3631        8371        4741        3630    
Adjusted R-sq.    0.093       0.023       0.117       0.124       0.054       0.151    
Notes: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
Robust (Huber/White) standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012. 
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Table 2.6. OLS Level Estimates of Returns to Education by Sector, Male Wage 
Workers 
Dependent Variable: ln(hourly wage). 
Ages: 15-64 15-34 35-64 
Sector:   Public     Private      Public     Private      Public     Private    
Education Level 
(Illiterate/R&W 
Omitted)                                                 
Primary         0.161**    -0.003      -0.142      -0.033       0.210**     0.013    
              (0.075)     (0.029)     (0.178)     (0.033)     (0.082)     (0.058)    
Preparatory     0.318***    0.007      -0.100      -0.018       0.368***  -0.019    
              (0.077)     (0.033)     (0.204)     (0.041)     (0.084)     (0.056)    
Voc. Sec.       0.585***    0.103***   0.029       0.056**     0.693***   0.117**  
              (0.053)     (0.024)     (0.130)     (0.028)     (0.059)     (0.049)    
Gen. Sec.       0.554***    0.148***   0.338*      0.096       0.432***   0.213*   
              (0.097)     (0.052)     (0.187)     (0.059)     (0.111)     (0.110)    
Higher Ed.      0.968***    0.383***   0.467***   0.294***    1.016***   0.488*** 
              (0.054)     (0.035)     (0.132)     (0.041)     (0.061)     (0.071)    
Work Experience 
(Yrs.)   -0.018**     0.008      -0.009       0.025**    -0.020**    -0.003    
              (0.008)     (0.006)     (0.025)     (0.010)     (0.009)     (0.012)    
Work Experience 
(Yrs.) Sq./100    0.052***   -0.016       0.005      -0.093**     0.055***   0.006    
              (0.018)     (0.015)     (0.117)     (0.041)     (0.020)     (0.025)    
Constant        0.826***    1.218***   1.267***   1.171***    1.595***   1.536*** 
              (0.089)     (0.045)     (0.160)     (0.053)     (0.493)     (0.251)    
Region            Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes    
5-year Labor Market 
Entry Cohorts      Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes    
Observations     2737        5634         826        3915        1911        1719    
Adjusted R-sq.    0.204       0.061       0.136       0.040       0.208       0.075    
Notes: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
Robust (Huber/White) standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012. 
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Table 2.7. OLS Level Estimates of Returns to Education and Skills, Male Wage 
Workers  
Dependent Variable: ln(hourly wage). 
 Specification:  Spec. 7     Spec. 8     Spec. 9    
 Ages: 15-64 15-34 35-64 
Education Level (Illiterate/R&W Omitted)                         
Primary         0.028      -0.043       0.031    
              (0.027)     (0.032)     (0.048)    
Preparatory     0.064**    -0.017       0.051    
              (0.031)     (0.040)     (0.048)    
Voc. Sec.       0.149***    0.024       0.203*** 
              (0.022)     (0.028)     (0.041)    
Gen. Sec.       0.151***    0.092       0.072    
              (0.046)     (0.056)     (0.081)    
Higher Ed.      0.294***    0.158***    0.360*** 
              (0.035)     (0.045)     (0.056)    
Required Education Level (Illit./R&W 
Omitted)                         
Requires Primary   -0.102***   -0.156***    0.003    
              (0.036)     (0.043)     (0.061)    
Requires Preparatory   -0.011      -0.133**     0.145*   
              (0.049)     (0.058)     (0.076)    
Requires Secondary    0.142***    0.047       0.250*** 
              (0.023)     (0.030)     (0.038)    
Requires Higher Ed.    0.359***    0.278***    0.441*** 
              (0.033)     (0.045)     (0.050)    
Requires Skill    0.102***    0.084***    0.108*** 
              (0.022)     (0.029)     (0.032)    
Apprentice, Craft Trade    0.053      -0.095       0.397**  
 
 (0.082)     (0.076)     (0.201)    
Assistant, Craft Trade   -0.014      -0.016      -0.003    
 
 (0.037)     (0.042)     (0.090)    
Craftsman, Craft Trade    0.084***    0.114***    0.067    
 
 (0.027)     (0.035)     (0.042)    
Work Experience (Yrs.)   -0.001       0.021**    -0.011    
              (0.005)     (0.010)     (0.007)    
Work Experience (Yrs.) Sq./100    0.011      -0.082**     0.032**  
              (0.012)     (0.039)     (0.016)    
Constant        1.062***    1.126***    1.405*** 
              (0.039)     (0.049)     (0.222)    
Region            Yes         Yes         Yes    
5-year Labor Market Entry Cohorts      Yes         Yes         Yes    
Observations     8371        4741        3630    
Adjusted R-sq.    0.149       0.079       0.179    
Notes: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
Robust (Huber/White) standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012.  
  50 
Table 2.8. Family Fixed Effects OLS Estimates of Returns to Education and Skills, 
Male Wage Workers  
Dependent Variable: ln(hourly wage).  
Specification: Spec. 10    Spec. 11    Spec. 12    Spec. 13    Spec. 14    Spec. 15    
Ages: 15-64 15-34 15-64 15-34 15-64 15-34 
Years of School  0.018***    0.007                                                    
              (0.005)     (0.007)                                                    
Education Level 
(Illiterate/R&W Omitted)                                                         
Primary                                 0.054      -0.034       0.044      -0.043    
                                      (0.057)     (0.062)     (0.056)     (0.061)    
Preparatory                             0.029      -0.083       0.023      -0.086    
                                      (0.069)     (0.075)     (0.067)     (0.076)    
Voc. Sec.                               0.102*      0.039       0.081       0.014    
                                      (0.055)     (0.061)     (0.054)     (0.061)    
Gen. Sec.                               0.100       0.040       0.067      -0.014    
                                      (0.113)     (0.119)     (0.114)     (0.118)    
Higher Ed.                            0.267***    0.112       0.176**     0.050    
                                      (0.074)     (0.091)     (0.082)     (0.092)    
Required Education Level 
(Illit./R&W Omitted)                                                                 
Requires Primary                                                   -0.198**  -0.194*   
                                                              (0.086)     (0.100)    
Requires Preparatory                                                    0.010       0.085    
                                                              (0.138)     (0.144)    
Requires Secondary                                                    0.066       0.154**  
                                                              (0.064)     (0.076)    
Requires Higher Ed.                                                    0.211**     0.193*   
                                                              (0.093)     (0.116)    
Requires Skill                                                   -0.030      -0.083    
                                                              (0.068)     (0.092)    
Apprentice, Craft Trade                                                    0.083      -0.155    
 
                                                 (0.310)     (0.174)    
Assistant, Craft Trade                                                    0.094       0.073    
 
                                                 (0.091)     (0.114)    
Craftsman, Craft Trade                                                    0.177**     0.203**  
 
                                                 (0.072)     (0.095)    
Work Experience (Yrs.)    0.022*** 
   
0.030***   -0.004       0.031*     -0.006       0.027    
              (0.007)     (0.011)     (0.015)     (0.019)     (0.015)     (0.019)    
Work Experience (Yrs.) Sq./100   -0.035      -0.106**   0.034      -0.155*     0.041      -0.138    
              (0.021)     (0.046)     (0.048)     (0.085)     (0.045)     (0.086)    
Constant     1.066*** 1.169*** 1.039*** 1.181*** 1.026*** 1.164*** 
              (0.078)     (0.083)     (0.187)     (0.286)     (0.183)     (0.290)    
Region             No          No         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes    
5-year Labor Market Entry 
Cohorts       No          No         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes    
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Specification: Spec. 10    Spec. 11    Spec. 12    Spec. 13    Spec. 14    Spec. 15    
Ages: 15-64 15-34 15-64 15-34 15-64 15-34 
Observations     2298        1650        2300        1652        2300        1652    
Groups            955         706         955         706         955         706    
Adjusted R-sq.  0.018 0.007 0.032 0.022 0.044 0.037 
Notes: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
Robust (Huber/White) standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012.  
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of Workers N (Obs.) 
Legislators and Senior Officials (-) (-) 5 
Corporate Managers 43.9 7.9 896 
General Managers 3.6 0.4 35 
Physical, Mathematical, and Engineering Science 
Professions 1.1 1.6 152 
Life Science and Health Professionals 1.3 0.8 100 
Teaching Professionals 0.3 4.3 501 
Other Professionals 1.2 4.4 500 
Physical and Engineering Science Associate 
Professionals 13.9 3.3 321 
Life Science and Health Associate Professionals 5.0 0.7 88 
Teaching Associate Professionals (-) (-) 4 
Other Associate Professionals 13.9 3.9 434 
Office Clerks 6.4 1.7 187 
Customer Service Clerks 6.0 0.7 78 
Personal and Protective Services Workers 49.6 5.0 566 
Models, Salespersons, and Demonstrators 50.9 6.8 795 
Market-Oriented Skilled Agricultural and Fishery 
Workers 95.1 18.1 2,188 
Extraction and Building Trades Workers 88.2 12.7 1,514 
Metal, Machinery, and Related Trades Workers 66.7 3.6 402 
Precision Handicraft, Printing, and Related Trades 66.4 1.0 89 
Wood Treaters, Cabinet Makers, Related Trades 81.1 3.8 419 
Stationary-Plant and Related Operators 17.8 0.5 65 
Machine Operators and Assemblers 45.5 2.7 285 
Drivers and Mobile-Plant Operators 45.0 8.7 946 
Sales and Services Elementary Occupations 58.3 7.2 794 
Agricultural, Fishery, and Related Laborers (-) (-) 1 
Mining and Construction Laborers 88.2 0.3 37 
Total 54.9 100.0  11,402  
Notes: (-) indicates a suppressed cell with <30 respondents. Occupations are classified on the two-digit 
level using ISCO 88 coding. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012. 
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Table 2.10. Economic Activities and Jobs Requiring No Education, Employed 






of Workers N (Obs.) 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 94.8 18.3 2,222 
Mining and Quarrying 61.3 0.3 32 
Manufacturing 51.6 14.8 1,559 
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply 9.8 0.9 103 
Water Supply; Sewage, Waste Management and 
Remediation Activities 29.5 1.1 111 
Construction 81.3 13.8 1,595 
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor 
Vehicles and Motorcycles 56.4 14.8 1,706 
Transportation and Storage 43.2 8.9 993 
Accommodation and Food Service Activities 58.4 3.2 359 
Information and Communication 9.0 1.2 140 
Financial and Insurance Activities 4.9 0.9 102 
Real Estate Activities (-) (-) 7 
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities 1.7 1.8 175 
Administrative and Support Service Activities 22.0 1.0 94 
Public Administration and Defense; Compulsory 
Social Security 15.0 7.3 860 
Education 7.9 6.5 739 
Human Health and Social Work Activities 12.0 1.7 197 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 30.2 0.6 65 
Other Service Activities 54.0 2.7 314 
Activities of Extraterritorial Organizations and Bodies (-) (-) 29 
Total 54.9 100.0  11,402  
Notes: (-) indicates a suppressed cell with <30 respondents. Economic activities are classified on the one 
digit level using ISIC 4 coding.  
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012. 
  
  54 
 





of Workers N (Obs.) 
Legislators and Senior Officials (-) (-) 5 
Corporate Managers 32.0 7.9 896 
General Managers 29.0 0.4 35 
Physical Mathematical and Engineering Science 
Professions 77.9 1.6 152 
Life Science and Health Professionals 66.0 0.8 100 
Teaching Professionals 47.3 4.3 501 
Other Professionals 38.6 4.4 500 
Physical and Engineering Science Associate 
Professionals 71.4 3.3 321 
Life Science and Health Associate Professionals 49.0 0.7 88 
Teaching Associate Professionals (-) (-) 4 
Other Associate Professionals 29.3 3.9 434 
Office Clerks 24.2 1.7 187 
Customer Service Clerks 29.6 0.7 78 
Personal and Protective Services Workers 30.2 5.0 566 
Models Salespersons and Demonstrators 13.0 6.8 795 
Market-Oriented Skilled Agricultural and Fishery 
Workers 11.2 18.1 2,188 
Extraction and Building Trades Workers 59.6 12.7 1,514 
Metal Machinery and Related Trades Workers 86.5 3.6 402 
Precision Handicraft Printing and Related Trades 54.9 1.0 89 
Wood Treaters Cabinet Makers Related Trades 74.7 3.8 419 
Stationary-Plant and Related Operators 51.7 0.5 65 
Machine Operators and Assemblers 61.4 2.7 285 
Drivers and Mobile-Plant Operators 59.3 8.7 946 
Sales and Services Elementary Occupations 7.6 7.2 794 
Agricultural, Fishery, and Related Laborers (-) (-) 1 
Mining and Construction Laborers 12.6 0.3 37 
Total 38.7 100.0 11,402 
Notes: (-) indicates a suppressed cell with <30 respondents. Occupations are classified on the two-digit 
level using ISCO 88 coding.  
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012. 
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of Workers N (Obs.) 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 11.8 18.3 2,222 
Mining and Quarrying 39.0 0.3 32 
Manufacturing 63.7 14.8 1,559 
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply 56.8 0.9 103 
Water Supply; Sewage, Waste Management and 
Remediation Activities 41.4 1.1 111 
Construction 57.2 13.8 1,595 
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor 
Vehicles and Motorcycles 24.4 14.8 1,706 
Transportation and Storage 52.2 8.9 993 
Accommodation and Food Service Activities 24.8 3.2 359 
Information and Communication 51.7 1.2 140 
Financial and Insurance Activities 34.8 0.9 102 
Real Estate Activities (-) (-) 7 
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities 58.6 1.8 175 
Administrative and Support Service Activities 31.4 1.0 94 
Public Administration and Defense; Compulsory 
Social Security 30.0 7.3 860 
Education 37.2 6.5 739 
Human Health and Social Work Activities 36.1 1.7 197 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 47.3 0.6 65 
Other Service Activities 47.7 2.7 314 
Activities of Extraterritorial Organizations and Bodies (-) (-) 29 
Total 38.7 100.0 11,402 
Notes: (-) indicates a suppressed cell with <30 respondents. Economic activities are classified on the one 
digit level using ISIC 4 coding.  
Source: Author’s calculations using ELMPS 2012. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Why is Fertility on the Rise in Egypt? The Role of 
Women’s Employment Opportunities 
3.1 Introduction 
The demographic transition—the shift from a high mortality, high fertility pattern 
to low mortality, greater life expectancy, and lower (replacement) fertility—leads to 
dramatic changes in the structure of societies and economies. The period prior to and 
during the transition, characterized by rapid population growth, presents a particular 
challenge. Rapid population growth tends to place serious pressure on public services, 
natural resources, and the labor market, but the demographic transition can also provide a 
“demographic dividend” to accelerate growth and generate a variety of other benefits for 
society (Canning & Schultz, 2012; Reher, 2011). Thus, the pattern and progress of a 
country’s demographic transition has critical implications for its economy and society. 
The determinants of the demographic transition generally, and fertility in 
particular, are complex. As well as the relatively obvious health and demographic factors 
that affect fertility, social and economic forces also shape fertility (Schultz, 1969). Past 
research has primarily focused on how different factors could speed or stall the fertility 
transition (Bongaarts, 2006). This essay demonstrates that the fertility transition has not 
just stalled but in fact has started reversing in Egypt, where fertility rates have risen. 
Although a number of different factors are likely to be contributing to the rise in fertility, 
this essay specifically tests whether the changing landscape of employment opportunities 
for women, namely the decline of the public sector as an employer, has contributed to 
rising fertility.  
Evidence in Egypt indicated that, despite some stalls, overall fertility had been 
declining through 2008 (Bongaarts, 2008; El-Zanaty & Way, 2009). The most recent 
evidence, however, indicates that the crude birth rate has been rising in Egypt, from a low 
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of 26 (births per thousand people) in 2003-2006 to a high of 32 in 2012 (Central Agency 
for Public Mobilization and Statistics, 2015). These rising birth rates could be due to an 
increase in fertility or to the changing age structure of the population. Egypt has a 
substantial youth bulge, and as of 2012 the peak of the youth bulge was in the 25-29 age 
range (Assaad & Krafft, 2015a), the prime childbearing age. This essay demonstrates that 
the rising tide of births is because fertility has increased in Egypt.   
Rising fertility in Egypt has coincided with substantial changes in the structure of 
the economy, and in particular changes in the types of employment available. The share 
of employment in the public sector has declined substantially, while informal private 
sector employment has increased. Informal and private sector employment opportunities 
are substantially less appealing and available to women than public sector jobs (Nassar, 
2003). In part due to the changing structure of the economy, the female employment rate 
has decreased in recent years. This decline in female employment is particularly 
surprising given that factors associated with higher female labor force participation, such 
as female education, have been increasing (Assaad & Krafft, 2015a, 2015c). 
That changes in the structure of employment may have increased fertility is 
consistent with economic theories that recognize that one of the costs of children is an 
opportunity cost—the value of parents’ time. If, for women, employment opportunities 
decrease, then the relative cost of childbearing will decrease, potentially increasing 
fertility. However, at the same time household income will fall, and the net effect of these 
income and price effects is theoretically ambiguous (Becker, 1960; Schultz, 1997). The 
global evidence to date on the impact of employment on fertility is primarily focused on 
rising relative wages increasing women’s employment and decreasing fertility (Galor & 
Weil, 1996; Heckman & Walker, 1990;  Schultz, 1985). There are also a few studies 
directly examining the impact of increasing employment opportunities for women on 
their fertility (Fang, Eggleston, Rizzo, & Zeckhauser, 2013; Jensen, 2012). However, 
papers on employment opportunities have addressed fertility behaviors primarily for 
young women, not lifetime fertility. In contrast, this essay estimates the impact of 
economic opportunities for women on the timing and occurrence of births over the full 
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range of women’s childbearing years, demonstrating how economic opportunities have 
contributed to the recent rise in fertility.  
This essay investigates, for the case of Egypt, both how the fertility rate has 
evolved over time and how childbearing responds to women’s economic opportunities, 
specifically public sector employment. The essay proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews 
the theoretical and empirical evidence on fertility and work. Section 3 presents the 
conceptual model for understanding how work opportunities may impact fertility. Section 
4 discusses the methods required to estimate fertility and its relationship with 
employment. Section 5 describes the data used to estimate the relationship between 
fertility and employment opportunities. Section 6 shows the descriptive results, in terms 
of patterns of fertility and related phenomena. Section 7 presents the estimated hazard 
models for the relationship between fertility and employment opportunities. Discussion 
and conclusions are provided in section 8.  
3.2 Theories and Evidence on Fertility and Work 
3.2.1 Demographic Transition Theories 
Demographic transition theories provide the over-arching framework for 
understanding long-term trends in fertility and their relationship with social and 
economic forces. Demographic transition theories specifically provide insight into the 
link between declines in fertility and increases in female labor force participation 
(Bloom, Canning, Fink, & Finlay, 2009; Canning & Schultz, 2012; Kim, 2010; Kirk, 
1996). The forces that bring about fertility declines and subsequent increases in female 
labor force participation can be broadly dubbed “modernization,” an umbrella term that 
has been associated with a variety of factors, including improvements in health and 
decreases in mortality, changing norms and values, and a changing economic landscape. 
Increases in (female) education may play a key role in modernizing changes, due to 
education’s links with wages (returns to education), work, and contraceptive use. 
Essentially, “modern” economic arrangements lead to increases in female labor force 
participation and reductions in childbearing. 
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The relationship between fertility and female labor force participation that is 
usually posited is that rising economic opportunities for women can cause decreases in 
fertility. This essay investigates an alternative form of this relationship—whether 
declining opportunities for women in Egypt increased fertility. While demographic 
transition theories recognize that socio-economic changes raise the costs and decrease the 
benefits of children, and theorize that this relationship drives declines in fertility 
(Bongaarts, 2006), these theories have limited insight into stalls in fertility declines 
(Bongaarts, 2006, 2008) and have not taken up potential reversals in fertility trends. 
3.2.2  The Economics of Fertility 
Early economic theories of fertility can be called the “new home economics” 
(Kirk, 1996), a school of thought led by Becker (1960) and Schultz (1973), which 
extended traditional economic theories of consumer choice to institutions such as the 
family. In this basic framework for the economics of fertility, a household (married 
couple) decides how many children to have by solving a utility maximization problem 
into which children enter as a source of utility (Becker, 1960; Willis, 1973). As well as 
being sources of satisfaction, children have a cost in terms of time and money. The cost 
of the child is characterized as a function of (the mother’s) time,49 as well as more 
explicit costs (Schultz, 1973; Willis, 1973). These costs have implications in terms of the 
allocation of women’s time. If the cost of a mother’s time increases (i.e. women’s wages 
increase), there may be a decrease in the number of children. This relationship is the main 
mechanism through which women’s economic opportunities can impact fertility, 
particularly in societies, like Egypt, where the household division of labor allocates child-
rearing responsibilities to women (Hoodfar, 1997).  
Early formulations of the economics of fertility suffered from a variety of 
problems. They tended to be static models and did not incorporate uncertainty (Schultz, 
1973; Willis, 1973). Additionally, they relied heavily on the unitary household model, 
where individual members’ utility could be readily aggregated, perhaps because an 
                                                
49 An implicit assumption in such theories is that women are responsible for child care. 
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altruistic household head maximizes the household’s utility (Willis, 1973). The unitary 
household model’s assumptions are questionable (Birdsall, 1988) and have not held up to 
empirical scrutiny (Udry, 1996). As an alternative, models that allow for bargaining 
between spouses over fertility decisions show substantial promise (Rasul, 2008). 
Although theoretical approaches to the economics of fertility vary, it is difficult to dispute 
that there is an opportunity cost, in terms of women’s time, of raising children. 
3.2.3 Empirical Evidence on Fertility and Work 
The empirical literature from both developed (Angrist & Evans, 1998; Jacobsen, 
Pearce, & Rosenbloom, 1999) and developing countries (Cáceres-Delpiano, 2012; Cruces 
& Galiani, 2007) provides substantial evidence that fertility impacts female employment. 
These studies make convincing causal arguments for fertility shocks affecting female 
employment based on instrumental variables methods, identifying the effect of fertility 
based on exogenous variation in child sex (Angrist & Evans, 1998; Cruces & Galiani, 
2007), or the occurrence of multiple births (Cáceres-Delpiano, 2012; Jacobsen, Pearce, & 
Rosenbloom, 1999).  
While the focus in the empirical literature has been on the impact of fertility on 
employment, there have also been investigations into reverse causality or 
interdependence. Lloyd (1991) recognizes the interdependence of women’s work and 
fertility, and argues that the expansion of work opportunities for women can decrease 
their fertility. A substantial challenge, which Lloyd does not overcome, is identifying a 
causal impact from work to fertility. This challenge has long plagued even developed 
country research (Cramer, 1980). There are convenient instruments for fertility, such as 
child sex and multiple births, but there are not as many easily identifiable sources of 
exogenous variation in employment. A more popular alternative than studying the impact 
of employment on fertility is studying the impact of education on fertility, a relationship 
that is also often linked to work. In general, increases in (women’s) education have been 
linked to decreases in fertility (Angeles, Guilkey, & Mroz, 2005; Bledsoe, Casterline, 
Johnson-Kuhn, & Haaga, 1999; Lavy & Zablotsky, 2015; Osili & Long, 2008), but there 
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are exceptions (Bledsoe, Casterline, Johnson-Kuhn, & Haaga, 1999; McCrary & Royer, 
2011).   
The papers that do attempt to estimate the causal relationship between women’s 
work and fertility suggest that women’s employment decreases fertility. Fang et al. 
(2013) use the availability of bus stops as an instrument for women’s (endogenous) 
current employment and its impact on fertility to date in China. They find that 
employment decreases fertility to date by 0.5 births. However, when they sub-divide their 
sample into those who are unlikely to have more children and those who may still have 
additional children, the reduction in fertility drops to 0.17 for younger women and there 
is no effect on fertility for women who are unlikely to have more children, effectively no 
effect on completed childbearing. That their original result disappears when they sub-
divide their sample casts substantial doubt on their initial result and their identification 
strategy.  
Jensen (2012) solves the identification problem with an experiment, randomly 
providing employment recruiting services to young women (15-21) in villages in rural 
India. After three years, young women in treatment villages were more likely to be 
employed, were 5-6 percentage points less likely to be married or have children, and 
expressed, on average, a desire for 0.35 fewer children. Due to the short time span of the 
study, it is unknown whether delays in marriage, decreased early childbearing, and lower 
desired fertility will translate into decreases in completed fertility.  
One key strand of the literature linking women’s employment and fertility 
theorizes that it is changes in women’s wages (relative to men’s) that increase their 
employment and thus decrease fertility, potentially due to changes in the technology of 
production (Galor & Weil, 1996; Schultz, 1997). Schultz (1985) empirically 
demonstrates how wages might affect fertility based on increases in the price of butter 
relative to grains in the 1880s in Sweden, which changed the relative wages of women, 
since dairy processing was women’s work. This increase in the value of women’s time 
(relative to men’s) is shown to be responsible for a quarter of the decline in fertility over 
several decades in Sweden. Similar relationships have been found for a more recent study 
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in Sweden, as well as examinations of Thailand and India (Heckman & Walker, 1990; 
Mukhopadhyay, 1994; Rosenzweig & Evenson, 1977). However, there continue to be 
debates about the (female) income and fertility relationship and whether the results are 
robust. One strand of the literature discusses whether, after a certain point, rising female 
wages might increase fertility (Ahn & Mira, 2002; Kögel, 2004; Martínez & Iza, 2004). 
Overall, the evidence indicates that increases in the value of women’s time will probably, 
but not definitely, decrease fertility. The reverse case, when the market value of women’s 
time declines, to the best of the author’s knowledge, has not been examined. 
3.2.4 Division of Labor, Employment, and Childbearing in Egypt 
The sexual division of labor within Egyptian households is such that men’s roles 
are limited to providing for the family (Hoodfar, 1997), i.e. their primary responsibility is 
engaging in some type of employment. In contrast, women’s primary responsibilities are 
attending to husband, children, and home. Women can work outside the home only if 
their domestic responsibilities can be performed at least as well—if not better—when 
combined with market work (Hoodfar, 1997). There is no decrease in married women’s 
hours of domestic work (carework) if they also engage in market-based employment 
(Assaad & Krafft, 2014). So while women in Egypt can mix employment and child-
production roles, the tradeoffs in doing so vary substantially by the nature of their work 
and its compatibility with domestic roles.  
Public sector jobs are much easier to reconcile with marriage and childbearing 
than private sector employment. Married women with children are more likely to report 
that they worked during their last pregnancy if they were working for a wage in the 
public sector (79%) compared to the private formal sector (64%) or private informal 
sector (46%). One reason for this disparity across sectors is the substantially more 
generous maternity benefits for public wage workers. Among women working during 
their last pregnancy, 86% of those in public sector wage work had a six-week or longer 
paid maternity leave, in comparison with 47% of private formal wage workers and just 
12% of private informal wage workers (Assaad & El-Hamidi, 2009). Women working in 
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the government can also take up to two years of unpaid leave for each of their first three 
children, above and beyond their paid maternity leave (Hoodfar, 1997). In part due to the 
substantially different nature and benefits of public sector jobs, qualitative and 
quantitative studies demonstrate that there is a strong preference for public sector jobs in 
Egypt. Young women particularly value public sector benefits such as increased job 
security and pensions, as well as the shorter hours and lighter workload associated with 
public sector employment (Barsoum, 2015).  
Structural adjustment programs and economic reforms have changed the 
employment opportunities available to women in Egypt. A key element of the initial 
structural adjustment program in 1987 was the reduction of the government wage bill 
(Nassar, 2003). Additionally, starting in the 1980s, there was a phase-out of a policy that 
had begun in the 1960s, when the government had guaranteed public sector jobs to all 
secondary and higher education graduates. This policy was no longer in effect as of the 
end of the 1990s. Since 1980, public sector hiring has declined. Substantial decreases in 
labor force participation rates for educated women have followed these reforms. Women 
who participate in the labor force are often unemployed, engaging in queuing behaviors 
whereby they register with the government as job-seeking in hopes of being appointed to 
a government job, but neither seek nor would accept a private sector job (Assaad & 
Krafft, 2015a; Assaad, 1997a).  
Women were and continue to be disproportionately dependent on the public 
sector for employment, with more than half (52%) of employed women working in the 
public sector in 2012, in contrast to just less than a quarter (24%) of employed men 
(Assaad & Krafft, 2015c). Rather than shifting to employment in the private sector, in the 
face of declines in public sector employment, women, especially educated women, have 
withdrawn from the labor force. Olmsted (2003) wondered whether the structural 
adjustment programs in Egypt, because they substantially reduced employment 
opportunities for women and the opportunity costs of having children, might cause 
stagnation or even an increase in fertility rates. This essay investigates that very question, 
looking at the impact of changing employment opportunities on fertility in Egypt.  
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3.3 Conceptual Framework  
This essay models fertility as the outcome of a child production function and a 
household utility maximization problem, as have many others before (Becker, 1960; 
Birdsall, 1988; Schultz, 1997; Willis, 1973). Since decisions over fertility are likely to be 
made at the household level, this essay uses a unitary household model for simplicity. 
Specifically, the model of Schultz (1997) for the demand for children is modified for the 
context at hand. A couple’s lifetime household utility, U, is a function of the number of 
children, C, the education and health of children, E and H, the leisure of the husband, Lh, 
and the wife, Lw, as well as a composite household consumption good, G:  !(!,!,!, !! , !! ,!) (3.1) 
Utility is assumed to be increasing in all these arguments. The goods in the utility 
function, namely C, E, H, and G, denoted generically as S, are produced through some 
constant returns to scale technology using market goods, X, and the time the husband and 
wife spend in production, ThS and TwS: ! = !!(!!,!!!,!!", !!) (3.2) 
for S = C, E, H, G. The term !! is couple specific productivity that is known but not 
controlled by the couple. For the output of children this term can be thought of as 
fecundity. 
Individuals face a time constraint across market work (subscripted m), production 
work, and leisure: Ω! = !!" + !!"! + !! (3.3) 
where Ω! denotes the time budget constraint for j = h, w and S = C, E, H, G. The 
household’s market income, Y, is based on its members’ wages, Wj, and their market 
labor supply: ! = !!!!! + !!"!! (3.4) 
Under certain assumptions, or as a helpful heuristic, full income, F, can also be derived 
as:  
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! = Ω!!! + Ω!!! (3.5) 
The household’s utility maximization problem is therefore to choose C, E, H, Lh,, Lw, G 
to: 
Max ! !,!,!, !! , !! ,!  
subject to (i) !!!!! + !!"!! = ! = !" 
(ii) ! = !! !!,!!!,!!", !!  
for S = C, E, H, G 
and (iii) Ω! = !!" + !!"! + !! 
for j = h, w 
(3.6) 
where P is the price of market goods. While utility is increasing in C, E, H, Lh,, Lw, and 
G, there are tradeoffs between these goods, as mediated through the constraints.  
The tradeoffs facing women considering different jobs are not solely captured by 
the market wage rate. Women’s wages are at parity with men’s in the public sector but 
there is a wage gap in the private sector (Said, 2015). Commute time and child care 
responsibilities are major considerations that are going to be weighed against wages, 
particularly for women (Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Hoodfar, 1997). As mentioned above, 
there are also non-wage benefits to jobs, which tend to be substantial in the public sector 
(Assaad, 1999; Barsoum, 2015). Rather than having reservation wages, women may also 
have reservation working conditions in terms of reputation (Dougherty, 2014; Groh, 
McKenzie, Shammout, & Vishwanath, 2014).  
Additionally, only some types of jobs (such as self-employment or family 
employment) allow for a continuous division of time. Wage jobs tend to have fixed hours 
of work that are closely related to the type of work, especially public sector versus private 
sector (Assaad & Krafft, 2015c; Hoodfar, 1997). Ultimately, women’s choice of market 
labor supply, Twm, is going to take all of these factors into account. For modeling 
simplicity, assume that all of these different factors can be monetized into what is now 
the effective wage rate facing women, Ww. Since for women both the wage and non-wage 
benefits of public sector jobs are greater than private sector jobs, a decrease in 
government employment is essentially a decrease in Ww or in expected Ww.  
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Consider now the issue of how changes in this broad concept of Ww , for instance 
decreases in public sector employment decreasing “wages,” might affect childbearing. 
Start with a case that simplifies the above model to allow only tradeoffs in terms of child 
quantity, C, versus the composite consumption good, G. Assuming an interior solution 
and given the assumption of a constant returns to scale production function for both the 
goods, utility will be maximized when the marginal rate of substitution equals the relative 
prices for C and G (Ben-Porath, 1974): !"/!"!"/!" = !!"!! + !!!!! + !!!!!!"!! + !!!!! + !!!! = !!!!  
(3.7) 
where !! is hereafter shorthand for the full (shadow) price of a unit of good S (C or G). 
With this notation, demand for children can then be denoted in price and (full) income 
terms as !(!! ,!! ,!).  
Let there be a change in the availability of public sector jobs, denoted by B, which 
affects women’s wages, Ww. To determine how the change in public sector employment 
affects childbearing define both full price effects: !!!!" = !!!!" ∗ !!"!  !!!!" = !!!!" ∗ !!"!  
(3.8) 
and a full income effect:    !"!" = !!!!" Ω! (3.9) 
The impact of changing B on fertility is then: !"!" = !"!!! ∗ !!!!" + !"!!! ∗ !!!!" + !"!" ∗ !"!" !"!! = !!!!" !"!!! ∗ !!"! + !"!!! ∗ !!"! + !"!" ∗ Ω!  
(3.10) 
To sign all the terms it is helpful to, first, decompose the price effects into compensated 
price effects and income effects, where compensated price effects are denoted by the 
symbol ° below. Recall that by the Slutsky equation we know: 
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!"!!! = !"°!!! − ! !"!" !"!!! = !"°!!! − ! !"!" 
(3.11) 
As a result, (3.10) becomes: !"!" = !!!!" !"°!!! ∗ !!"! − ! !"!" ∗ !!"! + !"°!!! ∗ !!"! − ! !"!" ∗ !!"! + !"!" ∗ Ω!  !"!" = !!!!" !"°!!! ∗ !!"! + !"°!!! ∗ !!"! + !"!" Ω! − !!" − !!"  
(3.12) 
An important fact to keep in mind in is that, since compensated demand is homogenous 
of degree zero in prices, by Euler’s formula: !! ∗ !"°!!! + !! ∗ !"°!!! = 0 !"°!!! = − !!!! ∗ !"°!!!  
(3.13) 
Substituting (3.13) into (3.12) yields: !"!" = !!!!" !"°!!! ∗ !!"! − !!!! ∗ !"°!!! ∗ !!"! + !"!" ∗ !!"  (3.14) 
This equation can be transformed into elasticity terms in a series of steps as follows. 
First, multiply both sides by !! and the right hand side by !!!!: !"/!!"/! = !!!/!!!"/! !"°/!!!! ∗ !!"! ∗!! − !!!! ∗ !"°/!!!! ∗ !!"! ∗!! + !"/!!" ∗ !!" ∗!!  (3.15) 
With further manipulation this becomes: !"/!!"/! = !!!/!!!"/! !"°/!!!!/!! ∗!!!! ∗ !!"! − !"°/!!!!/!! ∗!!!! ∗ !!"! + !"/!!"/! !!" ∗!!!  (3.16) 
which can be denoted in elasticities (an elasticity is denoted by !) after gathering together 
terms as: !!" = !!!! !!°!! !!!! ∗ !!"! − ! !!! ∗ !!"! + !!" !!"!!!  (3.17) 
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It is now possible to define the elasticity of interest, !!", the (percentage) change 
in childbearing resulting from a (percentage) change in public sector job opportunities. 
The predictions of the model in terms of how households’ fertility (C) responds to 
changes in job opportunities are ambiguous. In (3.17), !!!! denotes how women’s 
wages change as public sector employment opportunities change, which we can readily 
sign as positive. Then the question is the sign of the term within the first set of 
parentheses. Since children are considered a normal good (!!" > 0), there is a positive 
income effect in terms of the number of children. 
Since the compensated price elasticity must be negative (!!°!!<0), a key question 
for the price effect is then in regards to the relative time intensity of children and other 
goods. It is generally assumed that children are more time intensive for women than other 
goods (Galor & Weil, 1996; Willis, 1973), i.e.: !!!! ∗ !!"! > ! !!! ∗ !!"!  !!"!!!!"!! + !!!!!! + !!! > !!"!!!!"!! + !!!!!! + !!!  
(3.18) 
Under this assumption, once multiplied by !!°!! the overall price effect term is negative. 
Empirically, increases in Ww  tend to decrease fertility (Borg, 1989; Schultz, 1985, 1997), 
which means the net effect of what must be a negative price effect and positive income 
effect is itself negative, but this is not pre-determined from this theory. 
The case becomes more complex when “child quality,” in terms of child 
education and health (E, H), and leisure (Lh,, Lw) are restored to the model. Empirically, 
child quantity and quality have been shown to be substitutes (Hanushek, 1992; Schultz, 
1997). Thus an increase in Ww could have ambiguous effects on C, G, E, and H 
depending also on dimensions such as the relative time intensity of E and H. Rather than 
make any assumptions about how individuals respond in this ambiguous case, this essay 
empirically investigates the relationship between economic opportunities for women and 
fertility. 
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Despite the shortcomings of the unitary household model, it provides a helpful 
starting point for conceptualizing how individuals make decisions or allocate goods 
within the household, particularly in terms of the impact of Ww. If either the husband or 
the wife were the sole decision-maker, as long as the decision-maker derived utility from 
both children and other goods, the model’s implications would be the same. The issue 
becomes more complex in considering a bargaining model, since changes in women’s 
employment opportunities might also affect their bargaining power. The implications for 
fertility would therefore also depend on the variation in preferences of husbands and 
wives for children. In Egypt, on average women report that their husbands would like 
more children than they themselves would prefer (Ministry of Health and Population, El-
Zanaty and Associates, & ICF International, 2015), suggesting another potential 
mechanism through which declining public sector employment might lead to increases in 
fertility is through decreases in women’s bargaining power.  
3.4 Methods 
The ultimate goal of this essay is to estimate the impact of employment 
opportunities, particularly government employment, on fertility, and to shed light on 
whether decreases in government hiring might have contributed to the recent rise in 
fertility in Egypt. There are two important econometric steps in this task. First, estimates 
are generated of the effect of employment on the probability of childbearing. For reasons 
that are discussed below, this requires estimating survival analysis (also known as hazard, 
duration or time-to-event) models parameterizing the relationship between employment 
and the annual probability of giving birth. Endogeneity of employment is a serious 
problem in estimation, as explained in more detail below. Second, the estimated survival 
analysis parameters are used to simulate how the relationship between employment and 
the probability of giving birth affects fertility rates. 
This section describes the methods used to model these relationships. The first 
sub-section describes summary measures of fertility. The second sub-section discusses 
the need for and implementation of survival analysis methods. The third and fourth sub-
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sections describe instrumental variable and fixed effect methods to account for the 
endogeneity of own employment. The fifth sub-section discusses the transformation of 
survival analysis results into summary measures of fertility.  
3.4.1 Describing Fertility 
There are many ways of measuring fertility and different measures do not 
necessarily move together. Each measure has its advantages and drawbacks, both 
conceptually and in empirical implementation based on survey data. Completed fertility 
rates (CFRs) are, in one sense, the best measure of fertility. These rates are the number of 
births to women who have completed their childbearing, and represent the essential 
concept of fertility, the number of children a woman will have over her lifetime. 
However, these rates only can be calculated for women past their childbearing years, and 
as such, are essentially decades out of date for the purpose of studying current 
childbearing (Bongaarts & Feeney, 1998). Other measures must be used to assess the 
behavior of women currently bearing children.  
There are two common measures that underlie alternative calculations of fertility 
rates, one based on recent childbearing across ages (age-specific fertility rates) and one 
based on parity (births to date) and duration-specific birth probabilities (the parity 
progression ratio) (Ní Bhrolcháin, 1992). Different combinations of these approaches 
have been used in modeling the impact of covariates on fertility measures (Retherford, 
Ogawa, Matsukura, & Eini-Zinab, 2010; Van Hook & Altman, 2013). Elements of both 
are used in the essay, as explained below, so both are described, along with additional 
summary measures such as the crude birth rate.  
Age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) are calculated for age groups from age x to 
x+n (i.e. 15-19) as in Palmore and Gardner (1994):  !"#$!,!,! = !!,!,!!!,!,!  (3.19) 
Here the numerator, !!,!,!, is the number of (live) births that occurred within s years or 
months preceding the survey, for women who were x to x+n years of age at the time of 
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the birth. The denominator of the ASFR, !!,!,!, is the number of woman-years lived in the 
age bracket from age x to age x+n in the s years or months preceding the survey (El-
Zanaty & Way, 2009; Palmore & Gardner, 1994). ASFRs therefore represent the annual 
probability of childbearing at a specific age. These statistics are typically presented 
multiplied by 1,000 since probabilities at a given age may be low. 
There are a number of important details to note about estimating these rates. 
Women’s age at the time of birth is used to categorize women rather than their current 
age so that statistics are not driven by the length of s.50 Age groups are usually five-year 
brackets, and s is typically the three years preceding the survey, conventions this essay 
follows. The women-years included in the ASFR estimate are for all women in the age 
bracket, regardless of marital status. Since fertility questions are typically asked for 
women in a specific age range, such as women aged 15-49, fertility for the oldest age 
group surveyed, in this case the group aged 44-49, is necessarily truncated. For instance, 
if one looks back two years one has data only on women aged 44-47 two years ago, since 
the women aged 48-49 two years prior to the survey were 50-51 years old at the time of 
the survey and thus were not asked the fertility questions.  
The advantage of ASFRs is that they are relatively up-to-date, in reflecting the 
behavior in recent years of a specific age group. They also are useful for information on 
when, in a woman’s lifetime, childbearing is taking place. The disadvantage of ASFRs is 
that they do not convey meaningful aggregate information about population trends. They 
do not directly indicate the number of children a woman will bear over her lifetime, an 
essential fact about fertility.  
However, estimated age-specific fertility rates can be used to calculate the total 
fertility rate (TFR). Because later an alternative method for calculating the TFR, based on 
parity progression ratios, is presented, denote the TFR based on the ASFRs as the 
TFRASFR. The TFRASFR is essentially the cumulative lifetime fertility implied by the 
                                                
50 If current age at the time of the survey were used instead of age at the time of birth, increasing s would 
erroneously attribute increasing numbers of births to later ages. 
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ASFRs. The TFRASFR is calculated as the sum of the ASFRs over each age, x, (Palmore & 
Gardner, 1994):  !"#!"#$ = !"#$!,!!  (3.20) 
When five-year age group ASFRs are estimated, it is assumed that the rates for each 
single year are the same as throughout the age bracket. The TFRASFR measure represents 
the number of children a woman would have during her childbearing years if she bore 
children at the ASFRs during those years and survived until the end of her child-bearing 
years (Palmore & Gardner, 1994).  
A number of challenges occur in calculating these rates from survey data. One is 
the issue of recall; asking women about their lifetime childbearing is subject to 
substantial recall bias, particularly for older women or women with high fertility. By 
restricting the period under investigation in the ASFR (and therefore the TFRASFR) to the 
past few years, this issue is diminished, although not necessarily eliminated, since, for 
instance, infants who died may be overlooked. Accurate reporting of ages for women 
may also be a problem; certainly heaping at five and ten year ages is observed 
empirically in many datasets. The five-year age brackets may help with this age heaping, 
since over-represented ages will be grouped with under-represented ones.   
Certain assumptions are also made in terms of who is asked questions about 
fertility. The DHS surveys in Egypt ask ever-married women ages 15-49 about their birth 
histories. Fertility among never-married women is therefore assumed to be zero (El-
Zanaty & Way, 2009). Responses about marital status among young women may not be 
accurate; the legal age of marriage in Egypt for women is now 18, and this may 
discourage accurate reporting of the marital status for women 15-17. Selective mortality 
can be an issue if women who have more children are more likely to die early, a potential 
problem given the relationship between childbirth and maternal mortality.  
An alternative measure of the total fertility rate that can be used to assess lifetime 
fertility is based on probabilities assessed across parities (number of children already 
born). This parity progression ratio (PPR) measure has the advantage of assessing the 
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probability of whether there is a birth based on the number of children already born, 
likely the driving factor in childbearing, rather than a woman’s age (Retherford, Ogawa, 
Matsukura, & Eini-Zinab, 2010). Denote as pM the probability of ever marrying and pB as 
the probability of progressing from marriage to first birth. Denote pi as the ratio for 
progression from i to i+1 birth, the probability of birth i+1 after birth i. The TFR based on 
the PPR (TFRPPR) can then be calculated as the sum of the probability of each birth, 
where the probability of each birth is based on multiplying out the PPRs: !"#!!" = !!!! + !!!!!! + !!!!!!!! +⋯ (3.21) 
In practice, since high parities are difficult to estimate past a certain point, an estimate of 
px+ is used for births numbered x and higher. This approach assumes that all higher order 
PPRs at x and higher equal px+ and then a geometric series is implied from x onwards. As 
was the case with ASFR measures, PPR measures of fertility can be limited to a certain 
period preceding the survey, or analyses can be done for different cohorts. The resulting 
estimates of TFR from ASFR and PPR measures can vary, given the different methods 
for calculation (Retherford, Ogawa, Matsukura, & Eini-Zinab, 2010).  
Although ASFRs and PPRs are typically contrasted as separate approaches to 
estimate the total fertility rate, their elements can also be combined. Age-specificity along 
with parity and duration dimensions may best capture fertility measures (Ní Bhrolcháin, 
1992; Van Hook & Altman, 2013). Because the comparator statistics for time trends, 
from the DHS, are based on ASFRs (El-Zanaty & Way, 2009), equivalent TFRASFR 
measures are reported for this essay’s descriptive statistics. However, as discussed in 
detail below, the multivariate models used incorporate dimensions of age, parity, and 
duration since last birth but the simulated fertility measures are more akin to the TFRPPR.  
As well as examining ASFRs and TFRs, this essay also discusses estimates of 
crude birth rates (CBRs). Crude birth rates are calculated as the (annual) number of live 
births, B, per 1,000 population, P, (Palmore & Gardner, 1994):   !"# = 1,000!! (3.22) 
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CBRs can be calculated either from survey data or based on national reporting and 
registration of births. CBRs have the advantage of being available in the interim between 
surveys, based on vital statistics systems. However, they are also sensitive to the 
distribution of the population, especially if there are differential population growth rates 
across fertile and other ages.  
ASFRs, TFRASFRs, and CBRs are all measures to quantify births and fertility. 
However, these quantity outcomes are also the product of the timing of births. The 
demography literature distinguishes between quantum, the amount of births, and tempo, 
the timing of births (Bongaarts & Feeney, 1998). Measures based on ASFRs can suffer 
from tempo distortions. All else being equal, if the mean age at childbearing is rising 
(falling) then the TFRASFR will always under- (over-) estimate the true CFR the same 
cohort will ultimately attain. This is because, as the mean age of childbearing rises (falls), 
bearing the same number of children is spread out over a longer (shorter) time period. 
3.4.2 Discrete-Time Survival Analysis Using the Logit Model 
The relationship between childbearing and employment is of interest in this essay. 
However, modeling fertility is not straightforward, as many women have not yet 
completed their childbearing. These women are right-censored in terms of whether they 
will have another birth. The timing and occurrence of childbearing, accounting for right 
censoring, is best modeled using survival analysis (Van Hook & Altman, 2013). 
Specifically, this essay uses survival analysis models to estimate the effect of 
employment and employment opportunities on the probability of having a child. Discrete-
time methods are used,51 since the data analyzed are annual.  
This essay specifically uses a discrete-time logit (logistic) model to estimate the 
probability of a birth occurring at a point in time (year). Either complementary log-log 
                                                
51 Quite commonly continuous-time models such as the Cox proportional hazard model are used even when 
the data are discrete. However, because of how Cox estimates are undertaken without a direct estimate of 
the baseline hazard, simulation of outcomes in relation to a time-varying covariates is problematic and 
“extreme caution” (Therneau & Grambsch, 2000, p. 272) advised. Because discrete-time methods, as 
shown below, estimate the hazard directly, incorporating time varying covariates in simulations is more 
tractable.      
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models or logit models can be used in discrete-time survival analysis (Retherford, 
Ogawa, Matsukura, & Eini-Zinab, 2010; Van Hook & Altman, 2013). The 
complementary log-log model is a proportional hazards model, like the Cox proportional 
hazards model. The discrete-time logit model estimates a proportional odds model and 
odds ratios (Retherford, Ogawa, Matsukura, & Eini-Zinab, 2010). Both models have been 
used in applications simulating fertility data (Retherford, Ogawa, Matsukura, & Eini-
Zinab, 2010; Van Hook & Altman, 2013). Empirically, results of the logit and 
complementary log-log model are similar, particularly when probabilities are small. A 
study estimating TFRs from survival models in the Philippines which compared the two 
models found similar results out to the second decimal place (Retherford, Ogawa, 
Matsukura, & Eini-Zinab, 2010). Because it is amenable to the incorporation of fixed 
effects (Allison, 2009), one of this essay’s identification strategies, the logit model is 
used.  
Controlling for individual characteristics such as place of residence, education, 
and age, logit models can be used to measure the effect of employment opportunities on 
the spacing and probability of sequential births (giving birth once married, having a 
second birth after a first, a third birth after a second, etc.). The dependent variable 
underlying these models is essentially the time, in years, from one birth to the next (or 
from marriage to the first birth). For estimation, this duration is transformed into the 
probability of having a birth in each year if that birth has not yet occurred.52 Having a 
birth at a particular time, t, can be denoted as Tt. Then the probability of interest is the 
discrete-time hazard function, hit (Jenkins, 1995): ℎ!" = Pr!(!!|!! ≥ !) (3.23) 
                                                
52 An alternative approach to estimating events in survival analysis is the split-population model, which 
relaxes the assumption common to survival models that every observation eventually experiences the event. 
Split-population models divide the population into those that will never experience an event and those that 
will. Then essentially two models are estimated, one for the probability of ever experiencing an event and 
one for the timing of an event (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Schmidt & Witte, 1989). Such separate 
modeling is required when a model erroneously assumes everyone eventually fails (has the event), 
primarily a problem in parametric models. Because the empirically estimated baseline probability of an 
event can go to zero in the models implemented in this essay, split-population models are not required.  
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The logit estimates the relationship between this hazard and covariates, Xit, as 
(Jenkins, 1995): ℎ!" = 1{1+ exp −! ! − !!!" } (3.24) 
or log ℎ!"1− ℎ!" = ! ! + !!!" (3.25) 
The term ! !  is a series of dummies for the different years.53 The estimated coefficients, !, can be exponentiated to generate odds ratios, the relationship between a one-unit 
increase in a covariate and the odds of failure (giving birth). When the covariates are set 
to zero, equation (3.24) can be used to estimate the baseline hazard function from ! ! , 
the probability of having a birth at each point in time for the reference case (Retherford, 
Ogawa, Matsukura, & Eini-Zinab, 2010). To accommodate this modeling, the analyzed 
data is structured so that an observation is essentially a person-parity-year. This also 
facilitates the inclusion of time-varying covariates, such as employment opportunities 
changing over time or the year itself varying.  
Since fertility is generally a repeated event, i.e. a single woman has multiple 
births over her lifetime, adjustments are made for the repeated nature of these events. The 
data are structured such that a woman is not at risk for birth N until birth N-1 has 
occurred. Controls are included to account for the fact that the baseline hazard will vary 
over different births (Prentice, Williams, & Peterson, 1981). Models incorporate a fully 
interacted set of parity (number of children already born) and time (! ! ) dummy 
variables as controls to account for any potential heterogeneity in baseline hazards. 
Essentially the baseline hazard (probability) of each parity (first, second, third, etc.) at 
each year (0-1 year since last birth (or marriage), 1-2 years since last birth (or marriage), 
etc.) is estimated. Additionally, models include clustered standard errors to allow for 
potential correlation across years within parities, across parities for specific women, or 
among women in the same PSU.  
                                                
53 Year here in the sense of years from last birth or marriage, not calendar year. 
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3.4.3 Instrumenting for Own Employment 
Although the logit model can allow for a rich set of covariates, estimates of the 
causal impact of employment on fertility are likely to be biased due to the potential 
endogeneity of employment. One potential cause of endogeneity in this context is omitted 
variables. For instance, unmeasured local cultural norms that discourage women’s 
employment and encourage their childbearing could lead to estimates of the impact of 
women’s employment on fertility that are biased in the direction of a large negative 
impact. Reverse causality or simultaneity, wherein women might leave employment or 
enter employment because they have had a child (rather than have a child because of 
employment) or might make a joint decision about employment and childbearing, are 
also likely to be problems. These problems are also likely to bias the impact of public 
sector employment on fertility in the direction of a large negative impact.  
In general, there are several potential methods for overcoming endogeneity. 
Incorporating additional observable characteristics can help address the fundamental 
underlying problem of omitted variables. For instance, most of the models estimated 
include a full set of governorate of birth dummies interacted with urban/rural residence, 
which are likely to absorb a substantial share of the effect of local cultural norms. This 
essay includes a rich set of covariates, described in the data section below, to try to 
control for such differences. Identification of the impact of employment is unlikely to be 
achieved through controls alone, however, as unobserved individual tastes for work and 
children cannot be controlled for. Two methods might potentially alleviate these 
challenges and allow for causal identification: one is instrumental variables and the other 
is woman-level fixed effects.  
A potentially viable instrument for women’s own employment is urban/rural-
governorate level employment opportunities (in a woman’s place of birth, which is less 
likely to suffer from location endogeneity54). There is not, however, a well established 
practice for estimating a discrete-time duration model with instrumental variables. A 
number of challenges arise in instrumenting for employment, a binary variable, in the 
                                                
54 Most ever-married women (84%) currently reside in their governorate and urban/rural location of birth.  
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context of a nonlinear duration model. Predicting the endogenous variable in a nonlinear 
regression framework (i.e. using a logit, probit, etc.) in the first stage of instrumental 
variables estimation will only be consistent if the assumed functional form is exactly 
right (Angrist & Krueger, 2001). Problems may also arise in a non-linear second stage.  
The problems with the non-linear case suggest that linear approaches should be 
used, namely two-stage least squares (2SLS), since there are no restrictions in the 
assumptions of 2SLS as to whether the endogenous variables or instruments are 
continuous or discrete (Angrist & Krueger, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002). However, the 
underlying model for 2SLS is additive, and it is quite obvious that duration models are 
not likely to be additive. Consider the case at hand, where the impact of public sector 
employment is of interest. The impact of employment is not simply going to be a 2 
percentage point lower annual probability of birth, which is the sort of estimate that one 
would obtain from a 2SLS model that is essentially a pair of linear probability models for 
employment and childbearing. This 2 percentage point estimate averages over the effects 
of many years, ages, and parities, including at times when the baseline hazard is quite 
high, perhaps a 30% chance, to times when the baseline hazard is very near zero. A 
multiplicative functional form, such as a 95% chance of childbearing, is much more 
appropriate.   
The preferred approach in inherently non-linear settings is an instrumental 
variables control function approach (Wooldridge, 2015), also called two-stage residual 
inclusion (2SRI) in the health literature (Terza, Basu, & Rathouz, 2008). This approach 
has been demonstrated to perform better than alternatives in simulations for a variety of 
non-linear outcomes (Terza, Basu, & Rathouz, 2008; Terza, Bradford, & Dismuke, 2008) 
and also shown to perform well in a survival analysis setting (Carlin & Solid, 2014). 
Additionally, alternative methods such as joint quasi-maximum likelihood estimation are 
problematic in a case with discrete outcomes or discrete endogenous variables, such as 
both childbearing and employment. Control function/2SRI methods provide a simpler 
approach in such contexts (Wooldridge, 2014).  
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Consider the case where the outcome of interest, y, is based on a nonlinear 
function, M( ), and the regressors, x, can be partitioned into those that are endogenous, e, 
observable (and observed) confounders, o, and unobservable confounders u (Terza, Basu, 
& Rathouz, 2008): ! = ! !!!! + !!!! + !!!! + ! (3.26) 
The unobservable confounders are correlated with the endogenous variables, specifically 
there is some auxiliary equation for the endogenous variables: !! = ! !" + !! (3.27) 
where w includes both !! and instrument(s) z. Here the instruments, z, must satisfy the 
usual assumptions (Terza, Basu, & Rathouz, 2008): 
• !! are not correlated with z 
• z are sufficiently correlated with !! (no weak instruments) 
• z have no direct influence on y and are not correlated with ! (exclusion restriction) 
With this notation and these conditions, the control function/2SRI approach estimates a 
first stage of: !! = ! !!  (3.28) 
Which yields residuals: !! = !! − ! !!  (3.29) 
The second stage estimator allows for a non-linear model: ! = ! !!!! + !!!! + !!!! + !!!"# (3.30) 
Here !!!"# is the error term from the second stage.  
In the linear case, this is identical to 2SLS. In the non-linear case, the parameters 
of 2SRI characterize the conditional mean and are consistent, but 2SLS estimates are 
inconsistent (Terza, Basu, & Rathouz, 2008). Initially proposed as a specification test for 
endogeneity (Hausman, 1978), variations on residual inclusion approaches have been 
specified for count outcomes (Mullahy, 1997; Wooldridge, 1999, 2002) and binary 
outcomes (Rivers & Vuong, 1988). In the case at hand, 2SRI is used in the previously 
discussed survival analysis framework of logit estimation, with an instrument (a z) of 
governorate-urban/rural public sector employment for own employment in a particular 
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year based on a linear probability model. Standard errors are bootstrapped, with 
clustering at the PSU level.  
Public sector employment on an annual governorate-urban/rural basis merits some 
discussion as to its exogeneity and validity as an instrument. It is quite possible that 
public sector employment is correlated with some unobserved factors that do matter—
such as the local availability of health services and general economic development—but 
these conditions are controlled for. In general, local government employment is centrally 
set (Assaad, 1997a) and cannot be modified by individuals, so the instrument cannot be 
manipulated. Additionally, as discussed in detail in the data section below, there are 38 
unique combinations of urban/rural and governorate and 21 years of annual local 
measures used, which provide variation in the instrument, an important element of 
identification. Overall, using local government employment to instrument for own 
employment should address both omitted variables and potential reverse causality or 
simultaneity of employment.  
3.4.4 Incorporating Fixed Effects Using the Conditional Logit Model 
Identification of the effect of own employment on fertility can also potentially be 
achieved using a survival analysis woman fixed effect model to difference out 
unobserved characteristics on the woman level. The survival analysis literature tends to 
address the issue of unobservable heterogeneity across individuals with what are referred 
to as “frailty” models, where frailty is an unobserved random effect for an individual or 
group. Frailities are included in the hazard function, and can be modeled with a variety of 
different distributions, including normal and gamma distributions (Moeschberger & 
Klein, 2003). However, as with random effect models in general, using frailty to account 
for unobserved heterogeneity in hazard models requires assumptions that the random 
effect is independent (Murphy, 1995) and therefore uncorrelated with the Xit. Also, in 
general, the distribution of the error has to be assumed to follow a specific functional 
form. 
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A better method for accounting for unobserved heterogeneity is a fixed effect 
model, specifically (Allison, 2009): log ℎ!"1− ℎ!" = !! + ! ! + !!!" (3.31) 
with !! being a fixed effect for a particular woman. Estimation using dummy variables 
for each woman tends to suffer from typical panel data incidental parameters problems 
(Chamberlain, 1980) and performs poorly in survival analysis applications (Duchateau & 
Janssen, 2007). The one model that performs well for discrete outcomes while 
incorporating fixed effects is the conditional logit model, which uses conditional 
maximum likelihood estimation such that the !! themselves are not estimated (Allison, 
2009; Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, fixed effect logits (conditional logits) for individual 
women are estimated over different years and births. Fixed effects for multiple durations 
(births) on a single unit (an individual woman) remove biases related to time-invariant 
woman-specific effects and are especially important when the woman-specific effects are 
correlated with covariates. Essentially, this method creates woman-specific fixed effects 
across the timing and probability of different births.55 Women act as their own controls. 
This method should be effective for removing unobserved characteristics that are 
constant for women over time, such as fixed preferences for children, other goods, and 
leisure/work.  
Using own employment in a fixed effects model will likely not overcome 
problems of reverse causality. For instance, women may still exit jobs when they are 
planning to have a child, creating spurious results. However, variation in local 
employment opportunities can be considered exogenous after absorbing any time-
invariant characteristics of women (and their birth locales) into a fixed effect. 
Government employment opportunities will be correlated with own employment but 
                                                
55 This approach is slightly different than that for continuous time in the Cox proportional hazard model, 
wherein individual strata can be used to simulate fixed effects. The individual strata allow each woman to 
have her own baseline hazard because the baseline hazards drop out in partial likelihood estimation 
(Allison, 2009). In the conditional logit, women have their own effects on the hazard, but not their own 
baseline hazards. For the case at hand, this is akin to assuming certain women have fewer, more spaced out 
births while others have more, more closely spaced births. 
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should not suffer from the remaining endogeneity problem, reverse causality or 
simultaneity, of own employment. Essentially, a reduced form of the instrumental 
variable model can be estimated using government employment opportunities directly 
along with woman fixed effects, in addition to the 2SRI models that instrument for 
employment directly.  
3.4.5 From Multivariate Methods to Fertility Estimates 
While survival models produce hazard estimates that indicate important 
relationships, of particular interest are changes in summary measures, such as total 
fertility rates. It is possible to translate hazard model coefficients into total fertility rates, 
since essentially probabilities are being modeled. Both Van Hook and Altman (2013) and 
Retherford et al. (2010) illustrate similar methods for estimating total fertility rates from 
discrete-time survival models. Once the discrete-time hazard model has been fitted, 
predicted hazards, ajk, are simulated for the probability of having a birth at each duration 
from the previous birth (or marriage), k, and parity, j. In order to translate the hazards into 
fertility measures like the TFR, the conditional probability represented by the hazard 
must be translated into the unconditional probability of a birth. For each parity and 
duration since last birth, the ajk are multiplied by the proportion bjk at risk of birth j at 
duration k, to produce an unconditional probability, cjk: !!" = !!"!!" (3.32) 
Since the models are specifically for the duration from marriage to the first birth, etc., the 
proportion at risk initially for a first birth is the proportion who ever marry.56 The 
proportion at risk for bj0 after the first birth is the sum over k of cj-1k, for example the 
group at risk of a third birth is the share of women who ultimately have a second birth.  
The bjk at risk evolve within a parity based on the probability of progressing from one 
parity to the next at each duration: !!" = !!"!! − !!"!! (3.33) 
                                                
56 Implemented here based on the rates in the 2014 DHS (Ministry of Health and Population, El-Zanaty and 
Associates, & ICF International, 2015). 
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The parity-specific TFR can then be calculated as the sum of cjk over all durations 
(Van Hook & Altman, 2013): !"#! = !!"!  (3.34) 
After this calculation has been sequenced across each of the parities, then the overall TFR 
can be calculated as (Retherford, Ogawa, Matsukura, & Eini-Zinab, 2010; Van Hook & 
Altman, 2013):  !"#!!" = !!"!!  (3.35) 
This is the sum of the probabilities of births across all possible births and durations over 
the reproductive lifetime (assuming no mortality). As with other measures of fertility, 
these simulations provide the TFR for what would occur if women experienced all of the 
predicted probabilities from the hazard model over their reproductive lifetimes (Van 
Hook & Altman, 2013). The simulated TFRs can incorporate covariates, x, into the 
predicted hazards, ajk, as ajkx. The covariates, x, can be varied to simulate TFRs for 
different profiles, for instance for a public-employment profile as compared to a no-
public-employment profile. Standard errors can be generated around the TFR estimates 
for different profiles using bootstrapping (Van Hook & Altman, 2013). 
3.5 Data  
This essay uses the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS), a rich panel data 
set that includes detailed information on individuals’ labor market and demographic 
characteristics. The ELMPS is a household survey with three rounds to date: 1998, 2006, 
and 2012. The 2006 and 2012 rounds include both previous round households, split 
households, and a refresher sample. In 2012, the sample totaled 12,060 households and 
49,186 individuals. Each round includes a detailed work history for all individuals 15-64 
who ever worked, and the 2006 and 2012 rounds include detailed fertility data for ever-
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married women. The rounds are nationally representative at the time of fielding, and the 
data include weights that account for sample attrition processes.57  
3.5.1 Outcomes 
Fertility histories from 2006 and 2012 are used to identify the timing and number 
of births for descriptive measures of fertility. Birth history data are available for women 
aged 18-49 in 2012 and 16-49 in 2006, and they include the year and month of each live 
birth starting from the first child. For the multivariate models, only the 2012 round is 
used to have the greatest time span of years incorporated.58 The birth history data and the 
date of first marriage are used to construct the length of birth intervals in years,59 that is 
the time from marriage to the first birth, the first birth to the second, the second to the 
third, the third to the fourth, etc., the underlying outcomes used in the analysis. These 
outcomes can be right censored if a birth has not yet occurred, or will never occur. As is 
common with duration outcomes, information on both the time until an event (birth) and 
whether it occurs are captured jointly by the length of the interval and whether it ends 
with another birth or is right censored. 
3.5.2 Covariates 
Labor market histories from all three rounds (1998, 2006, and 2012) are used to 
construct annual data on individuals’ labor market statuses. The data include information 
on the start year of each status,60 the type of employment (wage work, employer, self-
employed, unpaid family work), and the sector of employment (public/private). An 
annual individual work history measuring participation in the public sector is constructed 
                                                
57 See Assaad and Krafft (Assaad & Krafft, 2013) for additional information on the ELMPS. Weights are 
used with this essay’s descriptive statistics. Regressions do not use sampling weights since sampling is 
unrelated to the dependent variable and in such a case unweighted methods are preferred (Deaton, 1997; 
Winship & Radbill, 1994).  
58 Comparisons of annual fertility rates for the early 2000s indicate relatively comparable data for that 
period across the ELMPS 2006 and ELMPS 2012.  
59 Although data are collected for the month of birth, there is a substantial share (9%) of “don’t know” 
responses for the month of a birth, making annual analyses preferable.  
60 Although data are collected for the month of status start, the large share of “don’t know” responses 
makes annual analyses preferable as well as consistent with the use of annual birth history data.  
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over time based on the 2012 data. Analyses comparing the contemporaneous (panel) data 
to the retrospective data across rounds suggest that the quality of retrospective reports of 
public sector employment is relatively high. Consistency of reporting across panel and 
retrospective data for public sector jobs was in the range of 85-89%, with slightly more 
consistent reporting among women than men (Assaad, Krafft, & Yassine, 2015). This 
suggests that while there may be some measurement error attenuating the coefficient on 
public sector employment, attenuation is likely to be small.  
Since local employment opportunities are themselves of interest and, as an 
instrument, may address endogeneity problems, individuals’ participation in public sector 
work is also aggregated into annual means at the urban/rural and governorate level based 
on place of birth61 for individuals 25-39.62 There are 21 governorates and 38 unique 
combinations of governorate and urban/rural (four governorates do not have any rural 
areas). Histories for the six (2012) to eight years (2006, 1998) from the date of each 
survey backwards in time are used, to minimize recall bias while providing a substantial 
time span of data. 
All models include year dummies as well as a fully interacted set of parity and 
duration since last birth or marriage dummies, which account for duration and parity 
dependence. A number of other covariates are included in the analyses. See Table 3.1 for 
summary statistics on the covariates, as measured for each woman at each parity and year 
(duration) since last birth, which is the data structure used in the multivariate models. 
Since age has an important relationship with fertility, age groups are incorporated into the 
analyses. The categorical educational attainment of women is incorporated, given strong 
relationships in the literature between education and fertility. Place of birth is controlled 
for, as a fully interacted set of birth governorate and urban/rural dummies, since local 
cultural differences and other local factors may affect fertility. As potential measures of 
socio-economic status, the woman’s parents’ education (categorically for both her mother 
                                                
61 Women not born in Egypt or born in the Frontier governorates are excluded from the analyses since these 
areas are not covered by the ELMPS. Because the Luxor governorate was split from the Qena governorate 
during the period of study the two are combined as Qena throughout.  
62 This age range is to proxy prime childbearing years among those old enough to have finished all of their 
schooling.  
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and father) is included in the analyses. Because son preference has been linked 
historically to childbearing in Egypt, with families with no living sons more likely to 
have children (Yount, Langsten, & Hill, 2000), an additional control is included for 
whether the woman has, as yet, borne any sons.63 Because the data are women-years 
starting at marriage and many women in the sample are early in their childbearing, less 
than the majority of women-years (44%) have a son. 
An additional set of controls attempts to measure access to health care, especially 
family planning, a key factor that will affect fertility. Unfortunately, access to family 
planning is not readily measured directly—the common measure of family planning 
prevalence conflates both supply and demand for family planning. As a proxy for access 
to family planning, prenatal care coverage is used. Data were compiled from Egyptian 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHSs) for 1992, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2014 on 
prenatal care coverage on a governorate and urban/rural level for births in the five years 
preceding each survey. Linear interpolation was used to generate trends in years between 
DHS surveys.  
Another set of controls on the governorate level measures mean life expectancy, 
adult (15+) literacy, and the GDP per capita (which was translated into real 2012 
Egyptian pound (LE) terms using the CPI (World Bank, 2013b)). These data were 
collected from the Egyptian Human Development Reports (HDRs) for 1995, 1998/1999, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2010 (Institute of National Planning, 1995, 2000; UNDP & 
Institute of National Planning Egypt, 2004; UNDP & Institute of National Planning, 
2003, 2005, 2008, 2010). Data were typically for one to two years prior to the report, but 
the date varied across indicators. These characteristics should control for general health 
and socio-economic conditions that might affect childbearing decisions. As with the 
prenatal care data, linear interpolation was used to generate local trends in years without 
data. Throughout the essay, although descriptive statistics are presented for the mean 
observed values of the incorporated continuous variables, all the continuous variables 
                                                
63 Empirical testing determined that the binary of having a son was what mattered. Beyond having a son, 
whether a daughter had been born or the percentage of children that were male did not affect fertility.  
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(prenatal care, life expectancy, adult literacy, and GDP per capita) are shifted to have a 
mean of zero in the multivariate analyses (the observed mean is subtracted from the 
observed values). This allows the baseline hazard across parities and births to be a more 
meaningful reference value. 
A series of additional analyses are conducted controlling for spouse 
characteristics. Spouse data are not available for all women, as the husband may not be 
present due to death, migration, separation, or divorce. Approximately 89% of women 
included in the sample have a spouse present in the household at the time of the survey. 
The age group of the spouse at each year, his education (categorically, as with women), 
and his time-varying employment in the public sector (based on his retrospective labor 
market history data) are incorporated as controls in this subset of regressions. The 
regressions with these additional controls can help test the possibility that there are 
substantial fertility preference differentials among individuals and households who work 
in the public sector.  
3.5.3 Time Period Analyzed 
Given the restricted universe of fertility histories (ages 18-49) and local labor 
market histories (back to 1991), the analysis is limited to the period 1991 to 2011. The 
oldest women with fertility histories, age 49, would have been 28 in 1991, which is above 
the 75th percentile for age at first birth (as shown in Figure 3.5 below). The time frame 
therefore provides the largest time window possible with reliable coverage of fertility and 
labor market histories. Women enter this data once they have married, so long as they 
married between 1991 and 2011.64 Restricting the analysis to women who married in 
1991 or thereafter essentially restricts the data to entry cohorts into motherhood, which 
are ideal for survival analysis. 
                                                
64 In order to be able to simulate fertility, women do not leave this model if they become separated, 
widowed, or divorced. These events are, however, fairly rare during fertile years. For instance, just 2.9% of 
women 40-44 were divorced and 5.9% widowed (Salem, 2015). 
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3.6 Descriptive Patterns of Fertility and Employment 
3.6.1 Trends in Total Fertility Rates 
An important initial result of the analysis is that fertility has risen recently in 
Egypt. Figure 3.1 presents fertility trends in Egypt, specifically the TFR (based on the 
ASFR) as measured by various surveys, primarily Demographic and Health Surveys over 
the period 1980-2014 (El-Zanaty & Way, 2009). Additionally, Figure 3.1 includes the 
TFR calculated from the 2012 ELMPS. In 1980, the TFR was quite high, at 5.3, and 
declined rapidly, falling to 3.6 by 1995. Since 1995, there have been moderate 
fluctuations in the TFR, but over the period 2000-2008 it declined from 3.5 to 3.0. The 
2006 round of the ELMPS found a TFR of 3.0, consistent with the 2005 DHS (TFR of 
3.1) and 2008 DHS (TFR of 3.0). However, the 2012 ELMPS indicates a substantial rise 
in fertility, to a TFR of 3.5. The trend of rising fertility has since been confirmed in the 
2014 DHS, which found a TFR of 3.5 as well (Ministry of Health and Population, El-
Zanaty and Associates, & ICF International, 2015). This essay argues that one of the 
factors contributing to these patterns, especially the flattening and then rise in fertility, is 
diminishing economic opportunities for women in Egypt.  
3.6.2 Trends in Age-Specific Fertility Rates 
The ASFRs underlying the TFRs also present a number of important trends 
(Figure 3.2). The general decline in fertility over 1980-2000 was driven by particularly 
steep declines in ages 25-44, with smaller decreases at the youngest ages, consistent with 
women rapidly having a first child after marriage (which typically occurs in the 20-24 
age bracket, as discussed below). The results for the ELMPS rounds of 2006 and 2012 
are generally consistent with the DHS surveys. The recent uptick in fertility from 2008-
2012 included substantial increases for age groups 20-39. The 2014 DHS results suggest 
that fertility is continuing to shift to younger ages, even to the extent that it is decreasing 
at older ages.  
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3.6.3 Trends in Crude Birth Rates 
There are a relatively finite number of data points for ASFRs and TFRs, since 
they depend on surveys; however, Egypt has a vital statistics systems that generates 
annual estimates of crude birth rates (CBRs), providing more frequently collected data. 
CBRs are births per thousand of population, and will be affected by the age structure of 
the population, as well as underlying fertility patterns. Figure 3.3 presents the CBRs for 
Egypt over the period 1988-2013. Starting in 1988, the CBR was 37.8 births per thousand 
population. It declined rapidly through the early 1990s, fluctuating in the 28-26 range 
from 1992 into the 2000s. Starting in 2007, the CBR began to rise substantially, reaching 
31.9 in 2012, and 31.0 in 2013. The CBRs in Egypt track quite closely with the TFRs 
(Figure 3.1), which hit a low of 3.0 in 2008 based on data for the preceding 1-36 months, 
i.e. the low period of 2005-2007 in the CBRs, and have risen to 3.5 in 2012 and 2014, 
consistent with higher CBRs over 2009-2013.   
3.6.4 Trends in Age at Marriage and Family Planning 
Two key issues that must be examined in reference to fertility changes are 
patterns in the age of marriage and use of family planning. In Egypt almost all births 
occur within marriages, so the timing of marriage essentially determines when women 
are at risk of becoming pregnant. Figure 3.4 displays the trends in the proportion of 
women married by various ages in Egypt by year of birth. For instance, among women 
born in the 1960s, less than 10% were married by age 15, a little more than 25% were 
married by age 18, more than 50% were married by age 21, and nearly 75% were married 
by age 24. The proportion of women married by ages 15 through 21 steadily declined for 
women born in the 1960s through about 1980. Starting around the 1980 birth cohort, 
while the proportion of women married by age 15 continued to decline, the proportion of 
women married by various older ages, particularly age 21, increased. Essentially, in 
Egypt, while marriage at younger ages was decreasing for the cohorts born in 1960 
through the late 1970s, for cohorts born in the 1980s through 1990s, more women were 
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marrying at younger ages, particularly in their early 20s. Marriage also remains nearly 
universal in Egypt; by their late 30s almost all women marry. 
Additionally, first births follow closely the timing of marriage. The prompt arrival 
of a child subsequent to marriage is the norm; the 2014 DHS for Egypt found that just 2% 
of ever-married women age 15-49 consider it appropriate to use family planning before 
the first pregnancy, while 92% thought it was appropriate to use family planning after the 
first birth (Ministry of Health and Population, El-Zanaty and Associates, & ICF 
International, 2015). The timing of the first child is much less likely to be affected by 
access to family planning methods or socio-economic change. Only the age at marriage is 
likely to drive the timing of first births. Figure 3.5 demonstrates this empirically, tracing 
the distributions of age at first marriage and first birth over time in Egypt for the 25th, 
50th, and 75th percentiles of each distribution. As well a clear pattern of co-locomotion, 
the persistence of an approximately two year gap between marriage and first birth over 
time and over the distribution is evident. For example, 50% of women born in 1970 had 
married by age 21, and 50% had their first birth by age 23. The trends in age at 
marriage—rising and then falling—will inevitably shape measures of fertility.  
Another key factor that intersects with fertility is the use of family planning 
methods. Use of family planning is an outcome of both supply and demand dimensions, 
including a couple’s desired fertility, their knowledge of planning methods, and their 
access (including financial access) to such methods. The ELMPS does not ask about 
family planning behaviors. However, Egypt DHSs have detailed information on this 
topic. Figure 3.6 presents the percentage of currently married women (ages 15-49) using 
family planning methods (modern or traditional)65 over time in Egypt based on the DHS 
surveys. Starting in 1980 just 24% of married women were using family planning. This 
rate rose fairly rapidly to 48% of women by 1991. The rate of increase slowed in the 
1990s, with 56% of women using family planning by 2000 and 60% by 2003. Since 
                                                
65 Methods of family planning incorporated into this statistic include modern methods (female sterilization, 
the pill, IUDs, injectables, implants, male condoms, diaphragm/foam/jelly, other), and traditional methods 
(periodic abstinence, withdrawal, prolonged breastfeeding, other) (Ministry of Health and Population, El-
Zanaty and Associates, & ICF International, 2015). 
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2003, the rate of family planning use has changed very little, with 59% of married 
women using family planning in the 2005 DHS, 60% as of the 2008 DHS, and 59% as of 
the 2014 DHS (El-Zanaty & Way, 2009; Ministry of Health and Population, El-Zanaty 
and Associates, & ICF International, 2015). This plateauing may be in part due to policy 
changes. USAID was a substantial supplier of contraceptives in Egypt for many years. In 
2004, USAID began shifting responsibility for contraceptive supply onto the Egyptian 
government, with the government taking full responsibility by 2007 (USAID, 2011).  
Although there remains some unmet need66 for family planning in Egypt (12% as 
of the 2008 DHS and 13% as of the 2014 DHS), there has also been a rise in the “total 
wanted fertility rate,” that is the fertility rate if unwanted births were excluded from the 
numerator of the TFR. The total wanted fertility rate has risen from 2.4 as of the 2008 
DHS to 2.8 as of the 2014 DHS (Ministry of Health and Population, El-Zanaty and 
Associates, & ICF International, 2015), suggesting that couples are actively deciding to 
have more children. The reasons for this preference for additional children are likely to 
be complex, but one potential factor is women’s lack of employment opportunities.   
3.6.5 Trends in Employment 
The question this essay investigates is whether recent increases in fertility in 
Egypt might be caused, in part, by decreases in employment opportunities for women due 
to the shrinking role of the public sector in employment. Figure 3.7 demonstrates the 
declining availability of public sector employment by showing the share of the population 
25-39 in each year67 working in the public sector over time based on the labor market 
histories in the ELMPS 2012. There has been a steady decline in public sector work over 
the 1991-2012 period, from 24% of 25-39 year-olds employed in the public sector in 
1991 to 14% in 2012. Males experienced a more rapid decline, from 33% to 18% over the 
                                                
66 The unmet need statistics presented here are the percentage of fecund women who are (i) not using 
contraception (neither modern nor traditional methods) and who (ii) wish to postpone the next birth or stop 
childbearing entirely (Ministry of Health and Population, El-Zanaty and Associates, & ICF International, 
2015). 
67 This group is of an age to have finished even a higher education and potentially be working. It is also, for 
women, peak childbearing ages. 
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period, while the share for females fell from a high of 15-16% in the 1990s to 10% by 
2012. Although this decrement is unlikely to be the sole factor driving increases in the 
fertility, the decline in government employment opportunities could be having important 
implications for fertility decisions. 
3.6.6 Employment and Family Formation 
Public sector work and non-wage work are much more easily reconciled with 
marriage and family formation. Figure 3.8 shows how women’s market work evolves in 
the years leading up to and after their marriages. An increasing share of women engage in 
market work (largely due to finishing school and entering the workforce) in the years 
leading up to marriage. However, at marriage almost half of those working in the private 
sector leave private sector wage work, but the shares in public sector work and non-wage 
work (being an employer, self-employed, or an unpaid family worker) continue to 
increase. Thus, in addition to public sector opportunities prior to marriage, which may 
affect the timing of marriage, as well as work and childbearing after marriage, the trends 
in public sector opportunities will affect fertility after marriage by providing women with 
more or fewer opportunities for work.  
3.6.7 Patterns of Fertility by Characteristics 
Fertility is linked with a number of women’s individual and household 
characteristics. Table 3.2 shows the relationship between TFRs and different 
characteristics of women and their households and how these relationships have varied 
from 2006 to 2012. Differences must be interpreted with some caution since, in addition 
to sampling variability, different tempo effects could be occurring for different groups. 
The first characteristic examined is whether women ever worked in a public sector job. In 
2006, the TFR for women who had worked in the public sector was 2.6, compared to 3.0 
for those who had not. In 2012, the rate had risen for both groups but the gap remained; 
those women who had ever worked in the public sector had a TFR of 3.2, compared to 
3.5 for those who had not. The rise in TFR for both groups suggests that although the 
decline in public sector work may be one factor contributing to rising TFRs, it is 
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definitely not the only factor. Additionally, a number of other characteristics, such as 
education, may be behind the observed link between fertility and public sector work.  
Fertility is closely linked to education, but the relationship is not monotonic. The 
TFR is highest for illiterate individuals in 2012, 4.0, while literate but uneducated 
individuals have a TFR of 3.0. Primary educated individuals have a TFR of 3.7, 
preparatory educated individuals a TFR of 3.5, vocational secondary graduates a TFR of 
3.9, post-secondary institute graduates a TFR of 2.9, and university and above graduates 
a TFR of 3.2 as of 2012.68 Looking at the evolution of the relationship between fertility 
and education over time, it is notable that vocational secondary graduates—the group that 
previously had guaranteed employment in government and has experienced the largest 
decrement in government employment opportunities across generations (Amer, 2015; 
Assaad & Krafft, 2014)—also had the greatest increase in TFR from 2006 to 2012, from 
3.1 to 3.9. Still, TFRs have increased for all education levels, even to a similar extent for 
the illiterate and those with university education. 
Looking at geographic differences, urban areas have a lower TFR (3.2) than rural 
areas (3.7) in 2012, and both experienced increases in fertility over 2006 to 2012, as did 
all regions, but to varying extents. In 2012, the Alexandria and Suez Canal region had the 
lowest TFR, 2.8, followed by Greater Cairo and urban Lower Egypt, then urban Upper 
Egypt and rural Lower Egypt, with rural Upper Egypt having the highest TFR in 2012, at 
4.0. Women living in poorer households have higher fertility; those in the poorest 20% of 
households have a TFR of 3.9, those in the middle three quintiles 3.5-3.6, and those in the 
richest quintile 2.9. Fertility decreases with both mother’s and father’s education, but not 
monotonically. Overall, individual and household characteristics are related to fertility, 
but increases in fertility have been occurring, albeit to varying extents, across the board.  
                                                
68 Bootstrapped standard errors, estimated with clustering, indicate that, first, the differences in total TFR 
from 2006 to 2012 are statistically significant. Second, many of the differences by characteristics within a 
year, such as by education in 2012, are statistically significant. Third, many of the changes that have 
occurred over time within groups appear to be statistically significant as well.   
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3.7 The Relationship between Fertility and Employment 
This section presents the results on the impact of employment on childbearing 
across the different estimation methods. The section begins with the baseline hazards of 
childbearing by years since previous birth and parity. Then the discrete-time survival 
analysis (logit) models are estimated to see the impact of public sector work on fertility, 
incorporating a number of controls. Models are also estimated with women fixed-effects 
as well as incorporating local employment opportunities instead of own employment to 
address the likely endogeneity of working in the public sector. Additionally, instrumental 
variable models using local employment opportunities as an instrument for women’s 
employment are estimated. Lastly, the impacts on fertility of different patterns of 
employment opportunities are simulated, to assess the impact of changing opportunities 
for public sector employment on the TFR.  
3.7.1 Baseline Hazards of Fertility 
The first discrete-time hazard (logit) model estimated includes only a fully 
interacted set of parities and years since last birth or marriage. Predicting from the 
coefficients of this model onto a simulated full set of parities and years allows for an 
examination of the probability of having a child in a given year, depending on the parity 
and time since last birth or marriage, and conditional on not yet having shifted to the next 
parity.69 Figure 3.9 presents the hazards for the model with just parities and time since 
last birth or first marriage. Hazards are highest immediately following marriage. Notably 
the hazard of having a second or higher order birth in the year immediately following the 
previous birth is low, which suggests women are actively spacing births. Hazards rise in 
the second year after the first birth and peak in the third year, with a 0.48 probability of 
having a second child at that point (if that point is reached). Hazards remain high but 
decline gradually thereafter. Hazards of a third birth show a less steep increase over time, 
increasing from year 1 to 2 and 3 but peaking at a hazard of 0.24 before declining slowly. 
                                                
69 Throughout, fifth and higher order parities are coded as a single category for parameter estimation, as are 
intervals of 10 years and longer.    
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Hazards for the 4th, 5th, and 6th birth onward follow relatively similar trajectories, with 
hazards peaking a little later, four years after the last birth, and never rising above a 0.15 
probability. These interactions between parity and time since last birth or marriage are 
incorporated into all of the models but not presented in detail hereafter. Using the 
methods for estimating fertility based on hazard models discussed above, this sample of 
women entering matrimony from 1991-2011 has a TFR of 3.5, consistent with fertility 
patterns over this period (Figure 3.1).  
3.7.2 Discrete-Time (Logit) Models of Fertility 
The first discrete-time hazard (logit) model estimated for the relationship between 
fertility and a woman working in the public sector is presented in Table 3.3, specification 
1. In addition to women’s public sector employment status in each year, this model 
includes only the baseline hazards by interacted parity and time since last birth (not 
shown). The results presented for the model are odds ratios. When greater than 1, they 
mean a greater odds (probability) of birth, and when less than one they mean a lower 
odds (probability) of birth. Their statistical significance can be evaluated with the 
standard errors in terms of deviations from 1. In specification 1, the odds ratio of 0.810 
for public sector work means that the estimated odds of a woman who is working in the 
public sector giving birth are 81.0% of the estimated odds for a woman who is not 
working in the public sector. This is a large effect size, but no other covariates are 
included and fertility is clearly associated with a host of (omitted) characteristics here.  
In specification 2 (Table 3.3), controls are added for the woman’s age group, her 
education, her parents’ education, her place of birth, local characteristics, and the year. 
Once these are included, the odds ratio for a woman being engaged in public sector work 
rises to 0.976 and becomes statistically insignificant. The implications for completed 
fertility (TFRs) of this estimate and other models are discussed in a following section on 
fertility simulations.  
Notably, a number of other characteristics are statistically significant in 
specification 2. There are significant differences by age compared to the reference age 
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group of 30-34; younger women have significantly higher odds while older women have 
lower odds, which drop substantially with age. Compared to those who are illiterate, there 
are some significant differences by education. Those with a primary education have 
significantly lower odds (0.867), while those with university and above education have 
significantly higher odds (1.157), which runs counter to the narrative of increases in 
women’s education decreasing fertility. The unexpected relationship between education 
and fertility may be in part because of the close connection between education and social 
class; it is in fact mother’s education, a marker of social class, that has the strongest 
relationships with the odds of a birth. Having a university-educated mother has a 
significant odds ratio of 0.777 compared to having an illiterate mother. Compared to an 
illiterate father, there is a statistically significant effect of having an above intermediate 
educated father (0.800) or a university-educated father (0.842).  
Although not shown, the birth governorate-residence interactions are often, but 
not always, statistically significant. Compared to urban Cairo, governorates in urban 
Greater Cairo and urban Lower Egypt tend to be only insignificantly different. Urban 
Upper Egypt and rural areas are significantly different, with higher probabilities of giving 
birth than in Cairo. Turning now to the time-varying local characteristics of individuals’ 
birth places, there are no significant differences by local adult literacy, GDP per capita (in 
thousands of 2012 LE), or prenatal care. Although not shown, there are some significant 
differences by year, which appear to reflect fluctuations more than a clear trend. 
In specification 2 a woman being engaged in public sector work had an odds ratio 
slightly less than 1, but was not statistically significant. It is, however, likely that public 
sector work has potentially differential effects across births. Almost everyone has a birth 
right after marriage and then fairly promptly a second birth. For instance, in the 
specification for the baseline hazards, the estimates indicate that 95% of those with first 
births have second births (Figure 3.9). The majority of women who have second births go 
on for a third birth (80%) and most of those (63%) continue on for a fourth birth, but 
there is clearly more scope for an impact on later parities. Thus, it seems likely that there 
might be differential impacts of public sector work on different parities, with greater 
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scope for an impact on later parities. This possibility is tested in specification 3, where a 
woman being engaged in public sector work is interacted with parity (compared to not 
working in the public sector) and, as before, controlling for parity and time since last 
birth or marriage, as well as the same set of other controls. 
In specification 3, there are higher but statistically insignificant odds ratios for 
progressing from marriage to a first birth and from a first birth to a second birth when 
women work in the public sector, lower but statistically insignificant odds of a third birth 
(when women have had a second birth) and a lower and statistically significant odds ratio 
(0.686) of progressing from a third to a fourth birth. The odds of going from a fourth to a 
fifth birth are slightly greater than 1, but statistically insignificant. For the few women 
who work in the public sector and progress to their fifth birth, the odds of a sixth birth 
and above are significantly higher (2.222).70 Thus, the evidence suggests that on what is a 
particularly relevant margin currently in Egypt, whether to move from three children to 
four, public sector work can reduce certain dimensions of fertility; however the net 
effects of these complex patterns on the total fertility rate must be examined through the 
simulations below. Additionally, although a rich set of controls is included, the 
relationship identified between fertility and employment is not necessarily causal; 
problems of endogeneity are a substantial concern.71 
One potential concern is whether households with individuals who work in the 
public sector are systematically different in unobservable ways. To a certain extent, this 
possibility can be checked by adding parity-interacted controls for the spouse’s work in 
the public sector to specification 3. This can be done only for the subset of women with 
their spouses in the household. Other controls are also added for spouse characteristics 
                                                
70 Results estimated separately by parity (not shown), which allow the impact of all covariates to vary by 
parity, although noisier, have a similar pattern of public sector odds ratios across parities.  
71 Shifting religious values over time or across generations are one potential source of endogeneity. 
Comparing changes across the Muslim and Christian populations in Egypt could shed light on how shifting 
religious values in the majority-Muslim country might be contributing to fertility. Unfortunately, religious 
affiliation is available for only a subset of women (married and 18-39 in 2012), precluding the calculation 
of a TFR. Models of childbearing estimated for the subset of women with religion data and adding 
interactions between years and religion are noisy but suggest that fertility has been rising for Muslim 
women to a greater extent than Christian women.  
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(age and education) to check whether these may also be driving forces in childbearing 
decisions. The results are presented in Table 3.4. Importantly, the impact of women’s 
public sector work persists with similar odds ratios across births. The impact on moving 
from the third birth to the fourth birth remains statistically significant. The spouse being 
employed in the public sector is not statistically significant.72 
3.7.3 Discrete-Time Models of Fertility Incorporating Fixed Effects 
One way to address endogeneity is to incorporate women-specific fixed effects 
into estimation using a conditional logit model. As with other types of fixed effects 
models, the coefficients on fixed characteristics (birth place, education, and parents’ 
education) cannot be estimated but are absorbed into the fixed effect that is conditioned 
out of the model. These fixed effects will also absorb unobserved time-invariant 
differences between women (and their households), which are likely to include important 
dimensions of preferences. Models can be estimated only for women who vary in their 
outcomes, i.e. have had at least one birth. Since 93% of women who marry ultimately 
have a first birth, this is unlikely to create substantial bias but may slightly inflate fertility 
simulations (calculated later). Additionally, the effects of various covariates, such as 
women’s own public sector employment, can be identified only from those women with 
variation in these characteristics, since fixed effects estimates are based on within-woman 
variation. Among the women who are observed working in the public sector at some 
point in the time period analyzed, 37% varied over time in their public sector status.  
In Table 3.5, specification 4 estimates a similar model to specification 3 with 
women’s public sector work interacted with parities. After adding the fixed effects, a 
similar pattern to specification 3 is found for the interactions with lower parities. There 
are higher odds ratios for moving from marriage to the first birth and after the first birth 
(for the second birth). Lower odds ratios for giving birth after the second, especially 
third, and fourth birth are found. Only the coefficient for moving from the third to fourth 
                                                
72 That spouse employment in the public sector is statistically insignificant and relatively small in 
magnitude compared to the odds ratios for women also suggests that the old-age security rationale for 
fertility is not driving the impact of public sector work. Having either the husband or the wife in the public 
sector would secure such a pension. 
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birth is statistically significant (0.630), as was the case for the model without the fixed 
effects. The odds ratio for moving from the fourth to fifth birth is less than one, but 
insignificant, and the odds ratio for the fifth birth and above (1.112) is insignificant and is 
much smaller than in specification 3, where it was significant and very high (2.222).  
Including women fixed-effects is likely to address many omitted variable 
problems but not necessarily issues of simultaneity and joint decision making, such as 
quitting a public sector job in order to have additional children. Therefore, an additional 
set of models are estimated for the impact of local public sector employment 
opportunities, rather than own public sector employment, on fertility.73 It is important to 
note that local public sector employment opportunities are in percentage point terms, and 
so are on a different scale than the binary variable for women’s own public sector 
employment. Figure 3.10 provides examples of the estimated variation in local 
employment opportunities over time for eight combinations of governorate and 
urban/rural. There is a substantial amount of variation in the estimated local employment 
opportunities over time. Although there is some consistency in overall trends, there are 
also clearly differences by location. For instance from 2002 to 2012 urban Giza had flat 
public sector employment rates around 10%, while from 2002 to 2012 urban Cairo had 
public sector employment rates that declined from 25% to 15%. This variation may be 
caused by where government jobs are allocated across a variety of different ministries 
and programs, such as the Social Fund for Development, which targets poor areas (with 
mixed success), or the national Youth Employment Program (Abou-Ali, El-Azony, El-
Laithy, Haughton, & Khandker, 2010; De Gobbi & Nesporova, 2005).   
These conditional logit models retain the women fixed effects and other 
covariates and are presented as specification 5 (in Table 3.5). Interacting public sector 
employment opportunities with births, there is a slightly higher odds ratio for moving 
from marriage to the first birth (1.012 for each percentage point increase in local public 
sector employment opportunities). There are lower odds ratios for moving on from the 
                                                
73 These are akin to reduced form instrumental variable models. The 2SRI models with women fixed effects 
were tested but generated implausible estimates. The 2SRI models without fixed effects are presented 
below.  
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first through fourth births, which are significant for the second to third birth (0.982), third 
to fourth birth (0.966) and fourth to fifth birth (0.960). For the highest order births, the 
odds ratio is 1.047 and statistically significant. This suggests that local employment 
opportunities are affecting women’s fertility—potentially through their own employment. 
It is also quite likely that these effects are under-estimates, since although individuals’ 
own reporting of employment status has relatively small measurement error, annual 
means for the 38 governorate and urban/rural combinations are based on finite samples 
and noisy. One additional concern with these estimates is whether the public sector local 
employment effect suffers from omitted variable bias.74 The inclusion of additional time-
varying local controls suggests that variation in health services and socio-economic 
characteristics, at least, is not driving the observed effects.  
3.7.4 Discrete-Time Models of Fertility Using Instrumental Variables 
As an alternative to using local employment opportunities as a reduced form 
instrument in the fixed-effects models, women’s public sector employment can in fact be 
directly instrumented. If there is random measurement error in the local employment 
opportunities, this should not be a problem for estimates in the second stage of a two-
stage instrumental variables framework. Table 3.6 presents the linear probability model 
for a woman working in the public sector in a given year, the first stage of the two-stage 
residual inclusion model. Public sector local employment opportunities are included in 
the current year, and lagged one and two years. Each percentage point increase in local 
opportunities increases the probability of a woman working in the public sector by 0.2% 
(p-value of 0.001). The one-year lag has a negative effect of 0.1% (p-value 0.068) and the 
two-year lag has a negative effect of less than 0.1% (p-value 0.615). The instruments 
together have a p-value of 0.002 and an F-statistic of 4.98. Thus, the instruments are 
                                                
74 Two additional checks of the robustness of the results based on local employment opportunities were 
undertaken. Models disaggregating male employment and female employment in the public sector, in case 
there was gender differentiation in jobs, showed similar effects for public sector work. Models with parity 
interacted public sector employment opportunities further interacted with education level were estimated as 
well. The impacts of local employment opportunities should be stronger for women with secondary and 
higher education. The coefficients provided only mixed evidence of a larger impact on the more educated 
and were noisy. 
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weak. Since controls for both year and location are included in the model, multi-
collinearity may be an issue. Age and education are statistically significant and 
substantial predictors in this first stage.  
In the second stage of the two-stage residual inclusion model, both the parity-
interacted actual values of women’s public sector employment and the parity-interacted 
residuals from the first stage are included in the equation. Table 3.7 presents the second 
stage discrete hazard logit model with bootstrapped standard errors. The standard errors 
around all of the public sector effects are large, and none of the public sector effects is 
statistically significant. However, the direction of the odds ratios is similar to the pattern 
in other models, suggesting that public sector work increases the probability of first 
births, decreases the probability of second, third, fourth, and fifth births, and after a fifth 
birth increases the probability of additional births.75  
The residual interactions indicate that those who have unobservable 
characteristics, captured by the residual, that make them more likely to work in the public 
sector are in fact significantly more likely to progress from the second birth to the third, 
as well as to the fourth and fifth births. The plausibility of the unobservable 
characteristics that make women more likely to work in the public sector also causing 
higher fertility merits discussion. One explanation may be that couples with moderately 
conservative values about women’s roles accept women working only in the public sector 
and also have higher fertility preferences, whereas couples with less conservative values 
accept women working in the private sector as well (and thus, women are somewhat less 
likely to work in the public sector). Observed relationships between socio-economic 
background and women’s work provide suggestive evidence of this potential link 
(Assaad & Krafft, 2014). Overall, although the instruments are weak, the findings at least 
suggest that the results of models not accounting for endogeneity are likely to be under-
estimates.  
                                                
75 A similar pattern was found when two-stage predictor substitution was used.  
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3.7.5 Fertility Simulations 
Based on the various discrete-time hazard models estimated, it is possible to 
simulate total fertility rates for different profiles. Of specific interest is varying the impact 
of public sector employment. For a particular specification, profiles are identical except 
for variation in public sector employment, so that differences in TFRs within a 
specification are due to variation in public sector employment.76  
For all of the simulations, other characteristics have to be selected. Time-varying 
local governorate characteristics are set to their mean, ages are increased by one group 
from 20-24 onwards for each parity in order to simulate an age progression, and the year 
is fixed at 2002. It is assumed that a male child will be born as the second child so that 
the dummy for having a male child equals zero for marriage to the first birth and the first 
birth to the second and equals one thereafter. In the fixed-effects models, results are 
estimated assuming the fixed effect is zero. In the 2SRI models, the residual is assumed 
to be zero.  
For the models without fixed effects, a relatively typical profile of time-invariant 
characteristics is used: a vocational secondary educated female, with preparatory 
educated parents, born in urban Cairo. Vocational secondary graduates are a large group, 
35% of women in the sample have attained a vocational secondary degree (Table 3.1), 
and also the group that has experienced the greatest decline in public sector employment 
over time (Assaad & Krafft, 2014). For all models, results are simulated over a full set of 
parity and birth interval interactions to estimate total fertility rates.  
The first set of simulations estimates the impact of public sector work by 
comparing outcomes for these profiles while varying whether the woman is employed in 
the public sector. Own public sector employment is essentially set to 1 or 0 throughout a 
woman’s entire fertility simulation. Figure 3.11 presents the results of these simulations. 
For the model incorporating a single public sector effect (specification 2), fertility is 
estimated to be 2.75 with a public sector job and 2.78 without a public sector job, a 0.03 
                                                
76 Simulating for profiles with different characteristics would generate different TFR levels and also some 
variation in differences between TFRs by public sector employment, since the log-odds for the hazards 
have an additive specification but resulting predicted hazards and simulated TFRs are not simply additive. 
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difference in childbearing. After fully interacting public sector work and parities 
(specification 3), the difference is larger, 0.11; fertility is predicted to be 2.68 with a 
public sector job and 2.79 without. In the parity-interacted fixed effect model 
(specification 4) fertility shifts from 2.70 for the public sector employee to 2.76 for a 
woman who is not employed in the public sector, an effect of approximately 0.06. For the 
2SRI model, fertility shifts from 2.34 if a woman works in the public sector to 2.83 if she 
does not, a difference of 0.49.  
Whether these differences in fertility are statistically significant can be assessed 
based on bootstrapped standard errors. None of the differences is statistically significant 
at p<0.05. The difference for specification 2 (single public sector effect) has a p-value of 
0.585 and the difference for specification 3 (public sector interacted with parity) has a p-
value of 0.080. The difference for specification 4 (public sector interacted with parity 
fixed effect model) has a p-value of 0.235. The difference for specification 6 (2SRI) has a 
p-value of 1.000. Overall, these potential differences in fertility are suggestive of changes 
in women’s employment opportunities contributing to rising fertility. However, these 
changes are unlikely to be the sole driver in the shift from a 3.0 to 3.5 fertility rate 
recently in Egypt, especially since the change in public sector employment opportunities 
will have impacted only a fraction of women.  
Simulating the impact of local employment opportunities on fertility shows a 
similar pattern (Figure 3.12). When public sector employment in the governorate and 
residence of birth is 10 percentage points above the mean (similar to the change over the 
period of study, see Figure 3.7) fertility in specification 5 is estimated at 2.81, while 
when simulating at the mean public sector employment rate fertility is 2.84, an 0.03 
difference (the difference has a p-value of 0.239). This is suggestive of the potential 
impact of declining government employment on national fertility rates, and again 
indicates that public sector employment opportunities are likely contributing to the rise in 
fertility in Egypt, but are unlikely to be the sole factor driving trends. Comparing the 
results in Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 also indicates that the exact impact is uncertain, as 
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it varies substantially across estimates. The estimation problems inherent to the various 
models may also be biasing estimates.  
3.8 Discussion and Conclusions 
This study contributes important evidence that fertility is on the rise in Egypt. 
While fertility had been decreasing relatively steadily over time, reaching a low of a 3.0 
TFR in 2008, this study demonstrates that fertility in Egypt has risen to 3.5 as of 2012, a 
pattern continuing in 2014 (Ministry of Health and Population, El-Zanaty and Associates, 
& ICF International, 2015). Thus, Egypt appears to be reversing its demographic 
transition, a phenomenon with concerning implications for its society and economy. It is 
likely that a variety of different factors are contributing to the rise in fertility, but one 
potential cause, and the focus of this essay, is the decline in employment opportunities for 
women, specifically in the public sector.  
In order to test the relationship between fertility and employment opportunities, 
this essay united the literature on using duration analysis models for fertility simulations 
(Retherford, Ogawa, Matsukura, & Eini-Zinab, 2010; Van Hook & Altman, 2013) with 
the literature on addressing endogeneity using fixed-effects in discrete-time duration 
models (Allison, 2009) and instrumental variables in inherently non-linear settings 
(Terza, Basu, & Rathouz, 2008; Wooldridge, 2015). Public sector employment was found 
to be particularly important at the margin of going on from a third to a fourth birth in the 
logit models. A similar pattern was found in the conditional logit (women fixed effects) 
models. The impact of local employment opportunities, which are beyond women’s 
control and thus avoid potential issues of simultaneity or reverse causality, further 
suggested an important relationship between public sector employment opportunities and 
women’s fertility. Instrumental variable estimates, although suffering from weak 
instruments and statistical insignificance, suggest that other methods are under-estimates. 
Overall, the evidence presented in this essay suggests that declining opportunities for 
women can have an effect on fertility, but are unlikely to be the sole driver of recent 
fertility increases in Egypt.  
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This study is one of the few to investigate the impact of economic opportunities 
for women on their childbearing. The findings suggest that labor market opportunities, 
and especially the type of jobs available to women, impact fertility. Traditionally, 
declining economic opportunities (i.e. recessions) are associated with declines in fertility 
(Sobotka, Skirbekk, & Philipov, 2011). However, this research indicates that economic 
opportunities may interact with gender. This finding also extends the literature on the 
potentially offsetting impacts of price and income effects from changing economic 
opportunities on childbearing (Schultz, 1997). These relationships are typically 
empirically estimated as how rising wages and increasing opportunities for women can 
decrease fertility (Fang, Eggleston, Rizzo, & Zeckhauser, 2013; Galor & Weil, 1996; 
Heckman & Walker, 1990; Jensen, 2012; Mukhopadhyay, 1994; Rosenzweig & Evenson, 
1977; Schultz, 1985). This essay examines the opposite case. Specifically, as economic 
opportunities that are particularly appealing to women decline and opportunities that are 
less appealing increase, so that the value of market work is substantially reduced, women 
may substitute into childbearing.  
The rise in fertility in Egypt is likely to be the result of a multitude of forces, but 
this essay’s findings indicate that the changing economic structure is a contributing factor 
to the rise in fertility. This impact is an unintended consequence of the attempt to shift 
from a public-sector led model of employment to a private-sector, market-oriented 
paradigm. In the wake of structural reform and reductions in the government wage bill 
and government employment, women have fewer employment opportunities. This is due 
in part to the failure of the private sector to replace public sector jobs with high-quality, 
formal private sector jobs with protections and benefits (Assaad & Krafft, 2015c; Gatti, 
Angel-Urdinola, Silva, & Bodor, 2014). Women choose to leave (or never enter) the 
labor force rather than undertake the informal jobs that are available (Amer, 2015; 
Assaad & Krafft, 2014, 2015c; Hendy, 2015). This paradigm could potentially be 
changed with appropriate labor market reforms (Assaad & Krafft, 2014; Krafft & Assaad, 
2015). 
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Whether Egypt can successfully integrate women into the labor force and again 
progress in its demographic transition is a question with crucial implications for Egypt’s 
society and economy. The pressures of the youth bulge on institutions such as the 
education system and labor market were severe (Assaad & Krafft, 2015a; Elbadawy, 
2015; Youssef, Osman, & Roudi-Fahimi, 2014). The “echo” of the youth bulge resulting 
from the youth bulge forming families along with higher fertility rates is sure to again 
place pressures on health and education systems as well as on the labor market (Krafft & 
Assaad, 2014). These findings also have important implications for global population 
policies and labor markets; increasing access to employment for women and closing 
wage gaps may be an important part of other countries completing their fertility 
transitions.  
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Figures  
Figure 3.1. Total Fertility Rates, 1980-2014 
 
Notes: TFRs for 1980, 1984, and 1991 are 12 months preceding the survey. TFRs for 2012 and 2006 are 
three years preceding the survey, remainder are 1-36 months preceding the survey.  
Source: TFRs for 1980-2005 and 2008 are from El-Zanaty & Way (2009) and are primarily Demographic 
and Health Survey statistics. TFR for 2014 is from the 2014 Demographic and Health Survey (Ministry of 
Health and Population, El-Zanaty and Associates, & ICF International, 2015). TFRs for 2012 and 2006 
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Figure 3.2. Age-Specific Fertility Rates, 1980-2014 
 
Notes: ASFRs for 1980, 1984, and 1991 are 12 months preceding the survey. ASFRs for 2012 and 2006 are 
three years preceding the survey, remainder are 1-36 months preceding the survey.  
Source: ASFRs for 1980-2005 and 2008 are from El-Zanaty & Way (2009) and are primarily Demographic 
and Health Survey statistics. ASFR for 2014 is from the 2014 Demographic and Health Survey (Ministry of 
Health and Population, El-Zanaty and Associates, & ICF International, 2015). ASFRs for 2012 and 2006 
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Figure 3.3. Crude Birth Rates, 1988-2013 
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Figure 3.4. Proportion of Women Married by Various Ages by Women’s Year of 
Birth 
 
Notes: Lowess smoothed, bandwidth 0.4. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
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Figure 3.5. 25th, 50th, and 75th Percentiles for Age at Marriage and Age at First Birth 
by Women’s Year of Birth  
 
Notes: Lowess smoothed, bandwidth 0.4. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
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Figure 3.6. Percentage of Currently Married Women Using Family Planning, Ages 
15-49  
 
Source: DHS surveys for Egypt (El-Zanaty & Way, 2009; Ministry of Health and Population, El-Zanaty 
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Figure 3.7. Percentage of Population Employed in the Public Sector over Time by 
Sex, Ages 25-39 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
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Figure 3.8. Proportion of Women in Public Sector, Private Sector Wage, and Non-
Wage Work by Years from Marriage, Women Married between 1992-2002 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
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Figure 3.9. Baseline Hazard of Next Birth by Years Since Last Birth or Marriage 
and Parity, Women Married between 1991 and 2011  
Source: Author’s calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
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Figure 3.10. Example Urban/rural and Governorate Level Trends in Percentage of 
25-39 Year-olds with Public Sector Employment 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ELMS 1998, ELMPS 2006, and ELMPS 2012. 
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Figure 3.11. Simulations of Fertility by Public Sector Employment across 
Specifications  
  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: Based on discrete-time hazard models (logits and conditional logits (based on models in Table 3.3, 
Table 3.5, and Table 3.7).  
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Figure 3.12. Simulations of Fertility by Local Public Sector Employment 
Opportunities  
  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Tables  
Table 3.1. Sample Characteristics  
An observation is woman-parity-years since last birth 
  Percentage   
Woman’s educational attainment 
 Illiterate (reference) 28.0 
 Read & write 2.8 
 Primary 8.4 
 Preparatory 6.4 
 General secondary 2.0 
 Vocational secondary 35.2 
 Post-secondary inst. 3.5 
 University & above 13.8 
 Mother's level of education attained 
Illiterate (reference) 80.8 
 Read & write 8.2 
 Less than secondary 5.4 
 Secondary 3.6 
 Post-secondary inst. 0.5 
 University & above 1.5 
 Father's level of education attained 
Illiterate (reference) 55.3 
 Read & write 19.6 
 Less than secondary 11.5 
 Secondary 7.5 
 Post-secondary inst. 1.3 
 University & above 4.6 
 Woman’s residence at birth 
 Urban (reference) 40.1 
 Rural 59.9 
 Woman’s governorate at birth 
 Cairo (reference) 11.4 
 Alexandria 4.9 
 Port-Said 0.5 
 Suez 0.8 
 Damietta 3.1 
 Dakahlia 6.0 
 Sharkia 7.2 
 Kalyoubia 5.8 
 Kafr-Elsheikh 5.6 
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Gharbia 6.1 
 Menoufia 3.8 
 Behera 6.2 
 Ismailia 3.4 
 Giza 5.0 
 Beni-Suef 4.0 
 Fayoum 3.7 
 Menia 5.4 
 Asyout 4.5 
 Suhag 5.2 
 Qena 4.9 
 Aswan 2.5 
 Have a son   
Not yet (reference) 43.8  
Yes 56.2  
Public sector employment 
No (reference) 90.3 
 Yes 9.7 
 Total 100.0 
       
  Mean Standard Deviation 
Governorate characteristics 
Public employment rate 18.5 6.5 
Life expectancy (years) 70.4 2.3 
Adult literacy rate (percentage) 68.8 12.1 
GDP per capita (in thousands of 2012 LE) 14.7 3.8 
Prenatal care (percentage) 71.3 16.7 
N 65781   
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 3.2. Total Fertility Rate by Women’s Characteristics in 2006 and 2012 





Ever worked in public sector 
    No 3.0 3.5 89.6 88.9 
Yes 2.6 3.2 10.4 11.1 
Educational attainment 
    Illiterate 3.5 4.0 32.2 25.1 
Read & write 3.0 3.0 3.6 2.5 
Primary 3.0 3.7 6.9 8.0 
Preparatory 3.2 3.5 8.3 10.6 
General secondary 2.1 3.2 6.2 6.8 
Vocational secondary 3.1 3.9 28.0 28.7 
Post-secondary inst. 2.7 2.9 3.8 3.1 
University & above 2.7 3.2 10.9 15.2 
Urban/Rural 
    Urban 2.6 3.2 43.7 42.8 
Rural 3.2 3.7 56.3 57.2 
Region 
    Greater Cairo 2.6 3.1 13.2 18.0 
Alexandria & Suez Canal 2.5 2.8 8.1 7.9 
Urban Lower 2.7 3.4 10.5 9.9 
Urban Upper 2.6 3.5 11.9 7.2 
Rural Lower 2.9 3.5 32.0 31.7 
Rural Upper 3.6 4.0 24.3 25.2 
Quintiles of household wealth 
    Poorest 3.1 3.9 18.8 17.9 
Second 3.2 3.5 20.7 20.4 
Third 3.0 3.6 20.8 21.1 
Fourth 2.9 3.6 19.7 20.6 
Richest 2.5 2.9 20.0 20.0 
Mother's level of education 
    Illiterate 3.1 3.8 75.5 73.1 
Read & write 3.1 3.6 8.9 7.0 
Less than secondary 2.6 2.6 6.4 7.5 
Secondary 2.6 3.1 5.7 7.8 
Post-secondary inst. 2.5 3.4 0.9 0.9 
University & above 1.9 3.4 2.5 3.6 
Father's level of education 
    Illiterate 3.1 3.8 49.6 50.7 
Read & write 3.3 3.8 22.7 16.7 
Less than secondary 2.6 3.1 11.2 12.5 
Secondary 2.8 3.5 8.1 10.5 
Post-secondary inst. 3.0 2.8 1.9 1.8 
University & above 2.3 2.7 6.5 7.8 
Total 3.0 3.5 100.0 100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ELMPS 2012 and ELMPS 2006. 
Note: Because public sector workers are required to have a secondary degree (i.e. be at least 18), the ASFR 
for the 15-19 age group was inestimable for those who worked in the public sector and treated as zero. 
  
  122 
Table 3.3. Discrete-Time Survival Analysis Models (Logit) for Births 
Dependent Variable: Probability (in year) of a birth. 
Coefficients have been transformed into odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. 
  Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 




 Public sector work interacted with parity 
   Marriage 
  
1.060 




















   
(0.228) 
Fifth birth and above 
  
2.222** 
   
(0.615) 
Age group 






























Have a male child (not yet omitted) 





Education (illit. omit) 






























University & above 
 
1.157** 1.163** 
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  Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 
  
(0.053) (0.054) 
Mother's ed. (illit. omit) 

























Father's ed. (illit. omit) 














































Parity and yrs. since last birth  Yes Yes Yes 
Birth gov. and urban/rural No Yes Yes 
Year dummies  No Yes Yes 
N 65763 65399 65399 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
Notes: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
Standard errors clustered at PSU level.    
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Table 3.4. Discrete-Time Survival Analysis Model (Logit) for Births Including 
Spouse Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Probability (in year) of a birth. 
Coefficients have been transformed into odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. 




First birth 1.066 
 
(0.086) 
Second birth 0.868 
 
(0.076) 
Third birth 0.691* 
 
(0.113) 
Fourth birth 1.430 
 
(0.329) 






















Have a male child (not yet omitted) 
 Yes 0.748*** 
 
(0.023) 
Education (illit. omit) 









General secondary 1.036 
 
(0.098) 
Vocational secondary 0.992 
 
(0.039) 
Post-sec. inst. 1.001 
 
(0.070) 
University & above 1.125* 
 
(0.066) 
Mother's ed. (illit. omit) 
 Read and write 1.007 
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(0.044) 






Post-sec. inst. 0.721 
 
(0.122) 
University & above 0.762* 
 
(0.081) 
Father's ed. (illit. omit) 
 Read and write 1.004 
 
(0.032) 






Post-sec. inst. 0.825* 
 
(0.078) 
University & above 0.870* 
 
(0.062) 
Spouse public sector work interacted with 
parity 
 Marriage 1.041 
 
(0.056) 
First birth 1.024 
 
(0.055) 
Second birth 0.940 
 
(0.051) 
Third birth 1.000 
 
(0.081) 
Fourth birth 0.794 
 
(0.118) 
Fifth birth and above 1.231 
 
(0.306) 
Spouse education (illit. omit) 









General secondary 0.870 
 
(0.079) 
Vocational secondary 0.955 
 
(0.039) 
Post-sec. inst. 0.886 
 
(0.056) 
University & above 1.016 
 
(0.052) 
Spouse age group (30-34 omit.) 
 




















 Life expectancy (years) 0.993 
 
(0.031) 
Adult lit. 1.004 
 
(0.004) 
GDP per capita (thousand LE) 0.992 
 
(0.005) 
Prenatal care 0.999 
 
(0.002) 
Parity and yrs. since last birth  Yes 
Birth gov. and urban/rural  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes 
N 56945 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
Notes: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
Standard errors clustered at PSU level.  
Only for sub-sample of women with husbands present in the household.   
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Table 3.5. Discrete-Time Survival Analysis Models with Women Fixed Effects 
(Conditional Logit) for Births 
Dependent Variable: Probability (in year) of a birth. 
Coefficients have been transformed into odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. 
  Spec. 4 Spec. 5 
Public sector emp. interacted with parity 
























 Public sector local emp. (percentage) interacted 
with parity 































  <20 0.576*** 0.572*** 
 
(0.075) (0.074) 
20-24 1.002 0.988 
 
(0.091) (0.089) 
25-29 1.254*** 1.251*** 
 
(0.071) (0.071) 
35-39 0.490*** 0.483*** 
 
(0.037) (0.036) 
40-44 0.119*** 0.115*** 
 
(0.020) (0.019) 
45-49 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) 
Have a male child (not yet omitted) 
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  Spec. 4 Spec. 5 
Life expectancy (years) 1.206*** 1.195*** 
 
(0.046) (0.046) 
Adult lit. 1.022*** 1.019*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
GDP per capita (thousand LE) 1.012 1.011 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Prenatal care 1.000 1.000 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Parity and yrs. since last birth  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
N 60673 60673 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
Standard errors clustered at woman level.  
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Table 3.6. Linear Probability Model (First Stage) for Employment in Public Sector 
in Year  
Dependent Variable: Probability (in year) of public sector employment. 
Public sector local emp. 
(percentage)   
In current year 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) 
One year lag -0.001 
 
(0.000) 
Two year lag -0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Age group (30-34 omit.) 


















Education (illit. omit) 









General secondary 0.145*** 
 
(0.028) 
Vocational secondary 0.109*** 
 
(0.009) 
Post-sec. inst. 0.209*** 
 
(0.028) 
University & above 0.353*** 
 
(0.017) 
Mother's ed. (illit. omit) 
 Read and write 0.008 
 
(0.015) 






Post-sec. inst. 0.020 
 
(0.072) 
University & above -0.001 
 
(0.046) 
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Father's ed. (illit. omit) 
 Read and write 0.010 
 
(0.009) 






Post-sec. inst. 0.014 
 
(0.036) 




 Life expectancy (years) 0.009* 
 
(0.005) 
Adult lit. -0.000 
 
(0.001) 
GDP per capita (thousand LE) 0.001* 
 
(0.001) 






Year dummies  Yes 
Birth gov. and urban/rural  Yes 
N 64787 
R-squared .227 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
Standard errors clustered at PSU level. 
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Table 3.7. Two-Stage Residual Inclusion Discrete-Time Survival Analysis Model 
(Second Stage Logit) for Births 
Dependent Variable: Probability (in year) of a birth. 
Coefficients are odds ratios. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 




First birth 0.918 
 
(3.832) 
Second birth 0.497 
 
(2.056) 
Third birth 0.259 
 
(1.087) 
Fourth birth 0.381 
 
(1.631) 
Fifth birth and above 3.109 
 
(14.029) 
Residual for public sector work interacted with 
parity 
 Marriage 0.895 
 
(3.726) 
First birth 1.247 
 
(0.326) 
Second birth 2.076* 
 
(0.735) 
Third birth 3.602** 
 
(1.622) 
Fourth birth 4.248* 
 
(3.074) 
Fifth birth and above 0.610 
 
(0.773) 
Age group (30-34 omit.) 






















Education (illit. omit) 
 Read and write 0.999 
 
(0.128) 







General secondary 1.114 
 
(0.725) 
Vocational secondary 1.027 
 
(0.466) 
Post-sec. inst. 1.102 
 
(1.002) 
University & above 1.260 
 
(1.847) 
Mother's ed. (illit. omit) 
 Read and write 1.025 
 
(0.080) 






Post-sec. inst. 0.805 
 
(0.249) 
University & above 0.757 
 
(0.204) 
Father's ed. (illit. omit) 
 Read and write 0.992 
 
(0.060) 






Post-sec. inst. 0.799 
 
(0.174) 




 Life expectancy (years) 0.969 
 
(0.051) 
Adult lit. 1.004 
 
(0.005) 
GDP per capita (thousand LE) 0.998 
 
(0.010) 
Prenatal care 1.000 
 
(0.003) 
Parity and yrs. since last birth  Yes 
Birth gov. and urban/rural  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes 
N 64769 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
Bootstrapping undertaken with clustering on the PSU level.  
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Chapter 4 
4 The Determinants of Child Health Disparities in 
Jordan 
4.1 Introduction 
The first few years of children’s lives provide a crucial window for human 
development. Faltering growth and development in the early years are difficult to reverse. 
Early missteps in human development have far-reaching consequences for children’s 
human capital, affecting later development potential, school success, labor market 
outcomes, and adult health. Early childhood77 is also the period when inequality 
originates and the intergenerational transmission of poverty begins. When children suffer 
from malnutrition in the early years, it damages their psycho-social development (Dercon 
& Sánchez, 2013), causes poorer school performance (Glewwe & Miguel, 2008), impairs 
adult health (Victora, Adair, Fall, et al., 2008), and ultimately lowers wages (Grantham-
McGregor, Cheung, Cueto, et al., 2007). It is therefore of paramount importance to 
identify the causes of poor early health and nutrition, and to understand what drives 
inequality in early health and nutrition, in order to provide children with equal chances 
for healthy growth.  
The specific focus of this essay is identifying the mechanisms that mediate socio-
economic inequalities in height and weight in Jordan. Essentially, this essay quantifies 
inequality, first as it relates solely to socio-economic status (parental education, 
employment, and wealth) and then with the addition of a number of other factors, such as 
feeding practices, that might be mechanisms through which socio-economic inequality 
occurs. Comparing inequality across these specifications allows for an assessment of the 
                                                
77 The term “early childhood” lacks a single clear definition in the literature. The margins of early 
childhood are uncertain in both directions, both whether the prenatal period is included in early childhood 
and how late early childhood extends. In this essay, the term early childhood is used to broadly refer to 
development from conception until the age of school entry. Specific analyses may use narrower time 
windows as noted.   
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roles of different factors in both total inequality and mediating socio-economic 
disparities. A number of potential mediators of socio-economic inequality are examined, 
including parental health knowledge, food quantity and quality, health conditions, the 
health environment, and prenatal development.  
While numerous papers have examined the role of socio-economic status in child 
health inequality (e.g. Assaad, Krafft, Hassine, & Salehi-Isfahani, 2012; Khawaja, 
Dawns, Meyerson-Knox, & Yamout, 2008; Monteiro et al., 2010; Wagstaff & Watanabe, 
2000), there has been little research on the factors that mediate these socio-economic 
disparities. Identifying the factors that mediate inequality in early health is crucial to 
understanding the causes of faltering and disparate early growth, as well as a necessary 
precursor to designing interventions to reduce inequality and ensure healthy growth. 
Malnutrition, by definition, is the result of inadequate food quality and quantity. 
However, a large number of different factors, such as breastfeeding, complementary 
feeding, total calorie intake, and dietary diversity can contribute to nutrition. The disease 
environment, public health inputs (such as sanitation, water, and access to medical 
services), and parents’ health practices and knowledge can contribute substantially to 
deficiencies in height and weight. Shortfalls in growth may also be shaped by children’s 
development prior to birth, mediated through maternal health and nutrition and fetal 
growth. The roles of these different factors in malnutrition, and in mediating socio-
economic inequality in child health, remain an unanswered question, and one with 
important policy implications for addressing malnutrition and the unequal distribution of 
child health both in Jordan and globally.  
To understand the determinants of child health inequality in Jordan, this essay 
uses Jordan’s 2012 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). Jordan is a country with 
substantial socio-economic inequality in child health. While children from high socio-
economic status backgrounds (for instance, from wealthier families) experience a healthy 
pattern of growth, children from poorer backgrounds experience poor and faltering early 
health. This clear differentiation in child health by socio-economic status makes Jordan 
an ideal case for studying the determinants of health disparities. Essentially, the 
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differences between the rich and poor have the potential to fully illustrate the 
determinants that yield good or faltering early nutrition. The data available in the 2012 
DHS for Jordan also provide a number of advantages in terms of rich information on 
socio-economic characteristics and detailed information about a wide variety of factors 
that could potentially mediate child health inequality. For example, the 2012 DHS 
includes information on food quantity and quality, with information on the feeding of a 
variety of different types of foods and the frequency of feeding. Information is also 
available on the mother’s health knowledge, the health inputs and environment, health 
conditions, and prenatal development. The richness of these data allows for an 
assessment of the relative roles of different mediating factors in child health inequality, 
focusing on children under age two. 
The findings of this essay demonstrate that a number of different factors 
contribute to inequality in child health. Some of the factors contributing to inequality in 
child health act as mediators for socio-economic disparities, and others have impacts that 
are independent of socio-economic status. The factors that tend to be the targets of 
malnutrition interventions, such as feeding practices and health knowledge (Horton, 
Shekar, McDonald, Mahal, & Brooks, 2010; World Bank, 2006, 2010), are not the most 
important mediators of socio-economic inequalities in child health in Jordan. Prenatal 
factors play the largest role in mediating socio-economic disparities in child health. Both 
birth weight (a measure of fetal growth) and maternal anthropometrics make large 
contributions to overall inequality and mediate socio-economic inequalities. These 
findings suggest that addressing inequality and deficits in child health will require 
sustained targeting of maternal health and nutrition before and during pregnancy. Policies 
and programs that target malnutrition during the early years may already be too late for 
many children in Jordan. 
The essay proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the state of current knowledge 
on child health and nutrition. Section 3 provides a conceptual framework for child health 
and inequality. In section 4, the methods for measuring and decomposing inequality in 
height and weight are described. Section 5 describes the data, sample, and variables used 
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in the analysis. Section 6 presents the results, first in terms of patterns of health and 
socio-economic status and then in terms of inequality of opportunity in child health and 
the factors that mediate this inequality. Section 7 concludes the essay with a discussion of 
the policy implications of these findings and suggests important directions for future 
research. 
4.2 Literature on Child Health and Nutrition 
4.2.1 Global Literature 
Children’s early health has long-lasting consequences. Early malnutrition has 
been linked to a number of negative later life outcomes across a wide variety of 
developmental domains. Victora et al. (2008) examine the links between undernutrition 
and human capital and find that height-for-age at age two is the best predictor of adult 
human capital, with links to health, education, and income. Glewwe and Miguel (2008) 
review what is known about the impact of child health and nutrition on educational 
outcomes and conclude that, although there are substantial challenges in estimating such 
relationships, the best evidence finds significant and sizeable impacts of child health on 
educational outcomes. Dercon and Sánchez (2013) show that, even after controlling for 
other factors, height-for-age early in life predicts psycho-social competencies in 
adolescents, including self-efficacy, self-esteem, and educational aspirations. These have 
been also linked to adult earnings. Stunting, as a measure of inadequate height-for-age, 
has been linked with lower levels of cognitive development, school achievement, adult 
economic and health outcomes, and health of subsequent generations (Dewey & Begum, 
2011). Thus, identifying the causes of malnutrition is considered a crucial element of 
promoting human and economic development (Victora, Adair, Fall, et al., 2008).  
Black et al. (2008) have a useful framework for understanding the causes and 
consequences of child undernutrition. They identify the basic causes of undernutrition as 
the social, economic, and political context, feeding into lack of capital (including 
financial, human, physical, social, and natural capital). These basic causes in turn 
generate the underlying factors affecting malnutrition, including income poverty, 
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employment, type of dwelling, assets, and financial transfers. These underlying causes 
manifest themselves as: (1) household food insecurity, (2) inadequate care, and (3) an 
unhealthy household environment and lack of health services. These three underlying 
causes drive the immediate causes of malnutrition, namely disease and inadequate dietary 
intake, which can interact (Black, Allen, Bhutta, et al., 2008). Considering the many 
potential causes of undernutrition suggests a large number of potential pathways through 
which inequality in child health and especially socio-economic disparities could occur. 
Malnutrition may also be directly passed across generations, as women who are 
malnourished are themselves more likely to have children with poor nutrition, especially 
low birth weights (Victora, Adair, Fall, et al., 2008). As a result of these different 
mechanisms, inequalities in child health due to disparities in economic status may also be 
an important part of the intergenerational transmission of socio-economic status (Case, 
Lubotsky, & Paxson, 2002; Currie & Moretti, 2007). Thus, understanding the roles of 
different factors in child health can play a key role in addressing not only 
contemporaneous inequality but also its intergenerational transmission.  
The large number of different factors that can contribute to poor early health and 
nutrition is reflected in the diverse body of research on challenges to early health and 
interventions to promote and protect early development. Inadequate fetal development, 
measured in terms of intra-uterine growth restriction (IUGR), resulting in low birth 
weight (or being small-for-gestational age), has been identified as a key early factor in 
malnutrition, one that is often an outcome of maternal undernutrition or stunting (Bhutta, 
Ahmed, Black, et al., 2008; Black, Allen, Bhutta, et al., 2008; Black, Victora, Walker, et 
al., 2013; Dewey & Begum, 2011; Victora, Adair, Fall, et al., 2008). Programs targeting 
pregnant mothers with additional calories and micronutrients are therefore considered an 
important intervention (Bhutta, Ahmed, Black, et al., 2008). 
Once children are born, feeding is a key target of interventions. There is a large 
body of literature showing that promoting exclusive breastfeeding, considered best 
practice for children under six months, can increase rates of breastfeeding. Although 
breastfeeding does have other health effects, such as reducing mortality, there is no clear 
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evidence that breastfeeding will increase children’s height and weight (Bhutta, Ahmed, 
Black, et al., 2008). Complementary feeding (the introduction of foods to infants) support 
and education programs are also considered crucial interventions to address feeding 
practices, and such programs have been demonstrated to increase children’s height in 
both food secure and food insecure populations (Bhutta, Ahmed, Black, et al., 2008).  
Conditional cash transfers that included maternal and infant health conditions 
have been shown to improve growth and reduce stunting. However, it is unclear if it is 
the health and nutrition conditions of the transfers or the increase in income that drives 
these effects (Gertler, 2004). Estimates of the income elasticity of energy intakes and 
specific nutrients suggest that increases in income would improve child health and 
nutrition (Bhargava, 2014). Specific micronutrients, such as zinc, can reduce 
malnutrition, and potentially intra-uterine growth restriction as well (Bhutta, Ahmed, 
Black, et al., 2008). Hygiene interventions, such as hand-washing, water quality, and 
sanitation, are also important for reducing diarrhea and thus improving nutrition 
outcomes (Bhutta, Ahmed, Black, et al., 2008; Spears, 2013).While the current literature 
does effectively document a wide variety of threats to nutrition and potential 
interventions across studies, it does a relatively poor job of addressing the issue of the 
relative roles of different factors in child health and nutrition, primarily focusing instead 
on single issues or assessing single interventions.  
Although there are a complex variety of inter-related causes of malnutrition, the 
empirical literature on the determinants of health and nutrition that does examine multiple 
potential factors tends to focus on the most easily measured factors, including socio-
economic factors such as parents’ education and wealth, geographic location, access to 
clean water and sanitation, and gender (Assaad, Krafft, Hassine, & Salehi-Isfahani, 2012; 
Khawaja, Dawns, Meyerson-Knox, & Yamout, 2008; Monteiro, Benicio, Conde, et al., 
2010; Wagstaff & Watanabe, 2000). The mechanisms through which socio-economic 
factors impact child health have received limited attention, despite their important 
implications for child health. One area that has received some attention in the literature is 
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how mother’s schooling affects child health (Behrman & Wolfe, 1987; Desai & Alva, 
1998; Glewwe, 1999). 
 Other mechanisms have received scant attention in the literature. For example, 
although inadequate diet, in terms of quality and quantity, is a clear proximate cause of 
malnutrition (Bhargava, 2014), its role in inequalities in health and nutrition has not been 
adequately examined. Whether socio-economic inequalities are mediated through food 
quantity or food quality, or whether socio-economic and food effects are relatively 
distinct, has substantially different implications for the types of policies that are needed to 
address under-nutrition. For instance, it might be the case that feeding practices are sub-
optimal regardless of socio-economic status, and thus feeding practices do not contribute 
to socio-economic inequality in malnutrition but do contribute to overall inequality. In 
contrast, access to water and sanitation may affect nutrition and vary substantially by 
socio-economic status. Targeting food aid to the poor would, in such a case, be a poor 
policy for addressing either overall malnutrition or decreasing inequalities, while targeted 
improvements in water and sanitation would be highly effective for both goals. 
4.2.2 Early Health and Nutrition in Jordan 
In the context of Jordan, the health and nutrition landscape shows a number of 
both supports and risks for children’s growth. In terms of food access and diet, Jordan is 
considered to have undergone the “nutrition transition” from under-nutrition to a diet 
high in fat, sugar, and carbohydrates. Consumption of fruit and vegetables has decreased 
over time. Although nationally caloric intakes are high, poor households spend almost 
half of their income on food and do not have adequate intake (Madanat, Troutman, & Al-
Madi, 2008). For instance, a study in Northern Jordan found that a third of women lived 
in households that were food insecure, with women reporting cutting down on food 
because of lack of money, not being able to afford balanced meals, and going hungry. 
Women who were less educated and in impoverished households were more likely to 
suffer from food insecurity (Bawadi, Tayyem, Dwairy, & Al-Akour, 2012). Almost half 
of women in poor urban households report their diet as inadequate, particularly in regards 
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to consumption of meat and fish, dairy, fruit and vegetables, and carbohydrates 
(Mahasneh, 2001). 
Jordan may have nutrition challenges, but healthcare utilization is high. The 
country has the highest rates of prenatal care and skilled delivery care (near 100%) 
among developing countries in MENA, as well as high rates of regular prenatal care (four 
or more visits, 95%) (El-Kogali & Krafft, 2015). Contraceptive knowledge is high (100% 
of married women in the DHS had heard of IUDs and the pill). Although current 
contraceptive use is also substantial (61% of married women are using contraception), 
there remains unmet need78 for family planning among 12% of married women. In part 
due to their access to health care and family planning services, women in Jordan have 
relatively long birth intervals (a mean of 32 months), but there are disparities by wealth 
and education (Department of Statistics (Jordan) & ICF International, 2013). Although 
health care during pregnancy is relatively good, a study in Irbid (in Northern Jordan) 
identified deficits in pregnant women’s nutrition behaviors. They did not achieve 
nutritional recommendations, particularly in regards to food quality and essential 
nutrients (Gharaibeh, Al-Ma’aitah, & Al Jada, 2005). 
Once children are born, initiation of breastfeeding is prompt (Abuidhail, Al-
Modallal, Yousif, & Almresi, 2014; Department of Statistics (Jordan) & ICF 
International, 2013). However, Jordan is far from the ideal six months of exclusive 
breastfeeding. In a study that followed mothers from post-partum in the hospital up to six 
months, while 68% of women said they would breastfeed when in the hospital, only 38% 
were exclusively breastfeeding after one month and just 1% until six months (the 
recommended period) (Abuidhail, Al-Modallal, Yousif, & Almresi, 2014). Part of the 
failure to exclusively breastfeed was a lack of knowledge; only half of women reported 
knowledge of exclusive breastfeeding. Further, this knowledge was linked to socio-
economic status (income and education). Relatedly, incorrect beliefs about 
complementary feeding (the introduction of solid foods) and other post-partum practices 
                                                
78 Unmet need is defined as the percentage of fecund women who (i) are not using contraception and (ii) 
want to space the next birth or stop childbearing altogether (Department of Statistics (Jordan) & ICF 
International, 2013). 
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have been identified as common in Jordan (Jarrah & Bond, 2007; Obeidat, Salameh, 
Tayem, Mutair, & Gawasmeh, 2014). Discontinuation of breastfeeding and introduction 
of solid foods may be related to good intentions but inaccurate beliefs. Women often 
stopped breastfeeding because they thought the baby was still hungry after breastfeeding 
(Oweis, Tayem, & Froelicher, 2009) and gave complementary foods early in order to 
help children grow (Obeidat, Salameh, Tayem, Mutair, & Gawasmeh, 2014). 
4.3 Conceptual Framework 
4.3.1 Child Health Production 
The literature on the causes of child malnutrition (Bhutta, Ahmed, Black, et al., 
2008; Black, Allen, Bhutta, et al., 2008) and the general health production function 
literature (Cebu Study Team, 1992; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1983; Strauss & Thomas, 
1998), as well as previous work on child health inequality (Assaad, Krafft, Hassine, & 
Salehi-Isfahani, 2012), can serve as a starting point for understanding the determinants of 
children’s height and weight. This essay posits the following general child health 
production function: 
H = h(F, K, N, E, D, P; S, ν)! (4.1) 
where a vector of health outputs, H (i.e. height, weight), is produced by the function h(), 
based on a series of vectors of health inputs including food, F, mother’s health 
knowledge, K, health conditions and practices, N, the health environment, E, maternal 
demographic and anthropometric characteristics, D, and prenatal development, P. The 
health inputs are selected in part by parents, and this selection may be affected by socio-
economic characteristics, S, such as education, wealth, and income. Additionally, S may 
shape the technology of the production function. An element of random genetic variation, 
ν, also affects height and weight. 
The budget constraint households face is a particularly important part of the role 
of S in shaping inputs. In general, families can be assumed to be selecting health inputs 
for their children to maximize utility in the face of their budget constraints (Cebu Study 
Team, 1992; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1983; Strauss & Thomas, 1998). However, some 
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aspects of health inputs, for instance local sanitation or clean water (elements of E in 
equation (4.1)), may be linked to socio-economic status, for instance the government not 
providing sanitation or water in poorer neighborhoods, without being under the control of 
parents. Thus, some inputs cannot be actively selected by parents, but will be associated 
with socio-economic status. In assessing the empirical relationship between health and 
socio-economic status, both parents’ choices based on socio-economic status and other 
relationships between socio-economic status and inputs will be estimated. 
When estimating the determinants of health, the unmeasured term ν, random 
genetic variation, will also pick up any unobservable determinants. If unobserved 
determinants are correlated with observed determinants, the estimated impact of observed 
determinants may be biased. For instance, in models of the determinants of child health 
where clean water is not accounted for, the direct role of food in the health production 
function will be over-stated if, for example, food insecure families live in areas with less 
access to clean water. 
4.3.2 Inequality 
Inequality is both deplorable and inevitable—not everyone can earn the same 
income, or be the same height. How, then, can economists or policy makers distinguish 
“problematic” inequality from “natural” inequality? Roemer (1998), drawing on various 
strands of political philosophy and economics, articulated a powerful and popular answer 
to this question with the concept of inequality of opportunity. He proposed that when 
considering inequality in outcomes, the portion due to “circumstances” beyond an 
individual’s control should be distinguished from the portion due to “effort.”79 Inequality 
in outcomes due to differing levels of effort is morally acceptable, as effort is, by 
definition, under an individual’s control, and also creates powerful incentives in the 
marketplace, as when individuals receive unequal wages in recognition of unequal effort. 
In contrast to effort, “circumstances” are factors that are outside an individual’s control, 
                                                
79 The inequality of opportunity literature can also allow for factors within an individual’s control to be 
influenced by circumstances. For instance, the “effort” exerted in school or work is likely to be affected by 
one’s circumstances and can be considered as an indirect form of inequality of opportunity (Bourguignon, 
Ferreira, & Menendez, 2007).    
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such as gender, the location of birth, or parents’ education. Inequality due to 
circumstances is considered to not be morally justifiable. This circumstance-related 
inequality is called inequality of opportunity. 
There are some problems with Roemer’s original conceptualization of inequality 
of opportunity when considering child health outcomes. First, when considering young 
children, no circumstances are under children’s control. No differences in height or 
weight could be reasonably attributed to infants’ inadequate “effort” to grow. To 
children, their parents’ efforts and choice of health inputs are also circumstances outside 
of their control, with important impacts on their early health and nutrition. Thus, under 
Roemer’s framework, all inequality in outcomes for this age group is, by definition, 
inequality of opportunity. This definition yields a very unrealistic standard of equality of 
opportunity requiring equal heights and weights for all children. This essay, as others 
have done (Assaad, Krafft, Hassine, & Salehi-Isfahani, 2012), modifies Roemer’s 
concept to consider inequality of opportunity only that inequality due to observable 
circumstances. Since not all circumstances are observable, or observed in survey data, 
inequality of opportunity measured based on observable circumstances is therefore a 
lower bound on true inequality of opportunity. The remainder of inequality is considered 
to be “luck.”  
This partitioning of inequality based on what is observed in survey data has been 
identified as a serious shortfall, particularly when drawing policy implications. Yet even 
the critics of inequality of opportunity note that the underlying exercise in assessing 
inequality of opportunity, analyzing the determinants of various outcomes, is valuable 
(Kanbur & Wagstaff, 2014). Thus, this essay uses the inequality of opportunity approach 
as a method for summarizing the determinants of child health inequality, a method that 
quantifies the role of those determinants and their mediators, and additionally grounds 
them in an ethical framework. 
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4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Creating a Single Measure of Height and Weight 
It is not possible to simply decompose inequality in height and weight directly. 
Height and weight progress with children’s age, and inequality identified by directly 
examining height and weight will be confounded by relationships between height and 
weight, the age distribution, and covariates. One common method, which this essay uses, 
is to measure height and weight in terms of z-scores calculated by comparing observed 
height and weight to reference distributions of healthy children of the same age and sex. 
The resulting measures are referred to as height-for-age, weight-for-age, and weight-for-
height. Height-for-age and stunting (2 SD below the median of the healthy reference 
population in terms of height-for-age) effectively capture long-term, chronic 
malnutrition. Weight-for-height and wasting (2 SD below the median of the healthy 
reference population in terms of weight-for-height) indicate rapid weight loss or acute 
temporary malnutrition (Black, Allen, Bhutta, et al., 2008). Height-for-age thus is, in part, 
an accumulated history of weight over time. Weight-for-age and underweight (2 SD 
below the median of the healthy reference population in terms of weight-for-age) include 
elements of both height-for-age and weight-for-height.  
The WHO reference for z-scores is used, as it is the most recent growth standard 
(World Health Organization, 2006). Particularly for children, there does not appear to be 
ethnic variation in growth (Bustos, Amigo, Muñoz, & Martorell, 2001; Ulijaszek, 2001), 
so the WHO reference can be used globally. The healthy reference populations have a 
constant mean and variance in the z-score. Z-scores do not, however, have a particularly 
intuitive interpretation in terms of inequality and would alter the inequality indices. Z-
scores also are problematic to use directly in inequality indices because they can be 
negative, and the best index for examining inequality in child health cannot handle 
negative numbers. Therefore, in this essay, z-scores are transformed back into height and 
weight measures in their natural units of centimeters and kilograms and standardized 
relative to the distribution of a single reference age and gender—in this case, a 24-month-
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old female child is used. This transformation, proposed by Pradhan, Sahn, and Younger 
(2003) allows for a more intuitive and less arbitrary scale in the inequality calculations 
and has been used in past studies (Assaad, Krafft, Hassine, & Salehi-Isfahani, 2012; 
Pradhan, Sahn, & Younger, 2003). Because the transformation, particularly for height-
for-age, is essentially multiplying the z-score and adding a constant (World Health 
Organization, 2006), it will have little impact on either the regressions or the resulting 
inequality measures.  
The standardized height, ℎ!, is calculated as:  ℎ! = !!!,!!–! !!,! ℎ   (4.2) 
where !!,! is a function that outputs height z-scores based on the distribution in the WHO 
healthy reference population for an individual age a and gender g. The observed height of 
that individual is h, ! = 24 months, and ! = female. Essentially, the z-score for a child of 
observed height h, age a, and gender g is calculated from !!,!(ℎ). The z-score is then 
used in the inverse function, !!,!!!() to calculate the height for a 24-month-old female with 
that z-score. An equivalent transformation is used for weight-for-age and weight-for-
height. 
4.4.2 Inequality Decompositions 
Assessing the role of different factors in child health inequality and in mediating 
socio-economic inequality requires estimating both total inequality in child health 
outcomes (transformed height and weight) and the shares attributable to socio-economic 
factors before and after accounting for the potential mediators such as feeding or prenatal 
factors. The choice of inequality index, the path of decomposition (direct or residual) and 
whether parametric or non-parametric methods are used for decompositions will all affect 
resulting estimates of inequality and shares (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2008).  
Assessing the shares of inequality attributable to different circumstances 
(distinguishing inequality of opportunity from the residual attributed to luck) requires a 
decomposable index. Generalized entropy (GE) indices are a class of inequality indices 
that are decomposable and have a number of other desirable theoretical and practical 
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properties (Duclos & Araar, 2006). The GE(0) index (also known as the Theil-L index or 
the mean logarithmic deviation) measures the average deviation between the logarithm of 
the mean and the logarithms of observed values of a continuous variable as follows 
(Duclos & Araar, 2006): GE 0 = !" ! − !"(! ! !"!!   (4.3) 
where ! is the mean value of the continuous variable of interest (transformed height, 
weight), p is the cumulative proportion of the population, where the population has been 
ordered from lowest to highest values of the variable of interest (e.g. shortest to tallest 
heights), and Q(p) is the value of the continuous variable (height, weight) at cumulative 
proportion p. Essentially, the GE(0) index quantifies the differences between the 
observed distribution of values and their mean, in log terms. The GE(0) index emphasizes 
inequality at the lower end of the distribution, which is desirable in assessing child health, 
as extreme malnutrition is of particular concern.80  
The GE(0) index can be decomposed into inequality of opportunity directly or 
indirectly (as a residual). A smoothed distribution can be used to eliminate all the residual 
inequality (leaving only inequality due to circumstances), or a standardized distribution 
can be used to eliminate all inequality due to circumstances (leaving only residual 
inequality due to luck). The smoothed distribution allows for an estimate of the share of 
inequality of opportunity in total inequality directly, while the standardized distribution 
calculates it as a residual (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2008). Only the GE(0) measure will 
generate the same results for both direct and residual methods (Duclos & Araar, 2006; 
Ferreira & Gignoux, 2008).81  
This essay uses the standardized distribution, using the residual approach to 
calculating inequality of opportunity because, as discussed below, child health and 
                                                
80 The GE indices (and their transformations) are also the measures that satisfy standard axioms and 
decomposability for measuring inequality in a continuous outcome (Cowell, 2000). These axioms have 
been derived in a context of income inequality, but they appear to be transferable to the context of health 
inequality, particularly in the absence of an axiomatic approach for health or child nutrition. 
81 For indices other than GE(0), removing inequality due to circumstances or removing inequality due to 
luck will yield different estimates of inequality of opportunity because of additional terms in the 
decomposition. See, for instance, the decomposition of the coefficient of variation squared (Roemer, 2014) 
or other generalized entropy measures (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2011). 
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nutrition deteriorate with age. Age is also correlated with a number of other 
characteristics, such as feeding practices, and thus it is necessary to control for age. 
However, it would be undesirable to treat age as a circumstance, as all children will pass 
through different ages. Using the standardized distribution to estimate inequality of 
opportunity with age not being treated as a circumstance makes it possible to estimate 
inequality of opportunity without age confounding estimates.  
While both parametric and nonparametric methods can be used to estimate how 
outcome y depends on circumstances, C, there are substantial tradeoffs associated with 
each of these two methods (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2008). Nonparametric methods allow 
one to partition the population into k groups, without any functional form assumptions on 
the relationships between circumstances and outcomes, simply comparing the group 
means and the population mean to estimate inequality. The main downside of this method 
is that, in order to retain adequate cell sizes for typical samples, very few circumstances 
rapidly exhaust the possibilities for decomposition. For instance, a relatively 
parsimonious specification, with three regions, three mother’s education levels, two 
genders, and five wealth quintiles requires 90 groups to be estimated. With a minimum 
cell size of 100, this already requires 9,000 observations. It also does not allow for the 
use of continuous variables, unless they too are partitioned (for instance, partitioning food 
intake into more than four feedings or less than four feedings), which will substantially 
reduce the inequality attributable to these variables. Nonparametric methods were 
therefore not considered for this essay, since a large number of variables are of interest, 
as well as continuous and count variables such as birth weight and number of feedings.  
Parametric methods require functional form assumptions (Ferreira & Gignoux, 
2011). For instance, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, the method used in this 
essay, assume that circumstances are additive, although interactions can relax this 
assumption somewhat. The assumed additive functional form substantially reduces the 
data requirements and allows for the assessment of potentially many more circumstances 
contributing to inequality.  
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Recall that two relationships are of interest: both how socio-economic 
circumstances, S, generate child health disparities and how these disparities are mediated 
through a number of different factors, hereafter referred to as M (i.e. F, K, N, E, D, P in 
(4.1)). Thus, in line with studies that decompose inequality into the direct and indirect 
effect of circumstances (Bourguignon, Ferreira, & Menendez, 2007), this essay estimates 
both a “reduced form” model with just socio-economic status and a “structural” model 
that attempts to disentangle the effects of socio-economic mediators (as well as any 
additional effects they may have). Essentially, this approach assumes that M are a (linear) 
function of socio-economic status, S: !! != !!!+!! (4.4) 
where ! is a vector of coefficients that link the socio-economic variables with the 
mediators.  
The direct effects of socio-economic status (or residual effects of omitted 
variables, as socio-economic status should not act as a direct input) and the indirect 
effects through M on y (height and weight measures) can then be disentangled by 
estimating:  !! != !!!! +!!! + !!  (4.5) 
This can be contrasted with the “reduced form” effects of socio-economic status: !! != !!!(! + !")+ !!! + !!!  (4.6) 
which are readily estimated as: !! != !!!! + !!  (4.7) 
Estimating first (4.7) and then (4.5) allows for a comparison of the magnitude of 
socio-economic effects and their mediators. Estimating (4.5) with subsets of M, such as 
those elements of the early environment only or prenatal environment only, can allow for 
identification of the relative role of different factors in mediating disparities by looking at 
the shifts in the contributions of S to inequality as various mediators are added. Since 
variables are actively omitted, different permutations are checked to ensure that omitted 
variables and the order of additions are not driving results.  
To move from the estimation of regressions to inequality shares, let the equation  
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!! != !!!! + !!  (4.8) 
with the vector C, circumstances, be used as a generalization of (4.5) and (4.7). C 
includes S and can also include M, i.e. circumstances include socio-economic status and 
potentially mediators as well (depending on the specification). Then the estimated 
parameters, !, are used to compute standardized distributions, !!, as (Ferreira & 
Gignoux, 2011):  !! = !! !+ !!!  (4.9) 
where ! is the vector of sample mean circumstances and !! is the estimated residual from 
equation (4.8). After differences in circumstances are controlled for by using mean 
circumstances, the remaining variability is exclusively in the residual, i.e. within types or 
circumstance groups. These  !! can be used to calculate inequality of opportunity,!!!, 
residually as a share of total inequality (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2008): !! = 1− GE! !! GE! !!   (4.10) 
The contribution of inequality of opportunity to overall inequality can thus be expressed 
as the share of total inequality due to circumstances.  
The partial shares of a circumstance or group of circumstances J in inequality can 
be calculated based on a counterfactual standardized distribution (Ferreira & Gignoux, 
2008): !!! = !!!! + !!!!!!!!! + !!  (4.11) 
This is then used to estimate the share of circumstance set J in total inequality as:  !!! = 1− GE! !!! GE! !!   (4.12) 
These partial shares are the focus of this essay, especially how shares for socio-economic 
inequality are mediated through different determinants such as health knowledge or the 
health environment. Both inequality of opportunity and partial shares are tested for 
statistical significance by generating bootstrapped standard errors around the estimates. 
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4.4.3 The Problems of Omitted Variables and Measurement Error 
Measurement error is a potential problem for both estimating inequality of 
opportunity and determining whether different factors mediate socio-economic 
inequality. A number of different variables could be mis-measured, starting with 
anthropometric measures. Although height and weight are the best-measured 
anthropometric measures (Ulijaszek & Kerr, 1999), major problems can still occur in 
fielding such measurements (Department of Statistics (Jordan) & Macro International 
Inc., 2008). Missing information on anthropometric indicators (data are missing for 7% 
of children) is relatively random (Department of Statistics (Jordan) & ICF International, 
2013) and unlikely to induce bias. If there is random measurement error in the dependent 
variables (height, weight), the regressions of these outcomes on circumstances will not be 
biased (Bound, Brown, & Mathiowetz, 2001). However, the estimate of total inequality is 
likely to be biased upwards by random errors, thus increasing the denominator but not the 
numerator of inequality of opportunity and underestimating inequality of opportunity.  
Because not all dimensions of socio-economic status are observed, estimates are 
likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. For instance, there are data on wealth based on 
an asset index, but not on incomes. Assuming that income and wealth have a substantial 
positive partial correlation, it is likely that the coefficient on wealth will be biased 
upward relative to the true effect of wealth. Omitted variable bias may affect various 
dimensions of socio-economic status differentially. If omitted income has a positive 
partial correlation with both wealth and education but a stronger partial correlation with 
wealth than education, both the wealth and education coefficients will be biased upward, 
but that of wealth more so. Since the primary use of the coefficients is generating the 
estimates of the contribution of socio-economic status to child health inequality, positive 
partial correlations between included and omitted socio-economic status variables will 
primarily increase the partial effect of socio-economic status towards its true value if all 
dimensions of socio-economic status were observed. Individual coefficients should be 
interpreted with some caution, keeping in mind potential omitted variables. 
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Measurements of socio-economic status that are available can be expected to have 
some degree of random error. In the regressions of anthropometric outcomes on 
circumstances, (randomly) mis-measured covariates will have coefficients that suffer 
from attenuation bias (Bound, Brown, & Mathiowetz, 2001). This will lead to an under-
estimate of inequality of opportunity in child health related to socio-economic status. 
Overall, given at least some degree of measurement error and certainly missing 
dimensions of socio-economic status, the estimated inequality of opportunity in child 
health from socio-economic status is a lower bound.  
When adding covariates that might mediate socio-economic inequality or have 
independent effects on child health inequality, an array of different measurement error 
problems might occur. Again, it is likely that many of the potential mediators will be 
measured with error, leading to attenuation bias in the regressions. This attenuation bias 
will in turn lead to an underestimate of inequality of opportunity. An additional set of 
considerations arises when comparing the partial effects for different sets of 
circumstances. Some dimensions of circumstances are likely to be better measured than 
others. Child gender, for instance, will probably be better measured than recall reports of 
whether breastfeeding initiation after birth was immediate, after one hour, after two 
hours, etc. This means that the estimated partial effects may be differentially attenuated 
depending on how extensive measurement error is. 
The comprehensiveness of the observed variables in capturing a concept is also 
going to be a factor. Child gender can fairly readily be captured by a single variable, but 
health knowledge or differences in feeding practices are not so readily measured. Omitted 
variable bias may make interpreting findings problematic. For instance, geographic 
differences in child health outcomes are likely to be driven by omitted variables such as 
local access to health services or the local disease environment. Findings must be 
interpreted with caution, keeping in mind what is included or omitted as well as what is 
likely to be accurately measured.  
A final problem arises in assessing the mediating roles of different factors in child 
health inequality. The assessment of factors’ mediating roles will be affected by the 
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extent of differential measurement in relation to links with socio-economic status. For 
instance, sewage connections may be closely related to housing characteristics and 
durable assets, which are captured by the wealth index, while the frequency of protein 
consumption relates more closely to current income, which is not measured directly but is 
proxied with assets and employment. Thus, if both sewage connections and protein 
feeding frequency actually equally mediate socio-economic disparities in child health, 
one would expect that sewage connections would appear to mediate more of socio-
economic inequality of opportunity in this essay’s necessarily partial and mis-measured 
estimates. Similarly, although the production function suggests that socio-economic 
status should have no direct effects on child health after all inputs have been accounted 
for, with mis-measured and limited information on inputs, it is likely that some partial 
effects from socio-economic inequality of opportunity will remain even after including 
all the available mediators.  
All of these measurement problems of partial information, mis-measurement, and 
differentially captured mediation will be further exacerbated if any of the measurement 
error is systematic (related to covariates). For instance, survey teams may have rushed 
through interviews with poorer households that had poor heating and taken more care at 
richer households that were well heated. Or families from poorer households might be 
more sensitive about appearing to be poor, in terms of having limited food, and so they 
inflated the frequency of children’s meals. These types of errors can introduce a large 
number of potential biases into the data. 
In an ideal world, it would be possible to correct the measurement error problems. 
For instance, instrumental variables can be used to correct random measurement errors. 
However, instrumental variable solutions to measurement error cannot be used when 
there is measurement error in a binary or categorical variable (i.e. most of the variables 
analyzed in this essay). This is because measurement error in such variables is non-
classical; there is always a correlation between the error and the true value (Bound, 
Brown, & Mathiowetz, 2001). Additionally, even for the continuous variables, a large 
number of valid instruments would be required to identify all of the potentially mis-
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measured variables. Such variables are not available in the DHS data, so no corrections 
for measurement error are undertaken. Thus, as in other studies (Bourguignon, Ferreira, 
& Menendez, 2007), measurement error will contribute to the residual or luck component 
of inequality. Overall, the different types of measurement error are likely to lead to 
under-estimates of inequality of opportunity, but to potentially differential extents for 
different variables. Thus, caution is required in interpreting the findings that follow.   
4.5 Data 
4.5.1 The Sample 
This essay uses the 2012 DHS for Jordan. The survey sampled 15,190 households 
and 11,352 ever-married women ages 15-49 (Department of Statistics (Jordan) & ICF 
International, 2013). The survey is nationally representative. The data include 
anthropometric information (height and weight) for children under age 5, with a two-
thirds random sample of households selected for anthropometric measurements. The 
2012 DHS also includes questions that refer specifically to the youngest child under two 
years of age. For instance, food consumed by the child in the day preceding the survey, as 
well as the number of times during the day the child had consumed foods, is collected 
only for the youngest child under two. Thus, for the analyses of inequality of opportunity, 
the sample is further limited to these 2,230 young children. Any expansion in inequality 
occurring past this age or any catch-up in growth will not be captured by this analysis. 
4.5.2 The Covariates   
In order to identify the drivers of socio-economic disparities in children’s 
nutrition, this essay first examines a number of socio-economic characteristics, such as 
parents’ education and wealth, and their relationships with children’s growth. In 
subsequent specifications, this essay incorporates a large number of measures of inputs to 
the child health production function, such as parents’ health knowledge or feeding 
practices. These inputs are the mechanisms through which socio-economic disparities 
may be mediated. Comparing the estimates of inequality of opportunity with and without 
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the input variables allows for an assessment of the mediating role of different inputs, such 
as feeding practices. 
Table 4.1 describes in detail how individual variables are aggregated into 
categories. Two broad categories of socio-economic variables are considered, parents’82 
education and “wealth and employment.” Parents’ education incorporates mother’s and 
father’s education categorically. Wealth and employment incorporates the household 
wealth score (a factor variable),83 parents’ employment statuses, and employed parents’ 
occupations. Education and wealth/employment may have different effects and different 
mediators in determining child health outcomes. For instance, parents’ education may 
mediate health knowledge, while wealth and employment may mediate food quantity and 
quality. 
In assessing the mediators of disparities, gender is considered (comparing females 
to males), to investigate whether gender discrimination is occurring generally or along 
socio-economic lines. Geographic differences are examined, in terms of governorates, 
rural versus urban, refugee camps versus non-refugee areas, and badia (arid areas) versus 
non-badia. Place of residence is not directly an input into the health production function. 
However, a number of potential mediators that cannot readily be measured in the data 
may be captured by place of residence, such as the local climate. Thus, if geographic 
differences mediate socio-economic disparities, this may be due to the disease 
environment, or differences in access to services such as sanitation, water, or health care. 
Geographic differences might also pick up ethnic disparities in health if certain ethnic 
populations are geographically concentrated.  
                                                
82 The analysis excludes children whose mothers were not interviewed. Father’s characteristics are 
available based on mother’s report, regardless of whether the father was present in the household. 
83 Because the wealth score provided with the data is a standardized factor, including negative values, in 
order to incorporate the wealth factor and its square into regressions appropriately, the wealth factor had to 
be shifted into purely positive terms. This was done by adding the minimum value of the standardized 
variable to all wealth scores. Although the coefficients on wealth and its square will vary depending on the 
constant added, essentially a function with a constant, linear term, and quadratic term underlies any 
transformation that adds a constant (within the range of values that will yield only positive values of 
wealth) and thus the contribution of wealth and its square to inequality will be unchanged.  
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Feeding practices are a key area of investigation, as these are both a target of 
policy interventions and a frequently posited mediator for socio-economic disparities. 
Children from poorer families may consume less food or less diverse food. They may 
also have different chances of being breastfed. Information on breastfeeding initiation 
and whether a child is currently breastfed, exclusively breastfed, or fed with a bottle is 
incorporated into the category “food.” In addition, the (categorical) frequency of feeding 
is incorporated. Being fed once, twice, thrice, or four or more times per day is the 
categorical breakdown. The frequency of feeding is a proxy for energy intake: depending 
on their breastfeeding status and age, children should be fed at least two or three meals a 
day, plus one or two snacks (Department of Statistics (Jordan) & ICF International, 2013; 
World Health Organization, 2005, 2008). The number of different types of foods, 
achieving a minimum daily variety of foods, and achieving certain minimums within 
certain types of foods, such as protein, all play an important role in adequate nutrition 
(Department of Statistics (Jordan) & ICF International, 2013; World Health Organization, 
2005, 2008). Food types in the data are detailed to the level of “yogurt” or “carrots, red 
potatoes, or pumpkin.” The essay aggregates information to assess the number of liquids, 
proteins, grains, and fruits/leafy vegetables fed as a part of the “food” category. Because 
feeding practices are closely related to age, age in months is controlled for, since, as 
discussed below, height- and weight-for-age decay over time, and could confound 
food/nutrition relationships. However, age is not considered a circumstance or mediator 
in the analyses.  
Mother’s health knowledge has been demonstrated in other contexts to be an 
important mediator of socio-economic disparities in child health (Glewwe, 1999). There 
are a large number of questions about mother’s health knowledge in the DHS data. 
Variables for mother’s knowledge of tuberculosis and oral rehydration salts (ORS) are 
incorporated into the analysis as measures of health knowledge that are likely to directly 
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affect child health. A factor variable based on women’s family planning knowledge is 
also included as a measure of general health knowledge.84  
Health conditions, and how they are managed, may mediate socio-economic 
disparities in health and nutrition. Diarrhea and infection in particular have been linked to 
malnutrition (Glewwe, Koch, & Nguyen, 2004; World Bank, 2010). Although the entire 
history of episodes of illness is likely to drive current nutritional status, in the DHS data 
the only information on diarrhea is whether it has occurred in the past two weeks, along 
with its persistence (whether it is still ongoing). Likewise information on fever/cough in 
the past two weeks and its persistence is incorporated. These measures together constitute 
the category of health conditions.  
A wide set of factors affect the health environment children experience. On the 
household level, the drinking water source, sewer connection, distance to health facilities, 
incidence of family smoking, and crowding (persons per room) may all mediate socio-
economic disparities in nutrition by affecting the child’s health environment. Since the 
DHS samples in clusters of approximately 20 households, the local (cluster) level health 
environment can be measured in terms of the drinking water source, sewer connections, 
and wealth of other households, all of which are likely to contribute to the health of 
children, particularly in terms of the potential disease environment in their community.  
Two final factors that are considered are mother’s demographics and child’s birth 
weight (as recalled by the mother). Mother’s demographics incorporate the height of the 
mother, her age (categorically) and birth spacing in months (or a dummy for being part of 
the first birth). Weight of the mother was considered but could be a product (rather than a 
cause) of the conditions that lead to child malnutrition. Mother’s height (particularly her 
own stunting and malnutrition during childhood) has been shown to transmit across 
generations (Bhalotra & Rawlings, 2011). Mother’s age at birth also has an important 
                                                
84 Additional data not included in the analyses measure health knowledge about HIV/AIDS, knowledge of 
sexually transmitted infections, knowledge of the fertile period, and other questions about knowledge of 
tuberculosis (Department of Statistics (Jordan) & ICF International, 2013). These questions were less 
relevant both to child health and as a measure of general health knowledge, since, for instance, there are 
fewer than 1000 reported cases of HIV in Jordan (Department of Statistics (Jordan) & ICF International, 
2013). Interpretation of the additional questions was also potentially problematic, as disease and 
transmission knowledge could be indicative of illness rather than general health knowledge.  
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effect on health and nutrition outcomes (Kozuki, Lee, Silveira, et al., 2013). Teenaged 
mothers are particularly a hazard to child health but are also fairly rare in Jordan, with 
only 5% of 15-19 year-olds pregnant or having had a child (Department of Statistics 
(Jordan) & ICF International, 2013). Birth spacing, particularly short birth intervals, has 
been demonstrated to play an important role in maternal and infant health outcomes, and 
birth spacing has also been associated directly with child nutrition (Dewey & Cohen, 
2007; Norton, 2005). 
Birth weight, particularly low versus normal birth weight, has been shown in 
other contexts to drive long-term health and nutrition outcomes (Bhutta, Ahmed, Black, 
et al., 2008; Black, Allen, Bhutta, et al., 2008; Black, Victora, Walker, et al., 2013; 
Dewey & Begum, 2011; Victora, Adair, Fall, et al., 2008). Birth weight is likely to be a 
function of maternal nutrition and health preceding and during pregnancy, and socio-
economic conditions will likely affect maternal and fetal health and nutrition. Birth 
weight may also pick up the effects of prematurity, as there is no gestation 
length/prematurity data in the DHS. Mother’s demographics and birth weight together are 
considered to be mediators of the prenatal environment, while the health environment, 
health conditions, health knowledge, feeding, gender, and geographic differences will 
mediate primarily the early (post-natal) environment. 
In order to quantify socio-economic disparities in child nutrition and to assess 
their mediators, the inequality decompositions are undertaken in sequence. This essay 
first estimates parametric regressions of the determinants of the standardized 
anthropometric measures and inequality of opportunity for socio-economic characteristics 
(education, wealth and employment) alone. Gender, geographic differences, 
food/feeding, health knowledge, health conditions, and the health environment are then 
added to the regressions to estimate how much of the socio-economic effects are 
mediated through these measures (how much the partial effects decrease after controlling 
for mediators). Lastly, mother’s demographics and the child’s birth weight are added to 
the analyses. This division of added regressors allows for the identification of socio-
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economic mediators after birth, and preceding birth, by comparing the latter two 
analyses.  
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Patterns of Health and Nutrition 
Overall, Jordan has a moderate problem with malnutrition. Figure 4.1 shows the 
distribution of height-for-age, weight-for-age, and weight-for-height z-scores for children 
under age five. Around 7.6% of children are stunted, and the average height-for-age is      
-0.39 SD. Around 3.0% of children under age five are underweight, and the average 
weight-for-age is -0.10 SD; weight falls just slightly short of a healthy reference 
distribution. Given the patterns for weight- and height-for-age, it is unsurprising that just 
2.4% of children are wasted, and the average weight-for-height is 0.17 SD.  
The rate of stunting is significantly higher than that expected in a healthy 
reference population (2.3% (World Health Organization, 2006)) at a statistical 
significance level below 0.01%. Average height-for-age and weight-for-age are below 
zero with significance levels below 0.1%. Wasting and underweight are not significantly 
different from 2.3%, but average weight-for-height is above zero with a significance level 
below 0.1%. 
The pattern of nutrition by age shows different outcomes for average nutrition and 
acute malnutrition. Figure 4.2 shows the mean anthropometric outcomes by age in 
months with a locally weighted regression (lowess) curve to demonstrate trends. At birth 
and during the first year of life, average height-for-age, weight-for-age, and weight-for-
height in standard deviations are similar to those for the reference population. Stunting, 
underweight, and wasting are relatively high at birth and decrease over the first 10 
months of life. With some moderate fluctuations, height and weight measures fall starting 
at 10 months, with an especially steep decline through 20 months. Both stunting and 
being underweight increase from 10 months to 20 months of age before leveling off and 
slowly decreasing over time. In developmental terms, this suggests that on average 
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children experience deteriorating nutrition throughout the early years but that acute 
malnutrition may be offset over time.85  
4.6.2 Health and Socio-economic Status 
There are large differences in health and nutrition by socio-economic status in 
Jordan. Although breaking the data down by both child’s age in months and wealth 
quintile is somewhat noisy, Figure 4.3 shows that children from less wealthy households 
have poorer nutrition outcomes. Only children from the richest quintile remain near the 
healthy reference median (a z-score of zero) for height-for-age in Jordan. The poorest 
quintile has particularly low height-for-age and high stunting, with the worst period 
between 30-40 months before some recovery and partial convergence towards the other 
wealth groups. The patterns of height-for-age and weight-for-age presented by poorer 
children in Jordan are similar to those seen throughout low and middle income countries 
(Shrimpton, Victora, de Onis, et al., 2001; Victora, de Onis, Hallal, Blössner, & 
Shrimpton, 2010). Although differences in weight-for-age are smaller, there is also a 
clear socio-economic gradient in weight-for-age and being underweight. Weight-for-
height, likely to measure transitory nutritional status, does not show such clear patterns.  
Figure 4.4 examines whether these differences by wealth are significantly 
different across the age distribution, showing the smoothed values of height-for-age, 
weight-for-age, and weight-for-height for children from the richest and poorest quintiles. 
In addition, 95% confidence intervals are presented. Over almost all of the age 
distribution for height-for-age, the mean values for the children from the richest and 
poorest quintiles lie outside of each other’s confidence intervals. For weight-for-age, the 
confidence intervals alternately do and do not overlap each other’s mean values, 
particularly depending on which confidence interval one is looking at. Weight-for-height 
shows no clear pattern nor significant differences.  
Focusing on the youngest child under two, the sample for the inequality of 
opportunity analysis, Table 4.2 shows anthropometric indicators, as well as the 
                                                
85 These differences by age in months are unlikely to be driven by cohort affects; the 2009 Jordanian DHS 
demonstrates similar patterns of nutrition by age in months.  
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distribution of the sample, by socio-economic status. There is a clear socio-economic 
gradient by parents’ education, with children of secondary-educated parents showing a 
substantial improvement in health over preceding levels of education, and children of 
university-educated parents being particularly well-off. It is also only among the richest 
fifth of households that stunting, underweight, and wasting are all below the level 
observed in the healthy reference population. The poorest quintile is clearly the worst off; 
for instance, 16.7% of children from the poorest quintile are stunted compared to 0.7% of 
the richest children. Employment characteristics, which may be related to income, 
wealth, and education, also show clear socio-economic differences. Children with parents 
in white-collar occupations, such as professionals or managers, have better nutrition 
outcomes. Overall, there are clear disparities in child health by socio-economic status. 
However, the mediators of these factors are not immediately obvious, and are important 
information for designing interventions to address both inequality and lingering 
malnutrition in Jordan.  
4.6.3 Inequality of Opportunity in Child Health 
The first set of parametric regressions modeling the determinants of the 
standardized anthropometric measures yields estimated inequality of opportunity for 
socio-economic characteristics (education, wealth and employment) alone. This 
specification is referred to as “SES.” In order to estimate the role of different factors in 
mediating socio-economic inequality, gender, geographic differences, food/feeding, 
health knowledge, health conditions, and the health environment are then added to the 
regressions. This specification’s additions are referred to as “+ Early Environment.” The 
final specification adds mother’s demographics and the child’s birth weight, which is 
referred to as “+ Prenatal Environment.” Partitioning the added regressors in this fashion 
allows for the identification of socio-economic economic disparities, mediators after 
birth, and mediators preceding birth, by comparing the various analyses. Table 4.3 shows, 
for the analysis sample, the summary statistics for the different circumstances and 
covariates.  
  161 
Table 4.4 (for height-for-age), Table 4.5 (for weight-for-age), and Table 4.6 (for 
weight-for-height) all show the underlying regressions for the outcomes transformed into 
the anthropometrics of a 24-month-old female, based on z-scores. Regressions are 
presented both without and with the addition of controls for age in months. Estimates of 
inequality of opportunity are based on the regressions where age is included as a control 
but does not contribute to estimated inequality of opportunity. Since age can contribute to 
total inequality but does not contribute to inequality of opportunity, the proportion of 
inequality due to circumstances is likely to underestimate inequality of opportunity in 
children’s long-term outcomes. 
Figure 4.5 presents inequality of opportunity under different specifications for the 
three anthropometric outcomes. Values underlying the figure, bootstrapped standard 
errors, and statistical significance are presented in Table 4.7. There is substantial (and, in 
the cases of height- and weight-for-age, statistically significant) socio-economic 
inequality of opportunity. In terms of height-for-age, 6.4% of total inequality is socio-
economic inequality of opportunity. Approximately 4.3% of inequality in weight-for-age 
is socio-economic inequality of opportunity as is 2.1% of weight-for-height. These 
measures are for models including socio-economic circumstances alone. If all variables 
were perfectly measured these socio-economic circumstances would have no explanatory 
power once mediators were added. 
Comparing subsequent specifications, it is notable how much additional 
inequality is explained with the added variables, suggesting that while the covariates may 
mediate socio-economic inequalities to some extent, they also have additional 
contributions to inequality that are unrelated to (measured) socio-economic status. 
Substantial measurement error in socio-economic status could also cause the addition of 
other variables to have an apparent direct role in inequality of opportunity when in fact 
the other variables are only mediating differences related to socio-economic status.  
Inequality of opportunity in height rises from 6.4% to 13.6% with the addition of early 
environmental factors, and further to 25.8% with the addition of the prenatal environment 
(mother’s demographics and birth weight). The increase with the addition of the prenatal 
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environment is particularly notable on two grounds. First, it is large, almost doubling 
inequality of opportunity, suggesting that more than half of explained nutrition inequality 
is determined prior to birth. Second, the resulting level of inequality of opportunity, 
25.8%, is very large, particularly given that inequality related to age, which is substantial, 
contributes to total inequality and that much of natural genetic variation remains 
unaccounted for.  
A similar pattern of increasing inequality of opportunity with the addition of 
variables across specifications is observed for weight-for-age and weight-for-height. 
Inequality of opportunity in weight-for-age rises from 4.3% with socio-economic status 
only to 12.9% with the addition of the early environment, and then to 22.9% with the 
addition of the prenatal environment. Again, there is both a large increase and a high 
level of inequality of opportunity after adding the prenatal environment. Weight-for-
height rises from 2.1% to 7.3% and then to 10.1% as the early and prenatal environment 
are added. Notably, the addition of the prenatal environment explains only a little more, 
which is consistent with weight-for-height being driven by short-term fluctuations in 
nutrition and health. 
Some of the inequality of opportunity detected here as relating to the prenatal 
environment may be related to genetic variation in anthropometrics and growth that 
occurs even among a healthy population. The importance of genetic variation in human 
development generally is vigorously debated in terms of nurture versus nature 
(Goldberger, 1979). There is a wide range of estimates of the proportion of differences 
due to genetic factors (heritability) for height and weight (Baker, Reynolds, & Phelps, 
1992; Dubois, Kyvik, Girard, et al., 2012; Livshits, Peter, Vainder, & Hauspie, 2000; 
Towne, Guo, Roche, & Siervogel, 1993). Genetic factors affect not just birth weight or 
length but also the parameters of growth patterns (growth curves) after birth. A study 
using data from 23 twin birth-cohorts across four countries found that heritability was 
low at birth (4.8% to 8.7%) but increased with age. Thus, some of the estimated 
inequality of opportunity in terms of the prenatal environment may be related to genetic 
variation. 
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4.6.4  Mediators (Partial Effects) of Inequality in Child Health 
A number of different factors mediate inequality of opportunity in child health. 
Figure 4.6 presents the partial effects for different categories of variables, in terms of 
shares of total inequality under different specifications for the different anthropometric 
outcomes. Values underlying the figure are in Table 4.7. Looking at socio-economic 
status alone, there are effects for both parents’ education and wealth and employment, 
particularly for height- and weight-for-age. Around 4.6% of height-for-age inequality is 
due to wealth and employment, and 3.0% is due to parents’ education.86 Weight-for-age 
likewise shows a larger effect from wealth and employment than from education, but the 
opposite is true for weight-for-height.  
Adding the child’s early environment reduces the impact of parents’ education but 
has little or no effect on the wealth/employment effects for weight-for-age or height-for-
age; it reduces wealth/employment effects more than education effects for weight-for-
height. Little of the long-term patterns of inequality in nutrition by wealth or employment 
are mediated through the early environment; it is not feeding, health knowledge, health 
conditions, or the health environment that contribute to wealth/employment inequality, 
but these do have some effect on education related socio-economic inequalities. That 
these factors are mediating little wealth/employment effect and only a modest education 
effect is particularly interesting given that, in a number of dimensions of these health 
inputs, there is clear socio-economic inequality. For instance, although there are not large 
socio-economic differences in breast-feeding, there are socio-economic disparities for 
mother’s education and especially wealth in terms of complementary feeding 
(Department of Statistics (Jordan) & ICF International, 2013). Yet these differences do 
not seem to be driving the socio-economic disparities in child health observed in Jordan.  
However, when adding the prenatal environment, there is a larger drop in 
wealth/employment inequality of opportunity and a small drop in education-related 
inequality (for height- and weight-for-age). The pattern of prenatal factors mediating 
wealth and employment differences but not education differences was confirmed by 
                                                
86 Partial effects do not necessarily add exactly to total inequality of opportunity.  
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adding the prenatal factors alone (excluding the early environment) to the SES variables 
and seeing a large decrement in wealth and employment but not in education.  
Thus, wealth and employment disparities are mediated primarily by prenatal 
development. Notably, there remain substantial disparities by socio-economic status even 
after the many variables included have been added.87 For example, even after adding the 
early environment and prenatal factors, 1.9% of inequality in height-for-age is 
attributable to parents’ education and 2.0% is due to wealth and employment. 
Insufficiently precise measurements of other covariates, such as health knowledge, may 
contribute to these lingering effects, but they also suggest that there are other socio-
economic effects not yet measured or accounted for that may contribute to socio-
economic disparities. Issues such as the disease environment (poorer families living in 
areas with higher burdens of parasites, for instance) may drive these remaining effects.  
A number of different individual partial effects mediate socio-economic status or 
make additional substantial contributions to inequality in children’s nutrition. There is 
essentially no gender inequality and only small and insignificant geographic inequality. 
Food and feeding practices do contribute substantially to inequality, particularly to 
weight. Around 3-4% of inequality in weight-for-age is related to feeding, and this is 
sometimes statistically significant across specifications. The smaller contributions of food 
and feeding to height may be because concurrent feeding affects weight, and the full 
history of feeding affects height, so effects on height are underestimated. Health 
knowledge has at most a small and never statistically significant contribution. Because 
parents’ health knowledge may manifest itself in terms of feeding practices or health 
conditions, the importance of health knowledge is particularly likely to be under-
estimated. However, if, for instance, knowledge of oral rehydration salts (ORS) played a 
central role in health inequality, that should still be picked up in terms of an impact of 
health knowledge rather than other covariates. Health conditions likewise have small and 
                                                
87 Differences by socio-economic status are unlikely to be driven by particular components of the asset 
index, such as refrigerators, freezers, or dishwashers, which might affect food safety, as there is little 
variation in household ownership of these three assets. Almost all families have refrigerators, fewer than 
10% have freezers, and almost none have dishwashers. 
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insignificant effects, although health conditions are only measured for the past two weeks 
and not a full history. 
The early health environment, on both the household and local level, does have a 
large and statistically significant contribution to inequality of opportunity for height-for-
age, contributing around 5% of total inequality. In the regressions (Table 4.4), cluster 
level wealth, sanitation, and water all have large effects and appear to matter more than 
the corresponding household level characteristics, suggesting that the health/disease 
environment contributes to inequality in height primarily on a community rather than a 
household level. 
The contributions of maternal demographics (age, height, and birth interval) are 
large and significant for height-for-age, where they contribute 7.4% of total inequality. 
Effects are smaller (2% or 1%) and insignificant for the weight measures. The effects of 
maternal demographics, driven primarily by mother’s height (Table 4.4), are a clear 
intergenerational transmission of long-term nutritional outcomes. Each additional 
centimeter in mother’s height predicts an additional 0.136 centimeters of height for a 24-
month old female, after accounting for other characteristics and age in months. 
Transmission of genetic factors across generations may play an important role in the 
effects of maternal demographics, but given estimates of heritability (Dubois, Kyvik, 
Girard, et al., 2012), which should also manifest in measures like birth weight, genetic 
factors can be expected to be only part of the relationship across generations. Both nature 
(genetic factors) and nurture have been identified as key factors in the intergenerational 
transmission of health, economic, and education outcomes (Behrman & Rosenzweig, 
2004; Bjorklund, Lindahl, & Plug, 2006). Other mechanisms may be occurring. For 
instance, maternal undernutrition has been linked to low birth weight (Victora, Adair, 
Fall, et al., 2008), and maternal height has been linked to stunting and underweight in 
global studies (Ozaltin, Hill, & Subramanian, 2010). 
Much of children’s nutrition is also driven by health and nutrition accumulated 
prior to birth; 11.2% of inequality in height-for-age and 12.0% of inequality in weight-
for-age is determined by weight at birth (both are statistically significant). Each 
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additional kilogram of birth weight predicts an additional 1.848 centimeters of height for 
a 24-month old female, after accounting for other characteristics. In Jordan, 13.8% of 
births have low birth weight (weigh less than 2.5 kilograms) (Department of Statistics 
(Jordan) & ICF International, 2013). Although comparability of national statistics may be 
problematic, this is a relatively high share of low-birth-weight infants, particularly 
considering Jordan’s performance on other anthropometric measures. The shares for the 
United States and United Kingdom are 8% and the average for the least developed 
countries is 13% (UNICEF, 2014). Weight-for-height, capturing short-term fluctuations, 
has only a 1.6% contribution from initial status, consistent with prenatal growth affecting 
long-term patterns but not short-term fluctuations. 
4.6.5 Further Explorations of Mediators of Inequality in Child Health 
The role of prenatal factors in overall inequality of opportunity in child health and 
particularly in mediating socio-economic opportunity is notable. Figure 4.7 and Figure 
4.8 further explore the relationship of socio-economic status, specifically wealth, with 
birth weight and mother’s height. Looking first at birth weight (Figure 4.7), there are 
clear differences in the pattern of birth weights by wealth quintile, with children in the 
poorest quintile in particular having a disproportionate chance of being low-birth-weight 
(below 2.5 kilogram) infants, 16%. The poorest generally have slightly lower birth 
weights overall, averaging 3.0 kilograms, compared to 3.2 kilograms for the richest. 
There is a clear gradient (not shown) through the richest quintile, with children from the 
richest quintile particularly disproportionately represented among relatively heavier birth 
weights.  
There is a similar pattern for mother’s height by wealth quintile (Figure 4.8), with 
a particularly strong gradient by wealth in the share of children whose mothers have short 
stature. Short stature here is defined as a height less than 151.1 centimeters, the 3rd 
percentile of the CDC reference for a healthy 20-year-old female (Centers for Disease 
Control, 2001). The entire distribution for the poorest quintile appears shifted to lower 
heights relative to the other wealth quintiles (only richest shown), while mothers from the 
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richest wealth quintile are disproportionately likely to have heights near 170 centimeters, 
in the taller end of the distribution. These prenatal disparities in fetal growth and maternal 
height have clear gradients by wealth, especially at the lower ends of the distributions 
where they are particularly likely to have adverse consequences for children’s growth and 
health. Although genetic factors inherited across generations could contribute to some 
extent to the impact of prenatal factors on inequality of opportunity in child health, 
prenatal factors are also closely linked with socio-economic status. One study of twins 
(Behrman & Rosenzweig, 2004) suggests that the impact of birth weight, as a prenatal 
factor, on adult outcomes would actually be underestimated in cross-sectional estimates 
such as these that do not account for genetic endowments. The disproportionate share of 
low birth weights and short mothers in the lowest wealth quintile in particular suggests 
important links between socio-economic status, the prenatal environment, and child 
growth—links that will in turn impact adult outcomes. 
While prenatal factors were identified as playing a larger role in child health 
inequality and socio-economic disparities, it may be the case that prenatal factors are 
better measured than early environmental factors, and thus measurement quality is 
driving the results. One factor that has been identified as a particularly important 
mediator of child malnutrition is diarrhea; the prevalence of diarrhea tends to rise at the 
same point in time as the precipitous decline in children’s nutrition (Glewwe, Koch, & 
Nguyen, 2004). Figure 4.9 explores the relationship between diarrhea, its persistence, 
socio-economic status, and children’s age. The percentages of children who had diarrhea 
within the past two weeks (but do no longer) and children who had persistent diarrhea are 
graphed against children’s age for the children from the poorest and richest quintiles. 
Recall from Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 that the major decline in child nutrition occurs 
from approximately 10 months to 20 months. As Figure 4.9 shows, diarrhea is relatively 
low in the few months after birth and then rises, with the peak prevalence occurring in the 
10-20 month range. The rise in diarrhea coincides with the period when children are 
increasingly interacting with foods and becoming increasingly mobile, exposing them to 
substantially more germs.  
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However, the comparison of the poorest and richest children’s experience of 
diarrhea is not consistent with the faltering of poor (but not rich) children’s growth being 
due to diarrhea; very similar patterns of diarrhea occur from 0-20 months for the poorest 
and richest children. While the poorest children initially have slightly higher rates of 
persistent diarrhea, rates converge by the time when the poorest children start to falter in 
their growth. Differences in diarrhea prevalence by wealth occur primarily from 20 
months onwards, which is when growth faltering stops, mean height-for-age stabilizes, 
and some recovery begins. Additional analysis also demonstrated that treatment of 
diarrhea (oral rehydration salts, antibiotics, etc.) was similar across wealth quintiles. 
Although these analyses are not the same as being able to include the full history of 
diarrhea and other health episodes in the calculations of child health inequality, they do 
indicate that diarrhea is unlikely to be the driving cause of the precipitous decline in child 
health for poorer children, while richer children continue to develop relatively normally. 
4.6.6 Simulating Policy Priorities 
The sizeable inequality of opportunity attributable to prenatal factors translates 
into large differences in children’s anthropometric outcomes. As a further demonstration 
of the relatively large role of prenatal factors in child health and child health inequality, 
Figure 4.10 shows how different circumstances can lead to substantially different child 
health outcomes for selected covariates from the regressions: birth weight, mother’s 
height, the frequency of daily protein feedings, diarrhea and its persistence, and cluster 
level sewage connections. These are some of the circumstances that have the greatest 
impact in the regressions. The figure demonstrates what would happen to average height-
for-age z-scores if each circumstance were moved from the 5th to 95th percentile of its 
distribution (with all other circumstances as observed) as a demonstration of the 
importance of these different factors. This shift in birth weights represents a movement 
from average z-scores of -0.87 to 0.28. A shift from the 5th to 95th percentile in mother’s 
height moves z-scores from -0.62 to 0.18. Increasing the frequency of daily protein 
feedings from the 5th to 95th percentile of the distribution raises average z-scores from      
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-0.41 to 0.01. Going from persistent diarrhea to none increases z-scores from -0.56 to       
-0.22. Raising the cluster-level sewage from none to universal raises z-scores from -0.46 
to 0.00.  
If these different simulations are considered as policy interventions, targeting 
birth weights has by far the highest impact, increasing z-scores 1.15, equivalent to 3.7 
centimeters for a 24-month female. Shifting the distribution of mother’s heights leads to a 
0.79 change in z-scores, equivalent to 2.6 centimeters for a 24-month female. Although 
actually changing mother’s heights is a very long-term change, targeting mothers with 
short stature for nutrition support could have similar effects. All the rest of the potential 
policy levers—increasing the frequency of protein feedings, eliminating diarrhea, and 
moving to universal sewage—have much smaller policy impacts, less than 0.50 
differences in z-scores, or between 1.1 and 1.5 centimeters of height. While still valuable, 
the impact of such investments pales in comparison to interventions targeting the prenatal 
period. 
Although prenatal factors have the greatest impact on child nutrition outcomes, 
they are not necessarily the best policy alternative. Determining priority policies for child 
health and nutrition would require an assessment of the relative costs and benefits of 
different approaches. The existing evidence indicates that the benefits of reducing low 
birth weight are substantial, but only some interventions, such as targeting women with 
poor obstetric histories, have sufficient information to assess benefit-cost ratios. A few 
interventions are clearly promising; for instance, providing medicine to women with poor 
obstetric histories has benefit-cost ratios in the range of 4-35 dollars of benefits for each 
dollar of cost (Behrman, Alderman, & Hoddinott, 2004). Other studies, although lacking 
the necessary information to assess benefit-cost ratios, demonstrate that food 
supplementation during pregnancy can increase children’s birth weights, particularly 
when mothers are malnourished (Fall, Yajnik, Rao, et al., 2003; Imdad & Bhutta, 2012; 
Mardones, Urrutia, Villarroel, et al., 2008; Shaheen, de Francisco, El Arifeen, Ekström, 
& Persson, 2006; Yang & Huffman, 2011). There are differences in supplementation 
  170 
impacts based on the nature of the supplement, such as what nutrients and micronutrients 
are included, as well as the duration of exposure to supplements.  
Additional studies assessing the relative costs and benefits of alternative 
interventions to reduce low birth weight, such as protein/energy supplementation for 
pregnant women, would be extremely valuable. Programs to improve birth weight have 
been identified as an area with limited evidence, particularly in comparison to growth 
promotion and micronutrient programs (Horton, Shekar, McDonald, Mahal, & Brooks, 
2010; World Bank, 2006). Additional analyses of the predictors of birth weight in the 
Jordanian 2012 DHS suggest that some of the policy levers for child health and nutrition 
may also be effective for fetal and maternal nutrition. For instance, community-level 
sewage access was predictive of birth weight (results not shown), a pattern that may be 
due to a relationship between local sanitation, mother’s health and weight-gain during 
pregnancy, and fetal growth.     
4.7 Discussion and Conclusions     
  Children’s early development has important implications for their long-term 
wellbeing. Faltering growth during the early years—or indeed, even before birth—leads 
to worse health, education, and labor market outcomes by adulthood. Early childhood is 
also the starting point for inequalities in children’s development, determined by 
circumstances entirely outside of their control. This essay demonstrated that there are 
substantial socio-economic disparities in child health in Jordan, particularly in terms of 
height, which is the best measure of accumulated nutrition (or lack of nutrition) and is 
crucially related to a number of different dimensions of human development. 
A number of different possible determinants for inequality of opportunity in child 
health were examined, which might mediate socio-economic disparities as well as make 
additional contributions to inequality. While food and feeding contributed substantially to 
inequality in weight, they appeared to mediate little of the observed socio-economic 
disparities. The effects of parental education were only slightly reduced and the effects of 
wealth and employment relatively unchanged with the addition of early environmental 
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measures. Health knowledge, geographic differences, and gender had small contributions 
at most. The health environment, particularly local water, sanitation, and wealth, did 
contribute substantially to inequality of opportunity but did not appear to mediate socio-
economic disparities, instead largely making additional contributions to inequality.  
Notably, almost half of the maximum explained inequality in weight-for-age and 
height-for-age was driven by outcomes that were determined prenatally. Birth weight in 
particular, which is likely to be a measure of poor maternal health and nutrition leading to 
intra-uterine growth restriction, played a large role in inequality. Other studies have 
likewise found that a large share (20%) of stunting is attributable to insufficient fetal 
growth (Christian, Lee, Angel, et al., 2013). In utero rainfall (and therefore nutrition) 
shocks have been shown to have a larger effect on long-term growth than shocks in the 
first two years of life (Leight, Glewwe, & Park, 2015). Maternal demographics 
(especially height) also played a large role in unequal height-for-age and represent 
intergenerational transmission of health inequalities. 
Some of the estimated inequality due to prenatal measures may also be related to 
natural genetic variation, but estimates of heritability (Baker, Reynolds, & Phelps, 1992; 
Dubois, Kyvik, Girard, et al., 2012; Livshits, Peter, Vainder, & Hauspie, 2000; Towne, 
Guo, Roche, & Siervogel, 1993), which measure the share of variation in health 
outcomes due to genetic factors, indicate that natural genetic variation is likely to be only 
a small part of these prenatal effects. Studies have also directly linked prenatal nutrition 
(birth weight) with adult health outcomes, as well as schooling and labor market 
outcomes, even after controlling for genetic endowments (Behrman & Rosenzweig, 
2004). The disproportionate importance of the prenatal environment to later life outcomes 
such as education, income, and health has also been emphasized in the “fetal origins” 
literature (Almond & Currie, 2011a; Lin & Liu, 2014). Prenatal development tends to be 
more important than post-natal development for the formation of human capital, although 
both periods make important contributions (Almond & Currie, 2011b). 
These findings, particularly the substantial socio-economic disparities and the 
large disparities that are determined prenatally, have important implications for nutrition 
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policy and policies addressing health and nutrition inequalities. The large role of prenatal 
factors suggests that an important emphasis in health and nutrition interventions should 
be intervening before and during pregnancy (Black, Victora, Walker, et al., 2013). 
However, much of the current landscape of research, policy, and interventions places the 
greatest emphasis on the early environment and issues such as breastfeeding, 
complementary feeding, or health knowledge and behaviors (Bhutta, Ahmed, Black, et 
al., 2008; Black, Victora, Walker, et al., 2013; Horton, Shekar, McDonald, Mahal, & 
Brooks, 2010; World Bank, 2006, 2010)—issues that, while important, are relatively 
secondary, at least in Jordan. These findings suggest that countering malnutrition after 
children are born may already be too late in Jordan. Although this study looked at only 
one country, research in other contexts suggests that other countries may have similar 
deficits in prenatal growth that drive early malnutrition. For instance, in an indigenous 
population in Guatemala that had an approximately 50% rate of stunting at 0-6 months, 
the strongest predictor of early infant growth failure was impaired fetal growth 
(Berngard, Berngard, Krebs, et al., 2013). 
Given the near-universal use of prenatal care and the relatively high frequency of 
such care in Jordan (Department of Statistics (Jordan) & ICF International, 2013), an 
important entry point for potential interventions in Jordan will be addressing maternal 
nutrition and fetal growth within prenatal care. Follow-up care related to birth weight 
(determined at delivery) could also be crucial to redressing disparate health outcomes that 
are related to poor fetal growth and low birth weight. Targeting additional support for the 
health and nutrition of children with poor nutrition status at birth will be an important 
part of improving nutrition—and reducing socio-economic disparities. Globally, public 
health spending plays a particularly important role in the health of the poor (Bidani & 
Ravallion, 1997), so public health interventions for prenatal nutrition and development 
may be particularly important. 
The findings of this essay indicate a number of important directions for future 
research. The far more detailed specification of inequality of opportunity in this essay as 
compared to previous work (Assaad, Krafft, Hassine, & Salehi-Isfahani, 2012; El-Kogali 
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& Krafft, 2015; Krafft & El-Kogali, 2014) has led to a far higher estimate of inequality of 
opportunity in child health than previous work had indicated for Jordan or other countries 
in the region. This essay’s relatively high estimate of inequality suggests that there are 
typically a large number of important factors omitted (or, more often, not available in the 
data) in assessing child health inequality. The contributions of factors such as birth 
weight and feeding need to be considered in other contexts.  
Although the 2012 DHS for Jordan had relatively rich data, the factors included in 
this essay were measured imperfectly. For instance, data were available about feeding 
frequency, but this is only a rough proxy for caloric or energy intake, so the effects 
estimated here are likely a lower bound on true inequality of opportunity. Measurement 
problems may also differentially affect the estimated partial effects, depending on how 
well measured different factors are (see earlier discussion on measurement error). In 
Jordan as well as in other contexts, there is a clear need for much richer data to assess the 
determinants of children’s health and nutrition and the drivers of inequality in these 
critical outcomes. An important contribution of this essay is its discussion of the 
complexities of identifying disparities and their mediators in the context of measurement 
error and omitted variables, a neglected issue in studies of health inequality.  
Further research is needed in other countries to assess whether the pattern of 
predominant prenatal factors, which also has been found to occur in other contexts 
(Berngard, Berngard, Krebs, et al., 2013; Neumann & Harrison, 1994), is widespread. 
There is also insufficient research on the impact of nutrition interventions during 
pregnancy, but existing evidence shows such interventions can be effective, especially 
when mothers have poor nutritional status (Imdad & Bhutta, 2012; Merialdi, Carroli, 
Villar, et al., 2003; Rasmussen & Habicht, 2010). Particularly if this pattern is common 
globally, future research needs to investigate interventions targeting not only early 
childhood nutrition after children are born but also maternal and fetal nutrition and health 
to assess how best to prevent or remediate these key drivers of child malnutrition.  
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Figures 
Figure 4.1. Distribution of Anthropometrics 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
Notes: Kernel densities, using Epanechnikov kernel (bandwidth 0.4). 
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Figure 4.2. Anthropometrics by Age in Months 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
Notes: Lowess smoother (bandwidth 0.4).  
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Figure 4.3. Anthropometrics by Age in Months and Wealth Quintile 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
Notes: Lowess smoother (bandwidth 0.4). 
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Figure 4.4. Anthropometrics by Age in Months, Poorest and Richest Quintiles and 
Confidence Intervals 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
Notes: Lowess smoother (bandwidth 0.4). The 95% confidence intervals are constructed using the standard 
errors for the means at each month.  
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Figure 4.5. Inequality of Opportunity in Anthropometrics by Specification, 
Youngest Child Under Two (Percentage of Total Inequality) 
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Figure 4.6. Partial Effects, Inequality of Opportunity in Anthropometrics by 
Specification, Youngest Child Under Two (Percentage of Total Inequality) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
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Figure 4.7. Distribution of Birth Weights (in Kilograms), Poorest and Richest 
Wealth Quintiles 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
Notes: Kernel densities, using Epanechnikov kernel (bandwidth 0.4). 
Low birth weight defined as less than 2.5 kilograms.  
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Figure 4.8. Distribution of Mother’s Height (in Centimeters), Poorest and Richest 
Wealth Quintiles 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
Notes: Kernel densities, using Epanechnikov kernel (bandwidth 5). 
Mother’s height below 3rd percentile if less than 151.1112 centimeters per CDC growth charts for a 20-
year-old female (Centers for Disease Control, 2001). 
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Figure 4.9. Diarrhea in the Past Two Weeks and Persistence by Age in Months 
(Percentages), Poorest and Richest Quintiles  
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
Notes: Lowess smoother (bandwidth 0.6). 
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Figure 4.10. Simulations of Height-for-age Z-scores (Shift from 5th to 95th 
Percentiles for Selected Covariates) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
Notes: Based on regressions for height-for-age, specification including prenatal environment and age in 
months (Table 4.4). All other characteristics as observed except the one being simulated.  
Shifts from 5th to 95th percentiles are: birth weight of 2 kilograms to 4 kilograms, mother’s height of 149.4 
to 168.2, number of proteins from zero to four, diarrhea from persistent to none, cluster sewage connection 
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Tables  
 
Table 4.1. Categories of Variables 
Category Variables 
Parents’ education Mother’s education (6 categories), father’s education (6 
categories) 
Wealth and employment Household wealth factor (and square), mother’s 
employment status (3 categories), father’s employment 
status (4 categories), father’s occupation (8 categories), 
mother’s occupation (2 categories)  
Gender Female 
Geography Governorate (12 categories), rural, refugee camps, badia 
(arid areas) 
Food Breastfeeding initiation after birth (8 categories), 
currently breastfed, exclusively breastfed, fed with a 
bottle, frequency of feeding, number of liquids fed, 
number of grains fed, number of fruits/leafy vegetables 
fed, number of proteins fed 
Health knowledge Mother knows tuberculosis is curable, mother knows oral 
rehydration salts (ORS), factor for family planning 
knowledge 
Health conditions Diarrhea and persistence (3 categories), fever/cough and 
persistence (3 categories) 
Health environment Household level: Drinking water source (4 categories), 
sewage connection, distance to health facilities is a big 
problem, mother smokes cigarettes, mother smokes 
nargile (hookah), household members smoke, persons 
per room 
Cluster level: Share drinking water source (4 categories), 
share sewage connection, wealth of other households 
(and square)  
Mother’s demographics Mother’s age at birth (7 categories), mother’s height (in 
centimeters), birth interval (in months), first birth 
Birth weight Birth weight (in kilograms) and indicator if missing 
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      No education -0.91 -0.28 0.32 19.6 2.3 0.0 1.0 
Elementary -0.45 -0.13 0.17 12.6 5.5 4.1 8.9 
Preparatory -0.45 -0.13 0.20 16.5 5.4 3.7 17.4 
Secondary -0.23 0.07 0.29 7.8 3.2 2.4 48.7 
Diploma -0.22 0.21 0.49 13.2 3.1 1.1 7.9 
University and 
above 0.11 0.20 0.27 4.3 1.4 1.4 16.0 
Mother's education 
      No education -0.55 -0.23 0.11 12.9 6.3 1.0 1.4 
Elementary -0.48 0.13 0.58 12.2 1.5 0.9 5.7 
Preparatory -0.61 -0.11 0.30 17.8 3.4 1.8 14.1 
Secondary -0.27 -0.03 0.19 9.8 5.2 3.6 46.2 
Diploma 0.13 0.17 0.18 5.2 2.2 2.4 12.0 
University and 
above -0.03 0.24 0.43 5.8 0.8 1.1 20.7 
Wealth quintile 
      Poorest -0.62 -0.24 0.20 16.7 5.0 4.2 23.6 
Poorer -0.26 0.02 0.24 9.8 3.9 4.7 22.7 
Middle -0.27 0.09 0.32 7.6 2.1 0.4 22.1 
Richer -0.03 0.22 0.34 10.2 5.2 1.6 17.5 
Richest 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.7 0.2 0.3 14.0 
Father's employment status 
     Not 
present/not 
working -0.34 0.01 0.30 14.1 1.8 2.7 9.9 
Wage worker -0.25 0.05 0.29 9.3 3.2 1.9 69.4 
Employer -0.07 0.05 0.15 10.7 7.3 4.3 8.8 
Self-employed -0.23 0.07 0.24 7.6 3.6 4.4 11.8 
Mother's employment status 
     Not working  -0.29 0.01 0.25 10.1 3.9 2.6 86.1 
Wage worker 0.06 0.29 0.41 7.1 1.0 1.8 13.1 
Other work 0.12 0.15 0.11 13.3 0.8 0.0 0.9 
Father's occupation 
      Did not work -0.34 0.01 0.30 14.1 1.8 2.7 9.9 
Professional/ 
technical/ 
managerial -0.10 0.15 0.35 4.1 1.4 1.1 20.1 
























Clerical 0.00 0.13 0.24 9.6 4.5 1.8 7.0 
Sales -0.23 0.12 0.35 11.7 2.7 2.7 11.4 
Agricultural -0.53 -0.27 0.05 5.2 3.0 1.0 1.6 
Household and 
domestic -0.77 -0.35 0.19 20.8 8.3 0.0 1.3 
Services -0.29 -0.01 0.24 10.1 3.5 1.5 15.9 
Skilled manual -0.27 0.01 0.24 10.6 5.5 3.9 29.7 
Unskilled 
manual -0.36 -0.10 0.11 12.6 1.9 4.8 3.1 
Mother's occupation 
      Not working  -0.29 0.01 0.25 10.1 3.9 2.6 86.1 
Professional/ 
technical/ 
managerial 0.18 0.31 0.36 4.1 0.9 1.8 11.3 
Other 
occupations -0.42 0.18 0.52 22.2 1.0 1.1 2.6 
Total -0.24 0.04 0.27 9.7 3.5 2.5 100.0 
N 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
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Table 4.3. Summary Statistics for Covariates, Youngest Child Under Two 




  Wealth score 6.720 1.140 
Wealth score sq./100 0.465 0.165 
Father's education 
  No education 0.010 0.099 
Elementary 0.089 0.285 
Preparatory 0.178 0.382 
Secondary 0.483 0.500 
Diploma 0.079 0.269 
University and above 0.161 0.368 
Mother's education 
  No education 0.014 0.116 
Elementary 0.058 0.234 
Preparatory 0.137 0.344 
Secondary 0.464 0.499 
Diploma 0.121 0.327 
University and above 0.205 0.404 
Father's employment status 
  Not present/not working 0.103 0.303 
Wage worker 0.691 0.462 
Employer 0.085 0.279 
Self-employed 0.121 0.326 
Mother's employment status 
  Not working  0.864 0.342 
Wage worker 0.127 0.333 
Other work 0.009 0.092 
Father's occupation 
  Did not work 0.103 0.303 
Professional/technical/managerial 0.204 0.403 
Clerical 0.070 0.256 
Sales 0.109 0.312 
Agricultural 0.016 0.125 
Household and domestic 0.014 0.117 
Services 0.155 0.362 
Skilled manual 0.296 0.457 
Unskilled manual 0.033 0.179 
Mother's occupation 
  Not working  0.864 0.342 
Professional/technical/managerial 0.111 0.315 
Other occupations 0.024 0.154 
Rural 0.209 0.407 
Camps 0.043 0.202 
Badia 0.083 0.276 
Governorate of residence 
  Amman 0.353 0.478 
Balqa 0.074 0.262 
Zarqa 0.138 0.345 
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  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Madaba 0.029 0.167 
Irbid 0.184 0.388 
Mafraq 0.060 0.238 
Jarash 0.040 0.196 
Ajlun 0.025 0.157 
Karak 0.045 0.208 
Tafiela 0.015 0.123 
Ma'an 0.019 0.136 
Aqaba 0.016 0.127 
Female 0.447 0.497 
Breastfeeding initiation 
  Not breastfed 0.053 0.224 
Immediately 0.129 0.336 
Within first hour 0.065 0.247 
One hour 0.176 0.381 
2-24 hours 0.339 0.473 
One day 0.121 0.326 
Two days 0.056 0.229 
3 or more days 0.061 0.240 
Other liquids within 3 days birth 0.666 0.472 
Exclusively breastfed 0.055 0.229 
Currently breastfed 0.525 0.500 
Drank from bottle 0.571 0.495 
Feeding frequency 
  None 0.207 0.405 
Once 0.104 0.306 
Twice 0.212 0.409 
Three times 0.316 0.465 
Four + 0.160 0.367 
Number liquids 2.395 1.190 
Number grains 1.278 1.007 
Number proteins 1.696 1.483 
Number fruits and vegs. 0.759 0.821 
Diarrhea 
  None 0.738 0.440 
Yes but gone 0.194 0.395 
Yes still 0.068 0.251 
Fever/Cough 
  None 0.657 0.475 
Yes but gone 0.029 0.166 
Yes still 0.314 0.464 
Persons per room 1.792 0.929 
Average cluster wealth factor 9.601 0.753 
Average cluster wealth factor sq./100 0.927 0.151 
Cluster share of households not flushing to sewer 0.498 0.461 
Cluster water 
  Cluster share of households with bottled water 0.404 0.216 
Cluster share of households with water piped in and treated 0.210 0.148 
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  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Cluster share of households with water piped in and not treated 0.300 0.230 
Cluster share of households with other water source 0.086 0.195 
Household Water 
  Bottled 0.430 0.495 
Piped to dwelling treated 0.218 0.413 
Piped to dwelling not treated 0.280 0.449 
Other 0.072 0.258 
Flush to latrine/other 0.487 0.500 
Household members smoke 0.639 0.481 
Mother smokes cigarettes 0.066 0.248 
Mother smokes nargile 0.088 0.284 
Distance to health care problematic 0.307 0.462 
Know tuberculosis is curable 0.540 0.498 
Know of oral rehydration salts 0.915 0.280 
Exposure to family planning factor 0.033 0.793 
Mother's age 
  15-19 0.031 0.172 
20-24 0.186 0.389 
25-29 0.291 0.455 
30-34 0.261 0.439 
35-39 0.160 0.367 
40-44 0.068 0.252 
45-49 0.003 0.053 
Mother's height (in centimeters) 158.563 5.965 
Birth spacing (in months) 37.348 18.484 
First birth 0.205 0.404 
Birth weight in kilograms 3.118 0.609 
Birth weight in kilograms missing 0.008 0.088 
N (Observations) 2,111   
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
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Table 4.4. Regressions for Height-for-age (in Centimeters as a 24-month Female), 
Youngest Child Under Two 



















      Wealth score 2.850* 2.346* 0.941 0.717 1.225 0.930 
 
(1.110) (1.146) (1.097) (1.131) (1.052) (1.079) 
Wealth score sq./100 -15.492* -11.396 -1.572 -0.230 -6.285 -4.510 
 
(7.476) (7.886) (7.446) (7.721) (7.116) (7.415) 
Father's education (none omit.) 
      Elementary 0.748 0.895 0.578 0.574 0.617 0.836 
 
(1.187) (1.164) (1.106) (1.029) (1.061) (0.968) 
Preparatory 0.693 0.805 0.547 0.574 0.316 0.525 
 
(1.175) (1.183) (1.122) (1.068) (1.064) (0.996) 
Secondary 0.728 0.911 0.535 0.633 0.057 0.398 
 
(1.178) (1.161) (1.074) (1.010) (1.038) (0.955) 
Diploma 0.906 1.224 0.628 0.793 0.503 0.846 
 
(1.569) (1.470) (1.301) (1.187) (1.204) (1.112) 
University and above 1.844 2.076 1.839 1.862 1.241 1.500 
 
(1.318) (1.290) (1.179) (1.110) (1.136) (1.051) 
Mother's education (none omit.) 
      Elementary -0.534 -0.417 -1.285 -1.203 -2.248* -2.058* 
 
(0.987) (1.024) (1.048) (1.039) (1.006) (1.002) 
Preparatory -1.225 -1.113 -2.148* -2.053* -2.715** -2.504** 
 
(0.990) (1.031) (1.035) (1.030) (0.971) (0.967) 
Secondary -0.358 -0.388 -1.574 -1.679 -1.944* -1.963* 
 
(0.905) (0.940) (0.967) (0.963) (0.919) (0.915) 
Diploma 0.550 0.531 -0.972 -1.078 -1.185 -1.302 
 
(0.998) (1.016) (1.077) (1.074) (1.018) (1.011) 
University and above -0.445 -0.666 -1.845 -2.077* -1.917 -2.122* 
 
(1.048) (1.059) (1.057) (1.045) (1.012) (1.001) 
Father's emp. status (none/absent 
omit.) 
      Wage worker -1.198 -1.196 -1.275* -1.282* -1.358* -1.328* 
 
(0.708) (0.635) (0.604) (0.558) (0.580) (0.539) 
Employer -1.024 -0.935 -1.158 -0.866 -1.305 -1.007 
 
(1.072) (0.969) (0.983) (0.910) (0.881) (0.805) 
Self-employed -1.068 -1.025 -1.123 -1.087 -1.423* -1.321* 
 
(0.873) (0.814) (0.783) (0.746) (0.698) (0.672) 
Mother's employment status 
(none omit.) 
      Wage worker 0.298 0.368 0.392 0.419 0.537 0.542 
 
(0.545) (0.535) (0.506) (0.482) (0.488) (0.467) 
Other work 1.757 1.911 1.881 2.213 1.584 1.779 
 
(2.033) (1.985) (1.979) (1.897) (1.795) (1.734) 
Father's occup. (professional 
omit.) 
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env.  and 
age/birth 
month 
Clerical 1.371 1.176 1.625* 1.358* 1.412 1.150* 
 
(0.946) (0.754) (0.811) (0.630) (0.719) (0.578) 
Sales 0.425 0.294 0.111 -0.031 -0.083 -0.173 
 
(0.706) (0.670) (0.694) (0.697) (0.605) (0.612) 
Agricultural 0.672 0.457 0.141 -0.250 0.404 0.037 
 
(0.852) (0.788) (0.790) (0.767) (0.776) (0.735) 
Household and domestic -0.230 0.063 -0.282 -0.159 0.301 0.332 
 
(1.213) (1.143) (1.112) (1.080) (0.947) (0.927) 
Services 0.599 0.714 0.584 0.484 0.762 0.680 
 
(0.690) (0.591) (0.591) (0.532) (0.518) (0.476) 
Skilled manual 0.800 0.771 0.630 0.499 0.929 0.766 
 
(0.626) (0.558) (0.552) (0.502) (0.498) (0.457) 
Unskilled manual 1.191 1.334 0.703 0.829 1.023 1.170 
 
(1.017) (0.946) (0.965) (0.968) (0.853) (0.866) 
Mother's occup. (professional 
omit.) 
      Other occupations -0.611 -0.612 -0.555 -0.767 -0.631 -0.778 
 
(0.964) (0.936) (0.927) (0.872) (0.849) (0.800) 
Rural 
  
-0.124 0.004 -0.030 0.038 
   
(0.342) (0.324) (0.329) (0.315) 
Area of residence 
      Balqa 
  
0.359 0.451 0.295 0.323 
   
(0.575) (0.540) (0.549) (0.505) 
Zarqa 
  
-0.151 -0.229 -0.459 -0.579 
   
(0.582) (0.540) (0.549) (0.508) 
Madaba 
  
0.485 0.650 0.352 0.400 
   
(0.515) (0.489) (0.503) (0.475) 
Irbid 
  
0.069 0.077 -0.218 -0.277 
   
(0.565) (0.552) (0.538) (0.522) 
Mafraq 
  
-0.986* -0.960* -0.905* -0.913* 
   
(0.496) (0.475) (0.438) (0.421) 
Jarash 
  
-0.879 -0.798 -0.813 -0.810 
   
(0.537) (0.501) (0.503) (0.468) 
Ajlun 
  
-0.501 -0.472 -0.655 -0.673 
   
(0.573) (0.582) (0.519) (0.529) 
Karak 
  
0.398 0.462 0.165 0.148 
   
(0.652) (0.616) (0.616) (0.579) 
Tafiela 
  
-0.292 -0.191 -0.415 -0.412 
   
(0.627) (0.604) (0.598) (0.577) 
Ma'an 
  
-1.245* -1.263* -0.981 -1.082* 
   
(0.544) (0.495) (0.501) (0.459) 
Aqaba 
  
-0.979 -1.027 -0.968 -1.024 
   
(0.679) (0.677) (0.660) (0.657) 
Camps 
  
-0.079 -0.130 -0.284 -0.251 
   
(0.499) (0.473) (0.475) (0.448) 
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0.236 0.325 0.505 0.576 
   
(0.520) (0.506) (0.449) (0.432) 
Female 
  
0.195 0.147 0.679* 0.636* 
   
(0.293) (0.277) (0.278) (0.264) 
Breastfeeding init. (never omit.) 
      Immediately 
  
1.321 1.613 0.523 0.816 
   
(1.056) (0.997) (0.960) (0.911) 
Within first hour 
  
0.558 0.931 -0.080 0.283 
   
(1.030) (0.916) (0.941) (0.833) 
One hour 
  
1.295 1.599 0.361 0.701 
   
(1.028) (0.926) (0.910) (0.834) 
2-24 hours 
  
1.369 1.617 0.445 0.699 
   
(0.948) (0.855) (0.856) (0.783) 
One day 
  
1.313 1.486 0.566 0.730 
   
(1.021) (0.931) (0.941) (0.869) 
Two days 
  
1.765 2.323* 1.092 1.596 
   
(1.092) (0.995) (1.011) (0.937) 
3 or more days 
  
0.666 0.912 0.199 0.354 
   
(1.010) (0.932) (0.912) (0.863) 
Other liquids within 3 days birth 
  
-0.838* -0.775* -0.585 -0.553 
   
(0.344) (0.334) (0.311) (0.298) 
Exclusively breastfed 
  
2.010** 2.034** 1.470* 1.578* 
   
(0.703) (0.762) (0.570) (0.625) 
Currently breastfed 
  
0.759* -0.173 0.501 -0.374 
   
(0.325) (0.350) (0.304) (0.339) 
Drank from bottle 
  
1.188*** 0.793* 1.022*** 0.676* 
   
(0.346) (0.326) (0.300) (0.283) 
Feeding frequency 
      Once 
  
0.797 0.759 0.689 0.561 
   
(0.603) (0.648) (0.624) (0.665) 
Twice 
  
1.458* 1.514* 1.463** 1.361* 
   
(0.589) (0.660) (0.541) (0.612) 
Three times 
  
1.042 1.244 0.922 0.987 
   
(0.574) (0.662) (0.523) (0.616) 
Four + 
  
0.812 0.900 0.878 0.882 
   
(0.622) (0.728) (0.567) (0.662) 
No. Foods 
      No. liquids 
  
-0.119 -0.052 -0.121 -0.064 
   
(0.183) (0.171) (0.169) (0.155) 
No. grains 
  
-0.090 0.025 -0.134 -0.038 
   
(0.192) (0.181) (0.177) (0.167) 
No. protein 
  
0.226 0.392* 0.196 0.339* 
   
(0.175) (0.173) (0.151) (0.150) 
No. fruits and vegs. 
  
-0.161 0.105 -0.102 0.129 
   
(0.238) (0.216) (0.184) (0.181) 
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env.  and 
age/birth 
month 
Diarrhea (none omit.) 
      Yes but gone 
  
0.115 -0.094 0.285 0.160 
   
(0.436) (0.385) (0.384) (0.334) 
Yes still 
  
-0.920* -1.283** -0.823 -1.109* 
   
(0.461) (0.467) (0.446) (0.452) 
Fever/Cough (none omit.) 
      Yes but gone 
  
-0.388 -0.341 -0.339 -0.263 
   
(0.822) (0.749) (0.828) (0.751) 
Yes still 
  
0.286 0.288 0.381 0.359 
   
(0.327) (0.315) (0.307) (0.296) 
Persons per room 
  
-0.042 -0.072 0.013 -0.073 
   
(0.168) (0.194) (0.171) (0.186) 
Cluster wealth 
      Average cluster wealth factor 
  
11.306*** 10.058** 10.106*** 8.394** 
   
(3.211) (3.394) (2.867) (2.981) 
Average cluster wealth factor 
sq./100 
  
-58.532*** -52.197** -51.319*** -42.639** 
   
(15.776) (16.697) (14.118) (14.742) 
Cluster share of households not 
flushing to sewer 
  
-2.397 -2.365 -1.591 -1.508 
   
(1.343) (1.215) (1.272) (1.144) 
Cluster water (bottled omit.) 
      Cluster share of households with 
water piped in and treated 
  
-4.690** -4.254** -3.786** -3.366* 
   
(1.546) (1.431) (1.383) (1.304) 
Cluster share of households with 
water piped in and not treated 
  
-0.828 -0.869 -0.497 -0.546 
   
(0.907) (0.922) (0.824) (0.841) 
Cluster share of households with 
other water source 
  
1.307 1.519 1.711 1.904* 
   
(1.003) (1.075) (0.906) (0.937) 
Household Sanitation (Sewer 
omit.) 
      Flush to latrine/other 
  
1.961 1.832 1.358 1.194 
   
(1.159) (1.053) (1.084) (0.982) 
Household Water (bottled omit.) 
      Piped to dwelling treated 
  
-0.049 -0.139 -0.018 -0.107 
   
(0.459) (0.411) (0.393) (0.362) 
Piped to dwelling not treated 
  
-0.434 -0.350 -0.468 -0.453 
   
(0.360) (0.350) (0.327) (0.315) 
Other 
  
-0.763 -0.862 -1.006 -1.137* 
   
(0.581) (0.567) (0.512) (0.493) 
Household members smoke 
  
-0.177 -0.207 -0.064 -0.057 
   
(0.280) (0.264) (0.253) (0.237) 
Mother smokes cigarettes 
  
-1.186 -0.764 -1.081* -0.753 
   
(0.670) (0.602) (0.549) (0.507) 
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env.  and 
age/birth 
month 
Mother smokes nargile 
  
0.372 0.310 0.001 -0.061 
   
(0.422) (0.429) (0.397) (0.398) 
Know TB is curable 
  
0.213 0.274 0.091 0.159 
   
(0.308) (0.280) (0.268) (0.240) 
Know of ORS 
  
-0.078 -0.059 0.102 0.023 
   
(0.455) (0.409) (0.451) (0.400) 
Exposure to family planning 
  
0.262 0.179 0.256 0.172 
   
(0.165) (0.160) (0.151) (0.142) 
Distance to health care 
problematic 
  
-0.048 -0.019 0.005 0.055 
   
(0.300) (0.279) (0.296) (0.265) 
Mother's age (15-19 omit.) 
      20-24 
    
0.019 0.461 
     
(0.645) (0.581) 
25-29 
    
-0.756 -0.074 
     
(0.608) (0.571) 
30-34 
    
-0.435 0.319 
     
(0.663) (0.614) 
35-39 
    
-0.584 0.056 
     
(0.697) (0.695) 
40-44 
    
-0.921 -0.214 
     
(0.732) (0.686) 
45-49 
    
-2.800* -2.136 
     
(1.357) (1.301) 
Mother's height (in centimeters) 
    
0.153*** 0.136*** 
     
(0.024) (0.022) 
Birth spacing (months) 
    
0.022** 0.023** 
     
(0.008) (0.007) 
First birth 
    
-0.147 -0.233 
     
(0.373) (0.360) 
Birth weight in kilograms 
    
1.774*** 1.848*** 
     
(0.218) (0.205) 
Birth weight in kilograms 
missing 
    
-4.967** -4.630*** 
     
(1.614) (1.335) 
Constant 72.982*** 73.074*** 25.783 30.996 1.593 11.461 
 
(3.854) (4.001) (16.243) (17.077) (15.465) (15.645) 
Age (months)  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
P-value (model) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N(Observations) 2111 2111 2111 2111 2111 2111 
R-squared 0.064 0.127 0.175 0.231 0.289 0.337 
Adj. R-squared 0.053 0.107 0.142 0.192 0.256 0.299 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 4.5. Regressions for Weight-for-age (in Kilograms as a 24-month Female), 
Youngest Child Under Two 



















      Wealth score 1.181** 0.884* 0.706 0.522 0.768 0.554 
 
(0.402) (0.383) (0.446) (0.437) (0.476) (0.463) 
Wealth score sq./100 -7.125** -4.907 -3.399 -2.148 -4.467 -2.989 
 
(2.721) (2.672) (3.074) (3.061) (3.374) (3.309) 
Father's education (none omit.) 
      Elementary 0.037 0.120 -0.150 -0.092 -0.085 0.028 
 
(0.362) (0.332) (0.302) (0.273) (0.300) (0.289) 
Preparatory 0.085 0.135 -0.138 -0.089 -0.128 -0.024 
 
(0.354) (0.326) (0.287) (0.259) (0.289) (0.282) 
Secondary 0.151 0.233 -0.067 -0.009 -0.144 -0.023 
 
(0.348) (0.317) (0.283) (0.256) (0.290) (0.281) 
Diploma 0.383 0.428 0.034 0.073 0.075 0.176 
 
(0.463) (0.408) (0.368) (0.330) (0.344) (0.333) 
University and above 0.255 0.300 0.047 0.063 -0.067 0.012 
 
(0.402) (0.373) (0.342) (0.316) (0.338) (0.331) 
Mother's education (none omit.) 
      Elementary 0.213 0.216 -0.023 -0.007 -0.250 -0.238 
 
(0.309) (0.308) (0.289) (0.290) (0.287) (0.280) 
Preparatory -0.329 -0.321 -0.501 -0.501 -0.592* -0.586* 
 
(0.301) (0.295) (0.300) (0.297) (0.292) (0.283) 
Secondary -0.167 -0.166 -0.390 -0.409 -0.483 -0.499 
 
(0.285) (0.277) (0.289) (0.286) (0.284) (0.276) 
Diploma 0.080 0.070 -0.225 -0.243 -0.280 -0.311 
 
(0.316) (0.307) (0.325) (0.323) (0.313) (0.306) 
University and above 0.096 0.046 -0.194 -0.245 -0.286 -0.363 
 
(0.340) (0.322) (0.314) (0.310) (0.309) (0.302) 
Father's emp. status (none/absent 
omit.) 
      Wage worker -0.395 -0.360 -0.308 -0.266 -0.412* -0.368 
 
(0.224) (0.216) (0.202) (0.199) (0.197) (0.195) 
Employer -0.362 -0.355 -0.294 -0.240 -0.453 -0.413 
 
(0.349) (0.319) (0.323) (0.300) (0.305) (0.280) 
Self-employed -0.407 -0.369 -0.328 -0.268 -0.501 -0.422 
 
(0.300) (0.299) (0.279) (0.275) (0.263) (0.261) 
Mother's employment status 
(none omit.) 
      Wage worker 0.089 0.163 0.154 0.193 0.202 0.244 
 
(0.200) (0.193) (0.172) (0.175) (0.169) (0.171) 
Other work 0.080 0.227 0.215 0.372 0.192 0.339 
 
(0.453) (0.496) (0.481) (0.510) (0.421) (0.457) 
Father's occup. (professional 
omit.) 
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env.  and 
age/birth 
month 
Clerical 0.280 0.227 0.232 0.179 0.208 0.155 
 
(0.274) (0.256) (0.230) (0.224) (0.198) (0.198) 
Sales 0.354 0.249 0.241 0.133 0.274 0.176 
 
(0.286) (0.266) (0.267) (0.262) (0.243) (0.241) 
Agricultural 0.048 0.091 -0.225 -0.223 -0.037 -0.015 
 
(0.334) (0.318) (0.324) (0.309) (0.312) (0.294) 
Household and domestic -0.088 -0.051 -0.239 -0.226 -0.053 -0.044 
 
(0.341) (0.318) (0.340) (0.326) (0.319) (0.313) 
Services 0.196 0.253 0.075 0.100 0.215 0.233 
 
(0.282) (0.258) (0.248) (0.230) (0.219) (0.207) 
Skilled manual 0.272 0.256 0.179 0.150 0.302 0.261 
 
(0.221) (0.204) (0.188) (0.184) (0.175) (0.175) 
Unskilled manual 0.261 0.291 0.133 0.157 0.259 0.270 
 
(0.311) (0.286) (0.266) (0.245) (0.243) (0.229) 
Mother's occup. (professional 
omit.) 
      Other occupations 0.220 0.153 0.178 0.113 0.109 0.062 
 
(0.352) (0.360) (0.364) (0.364) (0.338) (0.342) 
Rural 
  
-0.019 -0.005 0.002 0.003 
   
(0.114) (0.113) (0.111) (0.111) 
Area of residence 
      Balqa 
  
0.236 0.238 0.202 0.194 
   
(0.191) (0.183) (0.180) (0.170) 
Zarqa 
  
0.077 0.061 -0.015 -0.034 
   
(0.190) (0.179) (0.180) (0.169) 
Madaba 
  
0.227 0.239 0.170 0.158 
   
(0.185) (0.181) (0.178) (0.172) 
Irbid 
  
0.037 0.031 -0.058 -0.100 
   
(0.191) (0.191) (0.185) (0.184) 
Mafraq 
  
0.081 0.087 0.123 0.122 
   
(0.159) (0.159) (0.152) (0.152) 
Jarash 
  
0.032 0.037 0.057 0.038 
   
(0.212) (0.202) (0.205) (0.198) 
Ajlun 
  
0.301 0.313 0.253 0.258 
   
(0.223) (0.219) (0.217) (0.213) 
Karak 
  
0.320 0.349 0.224 0.246 
   
(0.212) (0.200) (0.210) (0.201) 
Tafiela 
  
0.246 0.270 0.218 0.228 
   
(0.256) (0.249) (0.245) (0.238) 
Ma'an 
  
-0.312 -0.304 -0.262 -0.252 
   
(0.208) (0.194) (0.180) (0.167) 
Aqaba 
  
0.286 0.238 0.299 0.234 
   
(0.240) (0.236) (0.251) (0.242) 
Camps 
  
0.050 0.011 0.003 -0.017 
   
(0.171) (0.165) (0.165) (0.159) 
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-0.070 -0.080 -0.005 -0.024 
   
(0.173) (0.171) (0.158) (0.155) 
Female 
  
-0.011 -0.004 0.158 0.166 
   
(0.105) (0.099) (0.101) (0.097) 
Breastfeeding init. (never omit.) 
      Immediately 
  
-0.211 -0.182 -0.547 -0.521 
   
(0.417) (0.406) (0.394) (0.382) 
Within first hour 
  
-0.432 -0.346 -0.632 -0.558 
   
(0.408) (0.379) (0.381) (0.358) 
One hour 
  
-0.173 -0.142 -0.514 -0.479 
   
(0.399) (0.378) (0.381) (0.363) 
2-24 hours 
  
-0.169 -0.178 -0.520 -0.527 
   
(0.388) (0.367) (0.373) (0.356) 
One day 
  
0.027 0.029 -0.335 -0.331 
   
(0.402) (0.384) (0.381) (0.368) 
Two days 
  
0.029 0.062 -0.299 -0.293 
   
(0.405) (0.386) (0.390) (0.375) 
3 or more days 
  
-0.421 -0.384 -0.586 -0.571 
   
(0.386) (0.371) (0.368) (0.355) 
Other liquids within 3 days birth 
  
-0.254 -0.230 -0.136 -0.128 
   
(0.131) (0.127) (0.115) (0.113) 
Exclusively breastfed 
  
0.883*** 0.702** 0.735** 0.579** 
   
(0.247) (0.246) (0.223) (0.209) 
Currently breastfed 
  
0.255* 0.116 0.191 0.072 
   
(0.124) (0.130) (0.115) (0.121) 
Drank from bottle 
  
0.295* 0.223* 0.235* 0.171 
   
(0.121) (0.113) (0.113) (0.107) 
Feeding frequency 
      Once 
  
-0.057 -0.061 -0.079 -0.084 
   
(0.199) (0.223) (0.179) (0.201) 
Twice 
  
0.148 0.062 0.194 0.091 
   
(0.230) (0.244) (0.200) (0.220) 
Three times 
  
-0.125 -0.224 -0.159 -0.267 
   
(0.260) (0.272) (0.231) (0.247) 
Four + 
  
-0.248 -0.323 -0.179 -0.258 
   
(0.258) (0.282) (0.225) (0.253) 
No. Foods 
      No. liquids 
  
0.023 0.041 0.021 0.037 
   
(0.067) (0.063) (0.063) (0.059) 
No. grains 
  
-0.016 -0.004 -0.039 -0.032 
   
(0.065) (0.064) (0.062) (0.059) 
No. protein 
  
0.152* 0.162* 0.129* 0.130* 
   
(0.064) (0.064) (0.059) (0.058) 
No. fruits and vegs. 
  
0.032 0.045 0.061 0.067 
   
(0.074) (0.077) (0.068) (0.073) 
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env.  and 
age/birth 
month 
Diarrhea (none omit.) 
      Yes but gone 
  
0.028 -0.051 0.080 0.017 
   
(0.157) (0.142) (0.151) (0.136) 
Yes still 
  
-0.370* -0.476** -0.322* -0.417* 
   
(0.163) (0.163) (0.161) (0.163) 
Fever/Cough (none omit.) 
      Yes but gone 
  
-0.005 -0.036 0.079 0.075 
   
(0.295) (0.296) (0.277) (0.284) 
Yes still 
  
0.091 0.119 0.105 0.134 
   
(0.123) (0.117) (0.120) (0.115) 
Persons per room 
  
0.036 0.009 0.018 -0.014 
   
(0.058) (0.058) (0.055) (0.055) 
Cluster wealth 
      Average cluster wealth factor 
  
3.813** 3.311* 3.350** 2.809* 
   
(1.316) (1.318) (1.297) (1.293) 
Average cluster wealth factor 
sq./100 
  
-19.580** -17.068** -16.989** -14.251* 
   
(6.479) (6.512) (6.454) (6.486) 
Cluster share of households not 
flushing to sewer 
  
-0.584 -0.506 -0.202 -0.122 
   
(0.376) (0.358) (0.348) (0.329) 
Cluster water (bottled omit.) 
      Cluster share of households with 
water piped in and treated 
  
-0.748 -0.701 -0.455 -0.437 
   
(0.536) (0.509) (0.505) (0.484) 
Cluster share of households with 
water piped in and not treated 
  
-0.194 -0.155 -0.146 -0.091 
   
(0.356) (0.351) (0.338) (0.326) 
Cluster share of households with 
other water source 
  
0.354 0.492 0.381 0.532 
   
(0.391) (0.377) (0.370) (0.354) 
Household Sanitation (Sewer 
omit.) 
      Flush to latrine/other 
  
0.854** 0.717* 0.528 0.395 
   
(0.311) (0.302) (0.286) (0.277) 
Household Water (bottled omit.) 
      Piped to dwelling treated 
  
-0.008 0.030 0.019 0.054 
   
(0.144) (0.145) (0.139) (0.141) 
Piped to dwelling not treated 
  
-0.148 -0.121 -0.175 -0.164 
   
(0.125) (0.120) (0.118) (0.116) 
Other 
  
-0.213 -0.239 -0.282 -0.324 
   
(0.235) (0.225) (0.212) (0.207) 
Household members smoke 
  
-0.006 -0.026 0.028 0.014 
   
(0.097) (0.098) (0.090) (0.090) 
Mother smokes cigarettes 
  
-0.108 -0.038 -0.108 -0.041 
   
(0.254) (0.232) (0.230) (0.212) 
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env.  and 
age/birth 
month 
Mother smokes nargile 
  
-0.001 -0.003 -0.074 -0.074 
   
(0.213) (0.211) (0.208) (0.207) 
Know TB is curable 
  
0.019 0.049 -0.032 0.004 
   
(0.105) (0.100) (0.098) (0.092) 
Know of ORS 
  
-0.303 -0.271 -0.302* -0.260 
   
(0.155) (0.147) (0.153) (0.145) 
Exposure to family planning 
  
0.082 0.067 0.080 0.062 
   
(0.063) (0.066) (0.059) (0.059) 
Distance to health care 
problematic 
  
-0.043 -0.052 -0.036 -0.046 
   
(0.115) (0.110) (0.109) (0.103) 
Mother's age (15-19 omit.) 
      20-24 
    
0.121 0.058 
     
(0.239) (0.239) 
25-29 
    
0.299 0.300 
     
(0.240) (0.245) 
30-34 
    
0.085 0.093 
     
(0.265) (0.265) 
35-39 
    
0.292 0.251 
     
(0.277) (0.280) 
40-44 
    
0.179 0.118 
     
(0.288) (0.297) 
45-49 
    
-0.969 -0.968 
     
(0.499) (0.593) 
Mother's height (in centimeters) 
    
0.031*** 0.027** 
     
(0.009) (0.008) 
Birth spacing (months) 
    
0.002 0.001 
     
(0.003) (0.003) 
First birth 
    
0.096 0.120 
     
(0.150) (0.147) 
Birth weight in kilograms 
    
0.759*** 0.774*** 
     
(0.078) (0.074) 
Birth weight in kilograms 
missing 
    
-1.127* -1.150* 
     
(0.539) (0.471) 
Constant 7.116*** 7.712*** -9.426 -6.559 -14.387* -10.611 
 
(1.340) (1.299) (6.389) (6.363) (6.218) (6.156) 
Age (months)  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
P-value (model) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N(Observations) 2111 2111 2111 2111 2111 2111 
R-squared 0.046 0.093 0.143 0.176 0.242 0.271 
Adj. R-squared 0.034 0.072 0.109 0.134 0.207 0.230 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
  200 
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Youngest Child Under Two 



















      Wealth score 0.345 0.180 0.413 0.271 0.406 0.253 
 
(0.388) (0.378) (0.420) (0.414) (0.429) (0.422) 
Wealth score sq./100 -2.266 -1.080 -2.403 -1.419 -2.300 -1.212 
 
(2.746) (2.710) (2.979) (2.949) (3.066) (3.024) 
Father's education (none omit.) 
      Elementary -0.170 -0.131 -0.299 -0.238 -0.247 -0.187 
 
(0.257) (0.256) (0.218) (0.214) (0.200) (0.200) 
Preparatory -0.084 -0.089 -0.262 -0.224 -0.199 -0.149 
 
(0.249) (0.249) (0.207) (0.204) (0.195) (0.196) 
Secondary -0.020 -0.006 -0.186 -0.159 -0.142 -0.112 
 
(0.249) (0.252) (0.206) (0.205) (0.198) (0.201) 
Diploma 0.094 0.060 -0.154 -0.159 -0.080 -0.068 
 
(0.306) (0.305) (0.248) (0.247) (0.228) (0.232) 
University and above -0.195 -0.218 -0.396 -0.389 -0.354 -0.342 
 
(0.290) (0.293) (0.247) (0.245) (0.232) (0.235) 
Mother's education (none omit.) 
      Elementary 0.444 0.429 0.445 0.432 0.451 0.413 
 
(0.283) (0.278) (0.251) (0.249) (0.248) (0.245) 
Preparatory -0.012 -0.012 0.076 0.051 0.119 0.074 
 
(0.234) (0.229) (0.232) (0.230) (0.232) (0.231) 
Secondary -0.066 -0.074 0.014 0.002 0.014 -0.014 
 
(0.226) (0.218) (0.227) (0.226) (0.225) (0.224) 
Diploma -0.004 -0.007 0.079 0.069 0.071 0.052 
 
(0.244) (0.237) (0.249) (0.248) (0.243) (0.242) 
University and above 0.279 0.263 0.322 0.306 0.262 0.215 
 
(0.254) (0.244) (0.247) (0.243) (0.248) (0.247) 
Father's emp. status (none/absent 
omit.) 
      Wage worker -0.071 -0.037 0.021 0.069 -0.054 -0.014 
 
(0.170) (0.173) (0.156) (0.158) (0.151) (0.152) 
Employer -0.119 -0.132 -0.032 -0.030 -0.141 -0.155 
 
(0.229) (0.240) (0.209) (0.222) (0.211) (0.219) 
Self-employed -0.158 -0.102 -0.047 0.032 -0.138 -0.055 
 
(0.213) (0.218) (0.197) (0.197) (0.191) (0.190) 
Mother's employment status 
(none omit.) 
      Wage worker -0.003 0.045 -0.003 0.030 0.007 0.046 
 
(0.190) (0.178) (0.188) (0.178) (0.182) (0.175) 
Other work -0.365 -0.248 -0.250 -0.168 -0.195 -0.094 
 
(0.247) (0.238) (0.283) (0.253) (0.279) (0.261) 
Father's occup. (professional 
omit.) 
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env.  and 
age/birth 
month 
Clerical -0.065 -0.071 -0.162 -0.162 -0.137 -0.139 
 
(0.254) (0.222) (0.221) (0.204) (0.206) (0.186) 
Sales 0.184 0.097 0.154 0.066 0.228 0.136 
 
(0.214) (0.213) (0.203) (0.205) (0.198) (0.199) 
Agricultural -0.197 -0.108 -0.353 -0.267 -0.236 -0.136 
 
(0.243) (0.236) (0.237) (0.227) (0.241) (0.234) 
Household and domestic -0.036 -0.088 -0.228 -0.239 -0.195 -0.191 
 
(0.313) (0.319) (0.335) (0.331) (0.326) (0.328) 
Services -0.038 -0.004 -0.159 -0.106 -0.075 -0.031 
 
(0.165) (0.158) (0.161) (0.153) (0.147) (0.140) 
Skilled manual 0.019 0.006 -0.025 -0.028 0.026 0.018 
 
(0.142) (0.144) (0.137) (0.143) (0.133) (0.138) 
Unskilled manual -0.127 -0.112 -0.133 -0.125 -0.099 -0.110 
 
(0.226) (0.250) (0.217) (0.251) (0.218) (0.245) 
Mother's occup. (professional 
omit.) 
      Other occupations 0.307 0.248 0.257 0.232 0.214 0.195 
 
(0.272) (0.280) (0.274) (0.272) (0.258) (0.261) 
Rural 
  
-0.016 -0.030 -0.015 -0.028 
   
(0.097) (0.094) (0.095) (0.092) 
Area of residence 
      Balqa 
  
0.167 0.153 0.150 0.143 
   
(0.150) (0.145) (0.149) (0.145) 
Zarqa 
  
0.111 0.115 0.101 0.111 
   
(0.130) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) 
Madaba 
  
0.080 0.042 0.067 0.033 
   
(0.152) (0.152) (0.150) (0.148) 
Irbid 
  
0.058 0.049 0.042 0.016 
   
(0.161) (0.159) (0.159) (0.155) 
Mafraq 
  
0.346** 0.344** 0.384** 0.383** 
   
(0.121) (0.118) (0.125) (0.122) 
Jarash 
  
0.262 0.250 0.278 0.262 
   
(0.158) (0.150) (0.157) (0.149) 
Ajlun 
  
0.468** 0.469** 0.468** 0.474** 
   
(0.165) (0.162) (0.167) (0.164) 
Karak 
  
0.272 0.285 0.244 0.269 
   
(0.191) (0.179) (0.191) (0.180) 
Tafiela 
  
0.326 0.333 0.338 0.356 
   
(0.217) (0.213) (0.216) (0.211) 
Ma'an 
  
0.014 0.028 0.002 0.038 
   
(0.174) (0.166) (0.168) (0.158) 
Aqaba 
  
0.484* 0.456* 0.509* 0.468* 
   
(0.204) (0.195) (0.207) (0.194) 
Camps 
  
0.082 0.042 0.085 0.047 
   
(0.146) (0.135) (0.142) (0.133) 
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-0.143 -0.171 -0.145 -0.179 
   
(0.126) (0.121) (0.128) (0.124) 
Female 
  
-0.029 -0.011 0.017 0.036 
   
(0.082) (0.079) (0.081) (0.079) 
Breastfeeding init. (never omit.) 
      Immediately 
  
-0.430 -0.472* -0.560* -0.604* 
   
(0.239) (0.230) (0.245) (0.236) 
Within first hour 
  
-0.414 -0.414 -0.450 -0.457 
   
(0.251) (0.239) (0.249) (0.241) 
One hour 
  
-0.372 -0.406 -0.476* -0.512* 
   
(0.231) (0.224) (0.238) (0.229) 
2-24 hours 
  
-0.369 -0.433* -0.483* -0.544* 
   
(0.212) (0.208) (0.219) (0.216) 
One day 
  
-0.119 -0.160 -0.282 -0.318 
   
(0.226) (0.215) (0.216) (0.210) 
Two days 
  
-0.250 -0.337 -0.399 -0.497* 
   
(0.272) (0.247) (0.260) (0.241) 
3 or more days 
  
-0.503 -0.501* -0.551* -0.544* 
   
(0.268) (0.252) (0.263) (0.250) 
Other liquids within 3 days birth 
  
0.015 0.016 0.064 0.057 
   
(0.100) (0.096) (0.095) (0.091) 
Exclusively breastfed 
  
0.364 0.148 0.343 0.131 
   
(0.265) (0.258) (0.259) (0.248) 
Currently breastfed 
  
0.148 0.185 0.152 0.196* 
   
(0.099) (0.099) (0.092) (0.095) 
Drank from bottle 
  
0.070 0.078 0.049 0.054 
   
(0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) 
Feeding frequency 
      Once 
  
-0.401* -0.351 -0.387* -0.318 
   
(0.196) (0.214) (0.191) (0.206) 
Twice 
  
-0.366 -0.415 -0.330 -0.361 
   
(0.200) (0.224) (0.193) (0.217) 
Three times 
  
-0.555* -0.645** -0.559** -0.630** 
   
(0.222) (0.241) (0.210) (0.229) 
Four + 
  
-0.594** -0.639** -0.551** -0.583* 
   
(0.212) (0.237) (0.200) (0.227) 
No. Foods 
      No. liquids 
  
0.061 0.064 0.061 0.062 
   
(0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.043) 
No. grains 
  
-0.003 -0.013 -0.015 -0.025 
   
(0.052) (0.048) (0.050) (0.046) 
No. protein 
  
0.093* 0.075* 0.078* 0.057 
   
(0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
No. fruits and vegs. 
  
0.038 0.004 0.051 0.016 
   
(0.065) (0.062) (0.064) (0.061) 
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env.  and 
age/birth 
month 
Diarrhea (none omit.) 
      Yes but gone 
  
-0.007 -0.036 -0.003 -0.035 
   
(0.089) (0.085) (0.092) (0.088) 
Yes still 
  
-0.197 -0.224 -0.174 -0.208 
   
(0.134) (0.127) (0.131) (0.124) 
Fever/Cough (none omit.) 
      Yes but gone 
  
0.005 -0.048 0.070 0.034 
   
(0.225) (0.226) (0.203) (0.208) 
Yes still 
  
0.000 0.024 -0.002 0.028 
   
(0.095) (0.091) (0.097) (0.091) 
Persons per room 
  
0.030 0.006 0.001 -0.015 
   
(0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.051) 
Cluster wealth 
      Average cluster wealth factor 
  
0.658 0.375 0.507 0.298 
   
(1.316) (1.291) (1.306) (1.319) 
Average cluster wealth factor 
sq./100 
  
-3.369 -1.967 -2.644 -1.592 
   
(6.609) (6.530) (6.580) (6.708) 
Cluster share of households not 
flushing to sewer 
  
0.088 0.157 0.240 0.303 
   
(0.241) (0.240) (0.238) (0.240) 
Cluster water (bottled omit.) 
      Cluster share of households with 
water piped in and treated 
  
0.426 0.382 0.511 0.446 
   
(0.362) (0.369) (0.359) (0.363) 
Cluster share of households with 
water piped in and not treated 
  
-0.050 -0.020 -0.074 -0.028 
   
(0.307) (0.300) (0.300) (0.287) 
Cluster share of households with 
other water source 
  
-0.100 0.015 -0.159 -0.030 
   
(0.419) (0.407) (0.403) (0.386) 
Household Sanitation (Sewer 
omit.) 
      Flush to latrine/other 
  
0.350 0.235 0.195 0.089 
   
(0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.199) 
Household Water (bottled omit.) 
      Piped to dwelling treated 
  
-0.053 0.004 -0.034 0.020 
   
(0.127) (0.122) (0.127) (0.124) 
Piped to dwelling not treated 
  
-0.015 -0.003 -0.038 -0.026 
   
(0.122) (0.114) (0.118) (0.110) 
Other 
  
-0.023 -0.034 -0.030 -0.049 
   
(0.239) (0.221) (0.234) (0.215) 
Household members smoke 
  
0.039 0.023 0.045 0.024 
   
(0.087) (0.085) (0.083) (0.080) 
Mother smokes cigarettes 
  
0.182 0.170 0.171 0.176 
   
(0.180) (0.179) (0.186) (0.181) 
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env.  and 
age/birth 
month 
Mother smokes nargile 
  
-0.084 -0.086 -0.065 -0.065 
   
(0.182) (0.172) (0.179) (0.170) 
Know TB is curable 
  
-0.041 -0.025 -0.069 -0.050 
   
(0.095) (0.091) (0.094) (0.090) 
Know of ORS 
  
-0.300* -0.260 -0.334* -0.264* 
   
(0.136) (0.137) (0.132) (0.131) 
Exposure to family planning 
  
0.020 0.023 0.019 0.019 
   
(0.051) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) 
Distance to health care 
problematic 
  
-0.031 -0.043 -0.034 -0.051 
   
(0.091) (0.084) (0.088) (0.082) 
Mother's age (15-19 omit.) 
      20-24 
    
0.101 -0.046 
     
(0.201) (0.216) 
25-29 
    
0.402* 0.257 
     
(0.203) (0.220) 
30-34 
    
0.133 -0.019 
     
(0.216) (0.229) 
35-39 
    
0.369 0.194 
     
(0.219) (0.234) 
40-44 
    
0.453 0.247 
     
(0.251) (0.269) 
45-49 
    
-0.185 -0.354 
     
(0.343) (0.440) 
Mother's height (in centimeters) 
    
-0.007 -0.007 
     
(0.008) (0.007) 
Birth spacing (months) 
    
-0.004 -0.005* 
     
(0.002) (0.002) 
First birth 
    
0.133 0.171 
     
(0.137) (0.135) 
Birth weight in kilograms 
    
0.292*** 0.290*** 
     
(0.076) (0.073) 
Birth weight in kilograms 
missing 
    
-0.044 -0.140 
     
(0.336) (0.336) 
Constant 10.697*** 11.114*** 7.312 9.244 8.268 10.091 
 
(1.265) (1.263) (5.928) (5.943) (6.208) (6.338) 
Age (months)  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
P-value (model) 0.320 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N(Observations) 2111 2111 2111 2111 2111 2111 
R-squared 0.023 0.077 0.097 0.138 0.127 0.168 
Adj. R-squared 0.011 0.056 0.061 0.094 0.087 0.120 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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Total inequality 0.00133*** 0.00865*** 0.00541*** 0.00133*** 0.00865*** 0.00541*** 0.00133*** 0.00865*** 0.00541*** 
 (0.0000799) (0.000536) (0.000292) (0.0000834) (0.000527) (0.000289) (0.0000800) (0.000552) (0.000281) 
 
         Residual inequality 0.00124*** 0.00828*** 0.00529*** 0.00115*** 0.00754*** 0.00501*** 0.000987*** 0.00667*** 0.00486*** 
 (0.0000770) (0.000529) (0.000284) (0.0000793) (0.000474) (0.000279) (0.0000638) (0.000433) (0.000265) 
 
         Inequality of 
opportunity (share 
of total inequality) 0.0641** 0.0427** 0.0209 0.136*** 0.129*** 0.0733** 0.258*** 0.229*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0162) (0.0120) (0.0306) (0.0239) (0.0241) (0.0283) (0.0251) (0.0273) 
Inequality of op. 
partial effects 
(share of total 
Inequality) 
         Parent's education 0.0300* 0.0188 0.0151 0.0180 0.0131 0.0139 0.0191 0.00883 0.0123 
 (0.0131) (0.0117) (0.00950) (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0105) (0.0129) (0.0121) (0.0116) 
 
         Wealth and 
employment  0.0456* 0.0307* 0.00634 0.0423* 0.0320 0.00328 0.0196 0.0246 0.00326 
 (0.0214) (0.0155) (0.00992) (0.0205) (0.0163) (0.0131) (0.0246) (0.0161) (0.0135) 
 
         Gender 
   
0.000571 -0.0000316 0.0000325 -0.00157 -0.00175 -0.000383 
 
   
(0.00303) (0.00222) (0.00194) (0.00473) (0.00345) (0.00201) 
 
         Area of residence  
  
0.00670 0.00596 0.00773 0.000595 0.00315 0.00821 
 
   
(0.0109) (0.00879) (0.00814) (0.0116) (0.00802) (0.00788) 




























         Food 
   
0.0140 0.0413* 0.0189 0.0118 0.0338 0.0145 
 
   
(0.0227) (0.0161) (0.0213) (0.0194) (0.0178) (0.0219) 
 
         Health knowledge  
  
0.00748 0.00396 0.00365 0.00694 0.00302 0.00338 
 
   
(0.00748) (0.00555) (0.00476) (0.00694) (0.00552) (0.00505) 
 
         Health conditions  
  
0.00328 0.00349 0.00154 0.00457 0.00372 0.00139 
 
   
(0.00621) (0.00609) (0.00438) (0.00621) (0.00548) (0.00469) 
 
         Health environment  
  
0.0513* 0.0238 0.0131 0.0537* 0.0277 0.0133 
 
   
(0.0242) (0.0194) (0.0148) (0.0219) (0.0171) (0.0136) 
 
         Mother's 
demographics  
     
0.0741*** 0.0207 0.00783 
 
      
(0.0176) (0.0124) (0.0107) 
 
         Birth weight  
     
0.112*** 0.120*** 0.0157 
 
      
(0.0231) (0.0207) (0.00925) 
 
         N 2111 2111 2111 2111 2111 2111 2111 2111 2111 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Jordan DHS 2012. 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Clustered bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.




The human development of individuals, especially their health, skills, education, 
and labor market participation, crucially shapes opportunities and outcomes throughout 
their lives. Individuals weigh a number of different factors when making decisions about 
human development. For instance, in considering whether to go to school or drop out and 
get an apprenticeship, young people and their families must consider the likely costs and 
benefits of each of their options. As this dissertation has demonstrated, these options are 
defined and constrained by the context in which individuals live, historical factors, and 
current policies. For example, in Egypt, the option of vocational secondary education has 
become substantially devalued as public sector employment opportunities have declined 
and formal, well-paid private sector jobs have remained scarce. Thus, human 
development is constrained by limited economic development and the policies and 
history of the education system. At the same time, human development is also a driver of 
economic development (Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, & Miller, 2004; Sen, 1999; Suri, 
Boozer, Ranis, & Stewart, 2011). The intertwined relationship between economic and 
human development makes understanding their interlinked complexities, such as why 
socio-economic status affects children’s nutrition, critically important.  
The MENA region in particular faces a number of unique human and economic 
development challenges (Chaaban, 2009; Salehi-Isfahani, 2013; United Nations 
Development Programme Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2009; World Bank, 2012). 
Education levels have risen rapidly, but without the expected benefits of education, 
leading to a disconnect that has contributed to uprisings and turmoil in the region 
(Campante & Chor, 2012). Gender inequality is a major problem in the region, 
particularly in regards to women’s ability to participate in the labor market (World Bank, 
2013a, 2013c). Sharp disparities and unequal opportunities for human development arise 
early in life and shape the lifecourse (El-Kogali & Krafft, 2015; Krafft & El-Kogali, 
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2014). This dissertation has investigated some of the causes and consequences of these 
human development challenges in MENA in order to provide insight into how to promote 
both human and economic development in the region.  
In the first essay, the assumption that formal secondary schooling is the best route 
to job skills was tested in Egypt. Specifically, the returns to a vocational secondary 
education were compared to alternative routes to skills acquisition, such as undertaking 
an apprenticeship to become a craftsman. The essay demonstrated that for recent 
generations, the returns to a vocational secondary education were the same as obtaining 
no formal degree, that is, zero. In contrast, skills acquired elsewhere, particularly 
becoming an apprentice and ultimately a craftsman, had substantial returns, even for 
youth. These results held even after addressing endogeneity using within-family 
estimation (comparing siblings with family fixed effects).  
The findings of the first essay provide a number of important insights for 
education research and policy. The literature on the returns to schooling is large enough 
for meta-analyses (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004), as is the literature on how to 
improve learning and school performance in developing countries (Glewwe, Hanushek, 
Humpage, & Ravina, 2013; Kremer, Brannen, & Glennerster, 2013; McEwan, 2014). The 
literature on other, non-school routes to acquiring job skills (including training and 
apprenticeships) is fragmentary and meager in comparison (Frazis & Loewenstein, 2005; 
Wolter & Ryan, 2011). Alternative routes to human capital other than formal schooling 
should be evaluated in other contexts to identify where, when, and potentially why 
different routes to human capital formation may be more or less valuable. One important 
reason that the returns to becoming a craftsman are more durable in Egypt than the 
returns to vocational secondary education may be the role of the market in the 
apprenticeship system. While vocational secondary education trains students essentially 
regardless of labor demand, craftsmen are very unlikely to take on apprentices without 
work for them to do. Thus, providing general skills in the education system and job skills 
directly through training in the labor market may be a better policy approach. 
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In the second essay, it was demonstrated that fertility has risen recently in Egypt. 
Whether declining employment opportunities for women, and therefore decreasing 
opportunity costs of childbearing, contributed to the recent rise in fertility was then 
investigated. Using discrete-time hazard models variously incorporating instrumental 
variables and fixed effects, the essay demonstrated that declining employment for women 
did increase their chances of childbearing. Although the magnitude of the resulting 
fertility simulations suggests that declining opportunities are unlikely to be the only 
factor contributing to the recent rise in fertility, this result demonstrates how economic 
forces can reverse the fertility transition. The findings are also a lesson in the unintended 
consequences of economic policies. Structural adjustment programs in Egypt, which 
reduced public sector employment opportunities, increased fertility. 
Increasing public sector employment is not a viable policy solution to addressing 
the social and economic challenges posed by rising fertility. However, the fertility 
consequences of women’s non-participation should be taken as yet another reason to 
work towards providing women with better labor market opportunities in the private 
sector in Egypt. Given their substantial domestic work burdens, private sector work and 
its longer hours are difficult to reconcile with family life for women (Assaad & Krafft, 
2014, 2015c). Harassment and difficulties with childcare and transportation are also 
obstacles to women’s participation in the labor market (Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Nassar, 
2003; World Bank, 2013c). Addressing some of these obstacles, as well as encouraging 
alternative work-at-home or part-time private sector employment could help women 
reconcile work and family responsibilities (Krafft & Assaad, 2015). Additionally, 
although evidence demonstrates a rise in desired fertility, there remains unmet need for 
family planning that should be rapidly addressed in Egypt (Ministry of Health and 
Population, El-Zanaty and Associates, & ICF International, 2015). There is also a clear 
need for further research, especially qualitative research, on why families have increased 
their desired fertility. For instance, are additional children a hedge against old-age 
poverty as access to pensions has declined?  
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The third essay of the dissertation investigated the mediators of child health 
disparities in Jordan. Jordan is notable as the one country in the MENA region where at 
least the best-off have healthy growth (El-Kogali & Krafft, 2015). Yet the poorest 
children have growth that resembles the typical growth-faltering profile in low-income 
countries (Shrimpton, Victora, de Onis, et al., 2001; Victora, de Onis, Hallal, Blössner, & 
Shrimpton, 2010). The findings demonstrated that, as well as substantial disparities in 
child health not related to socio-economic disparities, prenatal factors (especially birth 
weight and mother’s height) drive inequalities. Although the health environment and 
feeding practices also contribute to inequality, the results show a disproportionate role of 
development before children are even born.  
The current landscape of nutrition policy is at odds with the findings of prenatal 
factors being disproportionately important. Policies and programs tend to emphasize the 
post-natal environment, including breastfeeding, the introduction of solid foods, health 
knowledge, and behaviors such as hand-washing (Bhutta, Ahmed, Black, et al., 2008; 
Black, Victora, Walker, et al., 2013; Horton, Shekar, McDonald, Mahal, & Brooks, 2010; 
World Bank, 2006, 2010). The results of the third essay suggest that these issues, at least 
in Jordan, are of secondary importance. Policies and programs should shift towards 
targeting pregnant mothers, prenatal growth, and birth weights, areas where there is a 
clear need for further research on costs, benefits, and optimal program design (Horton, 
Shekar, McDonald, Mahal, & Brooks, 2010; World Bank, 2006), especially in contrast to 
the post-natal literature.  
While the essays in this dissertation provide important insight into specific human 
development issues in the MENA region, the findings share some common characteristics 
that merit broader consideration within development economics. Foremost is the 
importance of identifying and questioning assumptions, such as that school is the best 
route to skills or that nutrition policies should target children once they start to eat. The 
essays also demonstrate the importance of understanding the institutions and policies that 
are the context for individuals’ and households’ decision-making. Understanding rising 
fertility or falling returns to education in Egypt requires knowledge of the long history of 
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a multitude of economic and social forces. The contradictory findings of the literature on 
what works in education in developing countries (Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, & 
Ravina, 2013; Kremer, Brannen, & Glennerster, 2013; McEwan, 2014) are an example of 
how context matters and how programs’ and policies’ impacts can vary widely. The 
essays also point to a number of important avenues for future research, such as evaluating 
nutrition policies targeting pregnancy and prenatal development. Although the goal of 
these essays is to contribute to the literature on the microeconomics of development in 
the Middle East and North Africa, this contribution will be valuable only if it is built on 
by future work.  
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